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Small UAVs will be used with growing frequency in the near future for military 
operations. As SUAVs progress from being novelties and toys to becoming full members 
of the military arsenal, their reliability and availability must begin to approach the levels 
expected of military systems. They currently miss those levels by a wide margin. 
The military has wide experience with the need for reliability improvement in 
systems, and in fact developed or funded the development of many of the methods 
discussed in this thesis. These methods have not yet been applied to SUAVs. 
The projection of reliability experience from manned piloted aviation to UAVs 
has led to overestimation of the UAV reliability. Real and urgent operational demands in 
the Persian Gulf, Kosovo, and Afghanistan have highlighted the very low levels of 
reliability of UAVs compared to manned air vehicles. 
To make a decision, one needs analytical support. Analytical support requires 
models. Models require good data. Good data requires systems to collect and archive it 
for easy retrieval. When I began this thesis, I thought that good data on SUAV reliability 
would be easily available for analysis. I was mistaken. That is why the majority of this 
thesis has discussed data collection systems and argued that some (but not all) need to be 
applied to SUAVs. For ease of implementation, we adapted forms from commercial use 
for FMECA and FRACAS systems for SUAVs, and constructed a very detailed FTA for 
a typical SUAV. This work is more typical of a reliability engineering thesis, but was 
necessary to enable any operational analysis. 
With the existing crude data on one UAV system, I was able to perform a crude 
analysis using a reliability growth model based on Duane’s postulate. With good data, the 
Navy will be able to do much more, as outlined in the thesis. 
The DoD Reliability Primer is currently under extensive revision. In the 
meantime, this thesis can serve as a survey of the reliability methods that are applicable 
to SUAVs and as template for the implementation of FMECA, FTA, and FRACAS 
 xx
methods for reliability improvement for SUAVs. As with all surveys, it has depended on 
the work of the original authors, which I have borrowed liberally and documented 
extensively. The adaptation of these methods for SUAVs is the original contribution of 
this thesis. 
I observed developmental tests of SUAVs in the course of writing this thesis. I 
can personally attest that no appropriate methods of data collection, archival, or analysis 
are currently being used, and that these methods are desperately needed by the SUAV 
community if it is to progress beyond the novelty stage. I strongly recommend their 
adoption by NAVAIR. 
This thesis makes an initial examination of the real problem of SUAV reliability. 
Primarily it is a qualitative approach, which illuminates some of the problem’s aspects. 
Collecting real data from SUAV systems will formulate reliability databases. 
Quantitative reliability analysis may then follow and result in detailed information about 
reliability improvement, but only if the collection systems outlined here are implemented 





A. BACKGROUND (UAVS, SUAVS) 
1. UAV – Small UAV 
One hundred years after the Wright brothers’ first successful airplane flight, 
aircraft have been proven invaluable in combat. Unfortunately, airplanes have also 
contributed to the loss of operator life. Many pilots have been killed attempting to 
accomplish their mission, to become better pilots, and to test new technologies. The 
development of uninhabited or unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) raises the possibility of 
more efficient, secure, and cost effective military operations.1 
The UAV puts eyes out there in places we don’t want to risk 
having a manned vehicle operate. Sometimes it’s very dull, but necessary 
work—flying a pattern for surveillance or reconnaissance. UAVs can go 
into a dirty environment where there’s the threat of exposure to nuclear, 
chemical or biological warfare. They are also sent into dangerous 
environments—battle zones: Dull, Dirty, Dangerous. The primary reason 
for the UAV is the Three D’s.2 
The history of UAVs started in 1883 when Douglas Archibald attached an 
anemometer to the line of a kite. Archibald managed to obtain differential measures of 
wind velocity at altitudes up to 1,200 feet. In 1888, Arthur Batat made the first aerial 
photograph in France, after installing a camera on a kite. The first use of UAVs built for 
military purposes was during WWII by the Germans. The well-known flying bombs V-I 
and V-II showed that unmanned aircraft could launch against targets and create a 
destructive effect. In the 1950s, the US developed the Snark. It was an unmanned 
intercontinental range aircraft designed to supplement Strategic Air Command’s manned 
bombers against the Soviet Union. Snark, V-I and V-II destroyed themselves as they hit 
their targets. In fact, these were early versions of today’s cruise and ballistic missiles.3 
                                                 
1 Clade, Lt Col, USAF, “Unmanned Aerial Vehicles: Implications for Military Operations,” July 2000, 
Occasional Paper No. 16 Center for Strategy and Technology, Air War College, Air University, Maxwell 
Air Force Base. 
2 Riebeling, Sandy, Redstone Rocket Article, Volume 51, No.28, “Unmanned Aerial Vehicles,” July 
17, 2002, Col. Burke John, Unmanned Aerial Vehicle Systems project manager, Internet, February 2004. 
Available at: http://www.tuav.redstone.army.mil/rsa_article.htm 
3 Carmichael, Bruce W., Col (Sel), and others, “Strikestar 2025,” Chapter 2, “Historical Development 
and Employment,” August 1996, Department of Defense, Internet, February 2004. Available at: 
http://www.au.af.mil/au/2025/volume3/chap13/v3c13-2.htm 
2 
In the US, the need to perform reconnaissance (RECCE) missions by UAVs came 
after the realization that these missions are extremely dangerous and mentally fatiguing 
for the pilot. The U2 Dragon Lady planes used to be the state-of-the-art platforms for 
RECCE missions. They were slow, with a maximum speed of 0.6 Mach, and cruised at 
an altitude between 70 and 90,000 feet.4 In May 1960 the Soviets captured a U2 plane. 
The pilot, Gary Powers, confessed to the black bird program, created by President 
Eisenhower to monitor the development of Soviet intercontinental ballistic missiles after 
the launch of Sputnik-I. The U2 flights over Russia were suspended. Spy satellites filled 
their gap. In 1962, another U2 was hit by a Soviet anti-air missile while on a RECCE 
mission in Cuba. The pilot was killed in the crash. As a result of these incidents, the first 
unmanned RECCE “drone”, the AQM-34 Lighting Bug, was made by the Ryan 
Aeronautical Company in 1964. The term “drone” became slang among military 
personnel for early-unmanned vehicles. It was a byword of the DH.82B Queen Bee, 
which was a dummy target for anti-aircraft gunner training.5 
The Lightning Bug was based on the earlier Fire Bee. It operated from 1964 until 
April 1975, performing a total of 3,435 flight hours in RECCE missions that were too 
dangerous for manned aircraft, especially during the Vietnam War. Some of its most 
valuable contributions were photographing prisoner camps in Hanoi and Cuba, providing 
photographic evidence of SA-2 missiles in North Vietnam, providing low-altitude battle 
assessment after B-52 raids, and acting as a tactical air launched decoy.6 
In 1962, Lockheed Martin began developing the D-21 supersonic RECCE drone, 
the Tagboard. It was designed to be launched from either the back of a two-seat A-12, 
which was under development at the same time, or from the wing of a B-52H. The drone 
could fly at speeds greater than 3.3 Mach, at altitudes above 90,000 feet and had a range 
                                                 
4 The Global Aircraft Organization, US Reconnaissance, “U-2 Dragon Lady,” Internet, February 2004. 
Available at: http://www.globalaircraft.org/planes/u-2_dragon_lady.pl 
5 Clark, Richard M., Lt Col, USAF, “Uninhabited Combat Aerial Vehicles, Airpower by the People, 
For the People, But Not with the People,” CADRE Paper No. 8, Air University Press, Maxwell Air Force 




of 3,000 miles. The project was canceled in 1971 together with the A-12 development 
due to numerous failures, high cost of operations, and bad management.7 
In addition to the RECCE role, Teledyne Ryan experimented with strike versions 
of the BQM-34 drone, the Tomcat. They investigated the possibility of arming the 
Lightning Bug with Maverick electro-optical-seeking missiles or electro-optically-guided 
bombs Stubby Hobo. Favorable results were demonstrated in early 1972 but the armed 
drones were never used during the Vietnam War. Interest in the UAVs was fading by the 
end of the Vietnam War.8 
In the 1973 Yom Kippur War, the Israelis used UAVs effectively as decoys to 
draw antiaircraft fire away from attacking manned aircraft. In 1982, UAVs were used to 
obtain the exact location of air defenses and gather electronic intelligence information in 
Lebanon and Syria. The Israelis also used UAVs to monitor airfield activities,  changing 
strike plans accordingly.9 
2. The Pioneer RQ-210 
The US renewed its interest in UAVs in the late 1980s and early 90s, with the 
start of the Gulf War. Instead of developing one from scratch, the US acquired and 
improved the Scout, which was used by the Israelis in 1982 against the Syrians. The 
outcome was the Pioneer, which was bought by the Navy to provide cheap unmanned 
over the horizon targeting (OTHT), RECCE, and battle assessment. The Army and 
Marines bought the Pioneer for similar roles and six Pioneer systems were deployed to 
SW Asia for Desert Storm. 
Compared to the Lightning Bug, the Pioneer is slower, larger, and lighter, but 
cheaper. The average cost of the platform was only $850K, which was inexpensive 
relative to the cost of a manned RECCE aircraft. 11 With its better sensor technology, the 




10 The material of this section is taken (in some places verbatim) from GlobalSecurity.org, “Pioneer 
Short Range (SR) UAV,” maintained by John Pike, last modified: November 20, 2002, Internet, May 2004. 
Available at: http://www.globalssecurity.org/intell/systems/pioneer.htm 
11 National Air and Space Museum, Smithsonian Institution, “Pioneer RQ-2A,” 1998-2000, revised 
9/14/01 Connor R. and Lee R. E., Internet, May 2004. Available at: http://www.nasm.si.edu/research 
/aero/aircraft/pioneer.htm 
4 
Pioneer can deliver real-time battlefield assessment in video stream, a huge improvement 
compared to the film processing required for the Lightning Bugs. 
By 2000, after 15 years of operations, the Pioneer had logged more than 20,000 
flight hours. Apart from Desert Storm it was used in Desert Shield, in Bosnia, Haiti, 
Somalia, and for other peacekeeping missions. The Navy used the Pioneer to monitor the 
Kuwait and Iraqi coastline and to provide spotting services for every 16-inch round fired 
by its battleships. 
Pioneer can give detailed information about a local position to a battalion 
commander. Joint force commanders wanted to see a bigger, continuous picture of the 
battlefield, but space-based and manned-airborne RECCE platforms could not satisfy 
their demand for continuous situational awareness information. In response to that need 
and in addition to tactical UAVs (TUAVs) like the Pioneer, the US began to develop a 
family of endurance UAVs.  
Three different platforms compose the endurance UAV family: Predator, Global 
Hawk, and Dark Star. 
a. The Predator RQ-112 
Predator is a by-product of the CIA-developed Gnat 750, also known as 
the TierII or medium altitude endurance (MAE) UAV. It is manufactured by General 
Atomics Aeronautical Systems and costs about $3.2M to $4.5M per platform.13 Its 
endurance was designed to be greater than 40 hours with a cruising speed of 110 knots 
and operational speed of 75 knots using a reciprocating engine with a 25,000-foot ceiling 
and 450-pound payload. Predator can carry electro-optical (EO) and infrared (IR) 
sensors. It also collects full-rate video imagery and transmits it in near real-time via 
satellite, other UAVs, manned aircraft or line-of-sight (LOS) data link. More importantly, 
Predator is highly programmable. It can go from autonomous flight to manual control by 
a remote pilot. 
                                                 
12 The material for this section is taken (in some places verbatim) from: Carmichael. 
13 Ciufo, Chris A., “UAVs:New Tools for the Military Toolbox,” [66] COTS Journal, June 2003, 
Internet, May 2004. Available at: http://www.cotsjournalonline.com/2003/66 
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Except for Pioneer, Predator is the most tested and commonly used UAV. It was 
first deployed to Bosnia in 1994, next in the Afghan War of 2001, and then in the Iraqi 
war of 2003. 
Used as a low altitude UAV, Predator can perform almost the same tasks as 
Pioneer: surveillance, RECCE, combat assessment, force protection, and close air 
support. It can also be equipped with two laser-guided Hellfire missiles for direct hits at 
moving or stationary targets. During operation Enduring Freedom in Afghanistan, 
Predators were considered invaluable to the troops for scouting around the next bend of 
the road or over the hill for hidden Taliban forces. 
Used as a high altitude UAV, the Predator can perform surveillance over a wide 
area for up to 30 to 45 hours. In Operation Iraqi Freedom, Predators were deployed near 
Baghdad to attract hostile fire from the city’s anti-air defense systems. Once the locations 
of these defense systems were revealed, manned airplanes eliminated the targets. 
b. The Global Hawk RQ-414 
A TierII+ aircraft, Global Hawk is a conventional high-altitude endurance 
(CHAE) UAV by Teledyne Ryan Aeronautical. A higher performance vehicle, it was 
designed to fulfill a post-Desert Storm requirement for high resolution RECCE of a 
40,000 square nautical mile area in 24 hours. It can fly for more than 40 hours and over 
3,000 miles away from its launch and recovery base carrying a synthetic aperture radar 
(SAR) and an EO/IR payload of 2,000 pounds at altitudes above 60,000 feet at a speed of 
340 knots. The cost of a Global Hawk is about $57M per unit.15 
c. The Dark Star RQ-316 
The Tier III stealth or low observable high altitude endurance (LOHAE) 
RQ-3 UAV was the Lockheed-Martin/Boeing Dark Star. Its primary purpose was to 
image well-protected, high-value targets. Capable of operating for more than eight hours 
at altitudes above 45,000 feet and a distance of 500 miles from its launch base, it was 
designed to meet a $10M per platform unit cost. Its first flight occurred in March 1996; 
                                                 
14 The material for this section is taken (in some places verbatim) from: Carmichael. 
15 Ciufo.  
16 The material for this section is taken (in some places verbatim) from: Carmichael. 
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however, a second flight in April 1996 crashed due to incorrect aerodynamic modeling of 
the vehicle flight-control laws. The project was cancelled in 1999.17  
For the characterization code RQ-3 the "R" is the Department of Defense 
designation for reconnaissance; "Q" means unmanned aircraft system. The "3" refers to it 
being the third of a series of purpose-built unmanned reconnaissance aircraft systems.18  
3. RQ-5 Hunter19 
Initially engaged to serve as the Army’s short range UAV system for division and 
corps commanders at a cost of $1.2M per unit,20 the RQ-5 Hunter can carry a 200 lb load 
for more than 11 hours. It uses an electro-optical infrared (EO/IR) sensor, and relays its 
video images in real-time via a second airborne Hunter over a line-of-site (LOS) data 
link. It deployed to Kosovo in 1999 to support NATO operations. Production was 
cancelled in 1999 but the remaining low-rate initial production (LRIP) platforms remain 
in service for training and experimental purposes. Hunter is to be replaced by the Shadow 
200 or RQ-7 tactical UAV (TUAV). 
4. RQ-7 Shadow 20021 
The Army selected the RQ-7 Shadow 200 in December 1999 as the close range 
UAV for support to ground maneuver commanders. It can be launched by the use of a 
catapult rail and recovered with the aid of arresting gear, and remain at least four hours 
on station with a payload of 60 lbs. 
5. RQ-8 Fire Scout22 
The RQ-8 Fire Scout is a vertical take-off and landing (VTOL) tactical UAV 
(VTUAV). It can remain on station for at least three hours at 110 knots with a payload of 
200 lb. Its scouting equipment consists of an EO/IR sensor with an integral laser 
                                                 
17 GlobalSecurity.org, “RQ-3 Dark Star Tier III Minus,” maintained by John Pike, last modified: 
November 20, 2002, Internet, May 2004. Available at: Available at: http://www.globalsecurity.org 
/intell/systems/darkstar.htm 
18 Ibid. 
19 The material for this section is taken (in some places verbatim) from: Office of the Secretary of 
Defense (OSD), “Unmanned Aerial Vehicles Roadmap 2000-2025,” April 2001, page 4. 
20 Ciufo. 
21 The material for this section is taken (in some places verbatim) from: OSD 2001, page 5. 
22 The material for this section is taken (in some places verbatim) from: OSD 2001, page 5. 
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designator rangefinder. Data is relayed to its ground or ship control station in real time 
over a LOS data link and a UHF backup that could operate from all air capable ships. 
6. Residual UAVs Systems23 
The US military maintains the residual of several UAV programs that are not 
current programs for development but have recently deployed with operational units and 
trained operators. BQM-147, Exdrones, is an 80-lb delta wing communications jammer 
and was deployed during the Gulf War. From 1997 to 1998 some of them were rebuilt 
and named Dragon Drone and deployed with Marine Expeditionary units. Air Force 
Special Operations Command and Army Air Maneuver Battle Lab are also conducting 
experiments with Exdrones. 
Some hand-launched, battery powered FQM-151 Pointers have been acquired by 
the Marines and the Army since 1989 and were employed in the Gulf War. Pointers 
performed as test platforms for various miniaturized sensors and have performed 
demonstrations with the Drug Enforcement Agency, National Guard and Special 
Operations Forces. 
7. Conceptual Research UAV Systems24 
The various service laboratories have developed a number of UAVs to research 
special operational needs and concepts. The Marine Corps Warfighting Laboratory is 
exploring three such concepts. The Dragon Warrior or Cypher II is intended to fly over 
the shore on fixed-wing mode flight and then, after removing its wings, converts into a 
hovering land platform design for urban operations. 
Marines have converted a K-Max helicopter to a UAV in order to explore the 
Broad Area Unmanned Responsible Resupply Operations. This concept is for ship-to-
shore resupply by UAVs. 
Battery-powered Dragon Eye is a mini-UAV (2.4 foot wingspan and 4 lbs) 
developed as the Navy’s version for the Over-The-Hill RECCE Initiative and the 
Marines’ Interim Small Unit Remote Scouting System requirement. The Dragon Eye can 
be carried in a backpack, and hence is given the name of Backpack UAV.  
                                                 
23 Ibid, page 6. 
24 Ibid, pages 7-8. 
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Sponsored by the Defense Threat Reduction Agency, the Counterproliferation 
(CP) Advance Concept Technology Demonstrations (ACTD) envisions deploying several 
mini-UAVs like the Finder from a larger Predator UAV to detect chemical agents and 
relay the results back through Predator.  
The CP ACTD is designed to address the growing need to provide 
a military capability for “precision engagement” of weapons of mass 
destruction (WMD) related facilities. In order to accomplish this objective, 
the CP ACTD will develop, integrate, demonstrate and transition to the 
warfighters, operationally mature technologies that potentially address the 
unique requirements to enhance the joint counterforce mission to hold 
WMD-related facilities at risk. The driving CP counterforce requirements 
include enhancing the ability to predict and to control collateral effects 
and to provide prompt response and reliable kill.25 
Besides the Dragon Eye and Finder mentioned above, the Naval Research 
Laboratory (NRL) has built and flown several small and micro-UAVs. Definition for 
these airframes will follow. The Naval Air Warfare Centre Aircraft Division 
(NAWC/AD) maintains a small UAV test and development team and also operates 
various types of small UAVs. 
8. DARPA UAV Programs26 
The Defence Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA) is sponsoring five 
major creative UAV programs: 
a. The Air Force X-45 UCAV, which was awarded to Boeing in 1999. The 
mission for the UCAV is Suppression of the Enemy Air Defences (SEAD). The platform 
will cost one third as much as a Joint Strike Fighter (JSF) to acquire and one quarter as 
much  to operate and support (O&S). The X-45A, with a maximum speed of 1000km/h, 
was designed to carry two 500 kg bombs using radar absorbing materials, and was first 
flown in June 2002. 
b. The UCAV-Navy X-46/X-47 is a similar program for the equivalent 
Navy version of a UCAV that can be carrier-based. Apart from SEAD missions, RECCE 
and strike will be among the platform’s capabilities. The X-47A Pegasus by Northrop 
                                                 
25 Department of Defense, Director of Operational Test & Evaluation, “Missile Defense and Related 
Programs FY 1997 Annual Report,” February 1998, Internet, February 2004. Available at: 
http://www.fas.org/spp/starwars/program/dote97/97cp.html 
26 The material for this section is taken (in some places verbatim) from: OSD 2001, pages 8-9. 
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Grumman successfully flew in March 2003 using modified GPS coordinates for 
navigation. 
c. The Advanced Air Vehicle (AAV) program includes two rotorcraft 
projects: 
(1)  The Dragon Fly Canard Rotor Wing, which will demonstrate 
vertical take-off-and-land (VTOL) capability and then transition to fixed wing flight for 
cruise. 
(2)  The A160 Hummingbird, which uses a hingeless rigid rotor to 
perform high endurance flight of more than 24 hours at a high altitude of more than 
30,000 feet.  
d. DARPA is exploring various designs of micro-air vehicles (MAVs), 
which are less than six inches in any dimension. The Lutronix Kolibri and the Microcraft 
Ducted Fan rely on an enclosed rotor for vertical flight, while the Lockheed Martin 
Sanders Microstar and the AeroVironment Black Window and E-Wasp are fixed-wing 
horizontal fliers.  
9. Other Nation’s UAVs 
In FY00 some 32 nations manufactured more than 150 models of UAVs, and 55 
countries operate some 80 types of UAVs, primarily for RECCE missions. 
Derivatives of the Israeli designs are the Crecerelle used by the French Army, the 
Canadair CL-289 used by the German and French Armies and the British Phoenix. The 
Russians use the VR-3 Reys and the Tu-300 and the Italians the Mirach 150.27  
10. NASA 
In the civilian sector, NASA has been the main agency concerned with 
developing medium and high-altitude long endurance UAVs. The agency has been 
involved with two main programs “Mission to Planet Earth” and “Earth Science 
Enterprise” for environmental monitoring of the effects of global climatic change. During 
the late 80s, NASA started to operate high-altitude manned aircraft, but later decided to 
develop a UAV for high-altitude operations. NASA constructed the propeller driven 
                                                 
27 Petrie, G., Geo Informatics, Article “Robotic Aerial Platforms for Remote Sensing,” Department of 
Geography &Topographic Science, University of Glasgow, May 2001, Internet, February 2004. Available 
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Perseus between 1991 and 1994 and Theseus, which was a larger version of Perseus, in 
1996. 
In 1994 NASA started its Environmental Research Aircraft and Sensor 
Technology (ERAST) program. As a result, NASA has operated the Altus and Altus II 
since 1998. Their operating ceilings are 45,000 to 65,000 feet using turbocharged 
engines. 
The development of solar powered UAVs is also being supported and funded by 
NASA. The idea, development, and construction was initiated by the Aerovironment 
company, which has been involved in the construction of solar-powered aircraft for 20 
years. Solar Challenger, HALSOL, Talon, Pathfinder, Centurion, and Helios with a 
wingspan of 247 feet, were among the solar-powered UAVs during those efforts.28 
New technologies like regenerative fuel-cell-powered UAVs are underway. These 
allow UAVs to fly for weeks or months, reducing the costs of missions so as to deliver a 
maximum return on investment per flight. NASA will also support the development of 
such technology.29 
11. What Is a UAV?30 
The distinction between cruise missile weapons and UAV weapon systems is 
sometimes confusing. Their main differences are: 
a. UAVs are designed to be recovered at the end of their flight while cruise 
missiles are not. 
b. A warhead is tailored and integrated into a missile’s airframe while any 
munitions carried by UAVs are external loads. 
According to 1-02 DoD Dictionary, a UAV is 
A powered, aerial vehicle that does not carry a human operator, 
uses aerodynamic forces to provide vehicle lift, can fly autonomously or 
be piloted remotely, can be expendable or recoverable, and can carry a                                                  
28 Ibid. 
29 UAV Rolling News, “New UAV work for Dryden in 2004,” June 12, 2003, Internet, February 2004. 
Available at: http://www.uavworld.com/_disc1/00000068.htm 
30 The material for this section is taken (in some places verbatim) from: Office of the Secretary of 
Defense (OSD), “Unmanned Aerial Vehicles Roadmap 2002-2027,” December 2002, Section 1, 
“Introduction.” 
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lethal or non-lethal payload. Ballistic or semi ballistic vehicles, cruise 
missiles, and artillery projectiles are not considered unmanned aerial 
vehicles.31 
12. Military UAV Categories 
UAVs can be classified according to different criteria such as mission type, sensor 
type, performance, and control system. Remote Piloted Vehicles (RPVs) and autonomous 
UAVs are two distinct groups based on their different control systems. They have many 
common features but the main difference is that an RPV follows the data-link commands 
of a remote station for the specific air mission. In other words, it is a “dumb” vehicle, 
which can carry sensors and relay data. UAVs can be further classified according to their 
mission as Reconnaissance Surveillance and Target Acquisition (RSTA) UAVs, Combat 
UAVs (UCAVs), and others. According to the way they are launched, they can be 
classified as hand-launched, rail-launched, rocket-launched and airfield-launched. 
We also classify military UAVs in three main categories, considering their ceiling 
as their driver characteristic: Tactical UAVs (TUAVs), Medium-Altitude Endurance 
UAVs (MAE UAVs), and High-Altitude Endurance UAVs (HAE UAVs).32 
a. Tier I or TUAVs are inexpensive with an average cost of 100K$FY00, 
with a limited payload of around 50 kg, a LOS permitted range of the ground control 
station, and endurance of approximately four hours. In general, they are rather small with 
an average length of two meters and their maximum ceiling is around 5,000 feet. Pioneer 
is a typical example. This category is also referred to as “Battlefield UAVs” and can be 
divided in three subcategories: 
(1) Micro UAVs (MUAVs) are very small UAVs in sizes 6 to 12 
inches.33 The Aerovironment Wasp is an example of this category.34 
                                                 
31 Ibid. 
32 Tozer, Tim, and others, “UAVs and HAPs-Potential Convergence for Military Communications,” 
University of York, DERA Defford, undated, Internet, February 2004. Available at: http://www.elec.york 
.ac.uk/comms/papers/tozer00_ieecol.pdf 
33 Pike, John, Intelligence Resource Program, “Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVS),” Internet, March 
2004. Available at: http://www.fas.org/irp/program/collect/uav 
34 The material for this part of section is taken (in some places verbatim) from: OSD 2002, Section2, 
“Current UAV programs.” 
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(2) Mini UAVs have a span up to four feet. They provide the 
company/platoon/squad level with an organic RSTA capability out to 10 Km. The 
Aerovironment Dragon Eye is an example of this category.35 
(3) Small UAVs (SUAVs) have a size greater than four feet in 
length. “SUAV is a low-cost and user-friendly UAV system.” It is a highly mobile air 
vehicle system that among other potentials allows the small warfighting unit to set the 
foundation to exploit battlefield information superiority.36 
b. Tier II or MAE UAVs are larger than TUAVs, more expensive, with an 
average cost of 1M$FY00, and have enhanced performance. Their payload can reach 300 
kg, their endurance is 12 or more hours, and their ceiling is up to 20,000 feet. Predator is 
a typical example of a MAE UAV. 
c. Tier II Plus or HAE UAVs can be large craft with an endurance of more 
than 24 hours, payload capacities of more than 800 Kg and a ceiling of more than 30,000 
feet. Their average cost is about 10M$FY00. Global Hawk is a typical example of HAE 
UAV. 
d. Tier III Minus or LOHAE UAVs can be large crafts with an endurance 
of more than 12 hours, payload capacities of more than 300 Kg, and a ceiling of more 
than 65,000 feet. Dark Star was a typical example of LOHAE UAV. 
13. Battlefield UAVs 
Here are two descriptions of the use of UAVs in training and combat. 
a. Story 1. Training at Fort Bragg 
“FDC this is FO adjust fire, over”. “FO this is FDC adjust fire, 
out”. “FDC grid 304765, over”. “FO grid 304765, out”. “FDC two tanks 
in the open, over”. “FO that’s two tanks in the open, out”. Then about 30 
seconds later, “FO shot, over”. “FDC shot, out”. “FO splash, over”. “FDC 
splash, out”. Fort Bragg, N.C. (April 5, 2001). 
Communications like these can normally be heard during a live-fire 
training exercise between the forward observers (FO) and the Marines at 
the fire direction control centre (FDC), but during exercise Rolling 
                                                 
35 Ibid. 
36 NAVAIR, “Small Unmanned Aerial Vehicles,” undated, Internet, February 2004. Available at: 
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Thunder, the 3rd Battalion, 14th Marines used a different type of forward 
observer. 
Instead of a few Marines dug in a forward position, a UAV 
controlled by the Marines from the Marine fixed-Wing Unmanned Vehicle 
Squadron 2 (VMMU-2), Cherry Point, N.C., gave the calls for fire. 
The UAV is a remote-controlled, single-propeller plane with a 
wing span of 17 feet and an overall length of 14 feet. Inside the body of 
the plane is a camera that allows the pilots to see and to identify targets, 
according to Cpl. Tim Humbert, team non-commissioned officer, VMU-2. 
“This was an excellent training opportunity for us,” said Capt. 
Konstantine Zoganas, battalion fire direction officer, 3rd Bn., 14th Marines, 
Philadelphia, Pa. “There aren’t many units who get the opportunity to train 
with this equipment.” 
For this mission, the UAV, which was flying at around 6,000 to 
8,000 feet, was used to identify targets. They then looked at that data and 
turned it into a fire mission, which was sent to the Marines on the gun line. 
Once the Marines on the gun line blasted their round toward the target, the 
UAV was used to adjust fire. “After using the UAV, I think it is equal to, 
if not better than, a forward observer,” said Zoganas. “A forward observer 
has a limited view depending on where he is at, but a UAV, being in the 
air, has the ability to cover a lot more area,” said Zoganas. “I think the 
UAV’s capabilities are underestimated, it is a great weapon to have on the 
modern battlefield.”37 
2. Story 2. Desert Shield/Storm Anecdote 
Surrenders of Iraqi troops to an unmanned aerial vehicle actually 
happened. All of the UAV units at various times had individuals or groups 
attempt to signal the Pioneer, possibly to indicate a willingness to 
surrender. However, the most famous incident occurred when USS 
Missouri (BB 63), using her Pioneer to spot 16-inch gunfire, devastated 
the defences of Faylaka Island off the coast of Kuwait City. Shortly 
thereafter, while still over the horizon and invincible to the defenders, the 
USS Wisconsin (BB 64) sent her Pioneer over the island at low altitude. 
When the UAV came over the island, the defenders heard the obnoxious 
sound of the two-stroke engine since the air vehicle was intentionally 
flown low to let the Iraqis know that they were being targeted. 
Recognizing that with the “vulture” overhead, there would soon be more 
of those 2,000-pound naval gunfire rounds landing on their positions with 
the same accuracy, the Iraqis made the right choice and, using 
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handkerchiefs, undershirts, and bed sheets, they signalled their desire to 
surrender. Imagine the consternation of the Pioneer aircrew who called the 
commanding officer of Wisconsin and asked plaintively, “Sir, they want to 
surrender, what should I do with them?”38 
14. Battlefield Missions 
Reconnaissance is a “mission undertaken to obtain, by visual or other detection 
methods, information about the activities and resources of an enemy; or to secure data 
concerning the meteorological, hydrographical geographical characteristics of a particular 
area.” This task is about gathering general information about an enemy or an area. 
Surveillance is the “specific and systematic observation of a particular area or target for a 
short or extended period of time.”39 
UAVs have been used for the above missions since their inception. They can also 
be used for target acquisition, target designation and battle damage assessment (BDA). 
Due to their small size, they can operate more discreetly than their manned counterparts, 
allowing target acquisition to occur with less chance of counter-detection. “The 
surveillance UAV can be used to designate the target for a precision air and/or artillery or 
missile strike while providing near real-time battle damage assessment to the force or 
mission commander.”40 In that way, useless repeat attacks on a target could be avoided as 
well as wastage of munitions. 
Battlefield UAVs are appropriate UAVs for all of the above missions. In the 
beginning of the 1950s, UAVs like the Northrop Falconer had been developed for 
battlefield reconnaissance with little or no combat service. Later the Israelis were the 
early developers of the operational use of battlefield UAVs in the early 1980s in southern 
Lebanon operations. Their successes with battlefield UAVs drew international 
attention.41 
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We can distinguish two broad categories of battlefield UAVs; the “combat 
surveillance” UAV and the “tactical reconnaissance” UAV. 
a. Combat Surveillance UAVs42 
The function of combat surveillance UAVs is to observe everything on a 
battlefield in real-time, flying over the battle area, and relaying intelligence to a ground-
control station. In general, they are powered by a small internal combustion two-stroke 
piston engine, known as a “chain saw” because of its characteristic noise. An autopilot 
system with a radio control (RC) back-up for manual operations directs the platform from 
pre-takeoff programmed sets of waypoints. In most cases, the program is set up by 
displaying a map on a workstation, entering the coordinates, and downloading the 
program into the UAV. Navigation is always verified by a GPS and often by an INS 
system as well. 
Combat surveillance UAVs normally use the autopilot to get on station 
(above the operating area) and then operate in manual mode by RC to find or detect 
potential targets. As a result, only LOS ranges are permitted, due to the limitations of the 
RC transmitter signals.  
Sensors are generally housed in a turret underneath the platform and/or are 
integrated into the platform’s fuselage. They usually feature day-night imagers and in 
many case a laser designator, SIGINT packages, or Synthetic Aperture Radar (SAR).  
Larger UAVs have fixed landing gear that are used for takeoff and landing 
purposes on small airstrips. Larger UAV can also be launched by special rail launcher 
boosters and recovered by parachute, parasail or by flying into a net. Smaller UAVs may 
be launched by a catapult and recovered in the same way or by landing in plain terrain 
without any use of landing gear. 
b. Tactical Reconnaissance UAVs43 
Tactical Reconnaissance (TR) UAVs are usually larger and in some cases 
jet powered with extended range and speed. Like the combat surveillance UAVs, they are 
equipped with an autopilot with RC backup. Their primary mission is to fly over 
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43 Ibid. 
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predefined targets out of line of sight, and take pictures or relay near real-time data to the 
ground-control station via satellite links. 
A UAV of this type can usually carry day-night cameras and/or Synthetic 
Aperture Radar (SAR). The necessary communication equipment is usually located on 
the upper part of the platform’s fuselage. A TR UAV can also be launched from runways 
or small airstrips, an aircraft, and/or by special rail launcher boosters, and be recovered 
by parachute. 
The exact distinction between the two types of battlefield UAVs and other 
types of UAVs is not clear. Some types are capable of both missions. A small combat 
surveillance UAV may be the size of “a large hobbyist RC model plane.” It can be “used 
to support military forces at the brigade or battalion level and sometimes they are called 
‘mini UAVs.’ Their low cost makes them suitable for ‘expendable’ missions.” 
 
B. PROBLEM DEFINITION 
1. UAVs Mishaps 
According to the Office of Secretary of Defense “UAV Roadmap” the mishap rate 
for UAVs is difficult to define: 
Class A mishap rate (MR) is the number of significant vehicle 
damages or total losses occurring per 100,000 hours of fleet flight time. As 
no single U.S. UAV fleet has accumulated this amount of flying time, 
each fleet’s MR represents its extrapolated losses to the 100,000-hour 
mark. It is expressed as mishaps per 100,000 hours. It is important to note 
that this extrapolation does not reflect improvements that should result 
from operational learning or improvement in component technology.44 
 
A Pentagon report said that crashes and component failures are 
increasing the cost of UAVs and restrict their availability for military 
operations.45 
                                                 
44 OSD 2002, Appendix J, page 186. 
45 Peck, Michael, National Defense Magazine, May 2003, Feature Article, “Pentagon Unhappy About 
Drone Aircraft Reliability, Rising Mishap Rates of Unmanned Vehicles Attributed to Rushed 
Deployments,” Internet, February 2004. Available at: http://www.nationaldefensemagazine.org/article. 
cfm?Id=1105 
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The reliability issue has sparked controversy and concern that UAVs are 
becoming too expensive. There is a wide-spread notion that UAVs are simply 
expendables and cheap vehicles, something like diapers that are used once and discarded. 
The truth is that these are costly components of expensive systems.  
To get a view of the problem, we see that the 2002 crash rate for Predator was 
32.8 crashes per 100,000 flight hours, and for 2003 it was 49.6 until May. The accident 
rate for the Global Hawk was 167.7 per 100,000 flight hours on May 2003.46 
Nevertheless, commanders can take greater risks with UAVs without worrying 
about loss of life. These risks would not be taken with manned aircrafts. For example, the 
recently updated MR for the F-16 was 3.5 per 100,000 flight hours. According to DoD 
data, the MR for the RQ-2A Pioneer was 363 while the MR for the RQ-2A dropped to 
139. For the RQ-5 Hunter it was 255 for pre-1996 platforms, and has dropped to 16 since 
then. For the Predator RQ-1A, it was 43 and for the RQ-1B it was 31.47 
2. What is the Problem? 
Currently a network experiment series named Surveillance and Tactical 
Acquisition Network (STAN) is being conducted by the Naval Postgraduate School 
(NPS) at Camp Roberts, with SUAVs as the sensor platforms and the primary source of 
information. SUAV programs are currently of great interest to the Fleet, Special Forces, 
and other interested parties and are receiving large amounts of funding. There is a great 
deal of concern about the reliability of SUAVs because a lot of problems have emerged 
in testing. Reliability must be improved. 
This thesis documents these problems. At the CIRPAS site at McMillan Field in 
Camp Roberts on September 11 and 12, 2003, I observed flight, communication, search 
and detection, and target acquisition tests, using two different types of SUAV platforms, 
XPV-1B TERN and Silverfox, an experimental program funded by the office of Naval 
Research. Incidents regarding reliability that occurred during that time include: 
                                                 
46 Peck, Michael, National Defense Magazine, May 2003, Feature Article, “Pentagon Unhappy About 
Drone Aircraft Reliability, Rising Mishap Rates of Unmanned Vehicles Attributed to Rushed 




a. During the pre-takeoff checks in the runway end, an engine air-intake 
filter failed (due to broken support lock wire hole). The problem was obviously due to 
engine vibrations. There was no spare part filter or any other means to repair the failure, 
so it was replaced with another TERN platform’s air filter.  
Result: the mission was delayed for thirty minutes. 
b. During the start engine procedure, a starting device failed. The failure 
was due to a loose bolt and the starting device could not start the engine. After ten 
minutes delay, the bolt was tightened.  
Result: the procedure was delayed for ten minutes. 
c. After two and a half hours of flight operation on a TERN platform and 
while in flight, the engine stalled at 500 feet. The SUAV ran out of fuel. 
Result: loss of one TERN platform. 
d. At the pre-takeoff checks on a Silverfox platform, recalibration of an 
engine’s rpm was necessary (probably because it was during the initial flight after 
replacing the old engines with new).  
Result: five-minute delay. 
e. During the operations on Silverfox platforms, many bad sensor signals 
were received (especially using the CCD camera) probably due to ground-control station 
antennas or due to LOS constraints. 
Result: Missions lost their search and detection capability  
f. After Silverfox’s landings (calculated crashes) in the field (not on a 
runway), extensive cleaning of the interior of the platform due to weeds, soil and debris 
that entered the vehicle from the front engine opening was needed. 
Result: At least twenty minutes cleaning was needed after such landings. 
The next step for STAN experiment was at the CIRPAS site at McMillan Field in 
Camp Roberts from May 2 to May 6, 2004. I observed flight, communication, search and 
detection, and networking tests, using the XPV-1B TERN on May 2 and 3. Incidents 
regarding reliability that occurred during that time include: 
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a. During the assembly checks in the hangar on May 2, major software 
problem was detected. Repairing was not possible by the team members.  
Result: the platform was unable to operate at all. 
b. During the test flight operation of the next platform the same day, the 
engine stalled at 1000 feet and led to a platform crash. 
Result: loss of platform. 
c. On May 3, after one hour of flight operation, the third platform and 
while in flight, an autopilot software malfunction was occurred that led to a platform auto 
hard landing in the ground.48  
Result: loss of one more TERN platform. 
d. During landing of the next TERN platform and after two hours in flight 
operation the front tire delaminated on May 5.49 Probably due to operator error, the 
damage was impossible to be repaired by the team members.  
Result: loss of platform. 
e. On May 6, after one hour of operation flight and while in flight, a right-
wing servo failure occurred that result in loss of platform control and then to a platform 
crash.50  
Result: loss of platform.  
3. What is the Importance of the Problem? 
It is most notable that SUAVs are not technologically sophisticated enough to 
warn the operator that the vehicle is under attack and/or under critical failure (such as out 
of fuel), cannot operate under unfavorable weather conditions, and have a low level of 
reliability, which degrades their role in military operations. Even though SUAVs cost 
very little compared to other systems, such as observers, helicopters, planes and satellites, 
it is essential that small UAV missions be carried out with an acceptable level of 
                                                 
48 Gottfried, Russell, LCDR (USN), Unmanned Vehicle Integration TACMEMO, 5-6 May Recap, e-




reliability, operability, and reusability. In that way, they can become dependable systems 
and be used in the battlefield with other systems. 
4. How Will the Development Teams Solve the Problem without the 
Thesis? 
Trial and error and/or test, analyze and fix (TAAF) are the methods being used to 
overcome failures for the Silverfox system. Being in the experimental phase, it is the 
easiest but most time consuming way.  
For the other system (TERN) that has been operational for almost two years, an 
extended trial period is presently being conducted. From it, conclusions can be made for 
future system improvements and operational usages. Other experimental systems can also 
contribute to quantitative assessments of readiness and availability. 
5. How Will This Thesis Help? 
This thesis provides a tool to consider reliability issues by developing a system 
for tracking data that could be improve reliability for SUAV systems. 
6. How Will We Know That We Have Succeeded 
Verification and validation of the proposed solutions and methods by NAVAIR 
and the other interested parties will indicate the accuracy and the effectiveness of the 
framework suggested by this thesis. 
7. Improving Reliability 
UAV reliability is the main issue preventing the FAA from relaxing its 
restrictions on UAVs flying in civilian airspace and for foreign governments to allow 
overflight and landing flights. Improved reliability or simply knowing actual mishap rates 
and causes will enable risk mitigation and eventual flight clearance. 
Efforts toward improving UAV reliability are required, but how can this best be 
accomplished? The answer is by spending money, but we can be more specific. More 
redundancy of flight control-systems may increase reliability, but there is another trade 
off. The absence of components needed for manned aircraft makes UAVs cheaper, but 
this also degrades their reliability. If reliability is sacrificed, then high attrition will 
increase the number of UAVs needed and so the cost will rise again.  
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By focusing on flight control systems, propulsion, and operator training, which 
account for approximately 80% of UAVs mishaps, we can increase reliability.51 
Redundancy in on-board systems is not easily added, especially to small UAVs. Weight 
and volume restrictions are very tight and that can lead to expensive solutions. But then if 
we make UAVs too expensive, we cannot afford to lose them. 
We can categorize UAVs by their volume, by their usage, by their endurance or 
by their capabilities and type of operations, but we can also view each UAV system as a 
unique case. We can analyze the system according to its functional components and do a 
Failure Mode and Effect Analysis (FMEA). That is the first step for further 
implementation of a reliability tracking and improvement method such as FRACAS, 
Failure Mode Effect and Criticality Analysis (FMECA) or even an implementation of 
MSG-3, if it is more suitable. I discuss these methods, in details, later. 
Reliability by itself is a measure of effectiveness (MOE). In order to keep track of 
reliability I develop some measures of performance (MOP), and by using them we can 
determine the results of our reliability corrective actions, if any. We can also keep track 
of our system’s ability to be maintained, and if we consider the operational requirements 
and logistic data, then we can evaluate its availability as well. Definitions and a 
discussion of reliability are included in Appendix D. 
8. Area of Research 
This study provides a basis for conducting reliability tracking for SUAVs to 
improve techniques and methodologies that increase SUAVs readiness. To achieve this, 
existing methodologies of controlling reliability, FMEA and reliability centered 
maintenance (RCM) with maintenance steering group-3 (MSG-3) are analyzed and 
compared. Finally, a criticality analysis provides a method for SUAV operators to 
account for and to mitigate risk during operations.  
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II. RELATED RESEARCH 
A. EXISTING METHODS 
The following section, presents and analyzes existing general methods of failure 
tracking and analysis, as well as the existing reliability centered maintenance method that 
has been used by the civil aviation industry. A comparison between them, focusing on 
small UAV (SUAV) application, is also presented. 
1. General: FMEA, FMECA and FTA  
a. Introduction to Failure Mode and Effect Analysis (FMEA) 
Well-managed companies are interested in preventing or at least 
minimizing risk in their operations, through risk management analysis. “The risk analysis 
has a fundamental purpose of answering the following two questions:  
• What can go wrong?  
• If something does go wrong, what is the probability of it happening and 
what are the consequences?”52 
To answer these questions, previously forensic techniques were used. 
Today the focus has changed. “The focus is on prevention.”53 
FMEA is one of the first systematic techniques for failure analysis. “An 
FMEA is often the first step of a system’s reliability study.”54 It incorporates reviewing 
components, assemblies and subsystems to identify failure modes, causes and effects of 
such failures. FMEA is a systematic method of identifying and preventing product and 
process failures before they occur. It is focused on preventing defects, enhancing safety, 
and increasing customer satisfaction.  
                                                 
52 Stamatis, D. H., Failure Mode and Effect Analysis: FMEA from Theory to Execution, American 
Society for Quality (ASQ), 1995, page xx. The above part of section is a summary and paraphrase (in some 
places verbatim) of “Introduction.” 
53 Ibid, page xxi. 
54 Hoyland, A., and Rausand, M., System Reliability Theory: Models and Statistics Methods, New 
York: John Wiley and Sons, 1994, page 73. 
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The purpose of FMEA is preventing process and product problems before 
they occur.55 Used in the design and manufacturing process, FMEAs reduce cost and 
efforts by identifying product and process improvements early in the development phase 
when it is easier, faster and less costly to make changes. Formal FMEAs were first 
conducted in the aerospace industry in the mid 60’s, when looking at safety issues. 
Industry in general (automotive particularly) adapted the FMEA for use as a quality 
improvement tool. 
“FMEA is a specific methodology to evaluate a system, design, process or 
service, for possible ways in which failures (problems, errors, risks, and concerns) can 
occur.”56 For each of the failures identified, an estimate is made for its occurrence, 
severity, and detection. Then an evaluation is made for the necessary action to be taken, 
planned, or ignored. The effort focuses on minimizing the probability of failure or the 
effect of failure. This approach can be technical or nontechnical. Technical is the 
quantitative way, in other words, the way in which we determine, express, and measure 
the quantity of something. Nontechnical is the qualitative way, which is relative to, or 
involves the quality of something. For both ways, the focus is on the risk one is willing to 
take. In that way, FMEA becomes a systematic technique using engineering knowledge, 
reliability, and organizational development techniques.57 
b. Discussion 
FMEA, as a qualitative analysis, is better carried out during the design 
stages of the system. “The purpose is to identify design areas where improvements are 
needed to meet reliability requirements.”58 It provides an important basis for design 
reviews and inspections. It can be carried out using the bottom-up or the top-down 
approach. With the bottom-up approach or hardware approach, FMEA starts at the 
component level and expands upward. When the expansion is from the system level 
downwards, then the top-down or functional approach is being used. Most FMEA are 
                                                 
55 McDermott, E. R., Mikulak, J. R, and Beauregard, R. M., The Basics of FMEA, Productivity Inc., 
1996, page 4. 
56 Stamatis, page xxi. 
57 Stamatis, page xxii. The above part of section is a summary and paraphrase (in some places 
verbatim) of “Introduction.” 
58 Hoyland, page 74. 
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carried out according to the bottom-up approach. However, for some systems adopting 
the top-down approach can save time and effort.59 
In order to have a formal FMEA process, accurate data is key. Given 
accurate data, one can make the proper assumptions and calculations, producing an 
accurate FMEA process. Accurate data presume a comprehensive quality system 
implementation. Without accurate data “on a product or process, the FMEA becomes a 
guessing game, based on opinions rather than actual facts”. Implementing a quality 
system assures standard procedures and proper documentation and thus yields reliable 
data.60 
“The basic questions to be answered by FMEA are 
(1) How can each part of the system possibly fail? 
(2) What mechanisms might produce these modes of failure? 
(3) What could the effects be if the failures did occur? 
(4) Is the failure in the safe or unsafe direction? 
(5) How is the failure detected? 
(6) What inherent provisions are provided in the design to compensate for 
the failures?”61 
There are at least four prerequisites we must understand and must consider 
while conducting FMEA:  
(1) All problems are not the same and not equally important. 
(2) Know the customer (end user). 
(3) Identify the function’s purpose and objective. 
(4) When doing an FMEA, it must be prevention oriented.62 
                                                 
59 Hoyland, page 76. The above part of section is a summary of “Bottom-up versus Top-down 
Approach.” 
60 McDermott, page 4. The above part of section is a summary of “Part of a Comprehensive Quality 
System.” 
61 Hoyland, page 76. 
62 Stamatis, page xxii-xxiii. 
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Definitions of terms related to failure and failure modes are presented in 
Appendix C. 
c. FMEA: General Overview  
For a system, a FMEA “is an engineering technique used to define, 
identify and eliminate known and/or potential failures” before they reach the end user.63 
A FMEA may take two courses of action. First, using historical data there may be an 
analysis of data for similar products or systems. Second, inferential statistics, 
mathematical modeling, simulations, and reliability analysis may be used concurrently to 
identify and define the failures. A FMEA, if conducted properly and appropriately, will 
provide the practitioner with useful information that can reduce the risk load in the 
system. It is one of the most important early preventive actions in a system, which can 
prevent failures from occurring and reaching the user. “FMEA is a systematic way of 
examining all the possible ways in which a failure may occur. For each failure, an 
estimate is made of its effect on the system, of its seriousness of its occurrence, and its 
detection.” As a result, corrective actions required to prevent failures from reaching the 
end user will be identified, thereby assuring the highest durability, quality and reliability 
possible in the system. 64 
d. When is the FMEA Started?65 
As a methodology used to maximize the end user’s satisfaction by 
eliminating and/or reducing known or potential problems, FMEA must begin as early as 
possible, even if all the facts and information are not yet known. After FMEA begins, it 
becomes a living document and is never really complete. It uses information to improve 
the system and it is continually updated as necessary. Therefore, an FMEA should be 
available for the entire system life. 
                                                 
63 Stamatis, page 25. 
64 Stamatis, page 26. The above part of section is a summary and paraphrase (in some places verbatim) 
of “FMEA: A General Overview.” 
65 The material from this section is taken (in some places verbatim) from: Stamatis, page 29, “When is 
the FMEA Started?” 
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e. Explanation of the FMEA66 
Identification and prevention of known and potential problems from 
reaching the end user is the essence of an FMEA system. One of the assumptions that 
must be made is that problems have different priorities. Finding or setting priorities is 
important because that is the main issue, which drives the methodology. Three 
components help define the priority of failures: occurrence, severity and detection. 
Occurrence is the frequency of the failure. Severity is the 
seriousness (effects) of the failure. Detection is the ability to detect the 
failure before it reaches the customer. To define the value of these 
components, the usual way is to use numerical scales called risk-criteria 
guidelines. These guidelines can be qualitative and/or quantitative.67 
If the guideline is qualitative, then it must follow the theoretical expected 
behavior of the potential component. For occurrence the expected behavior follows a 
normal distribution because frequencies tend to be like that over time. For severity, the 
expected behavior is lognormal. This is due to the fact that failures, which do occur, 
should cause annoyance, and they are not usually critical or catastrophic. So the guideline 
should follow a right-skewed distribution. For detection, the expected behavior is that of 
a discrete distribution. This is expected due to the fact that there is more concern if the 
failure is found by the end user than finding it during the manufacturing phase in the 
production facilities. So the guideline should follow a distribution with a gap between 
values. 
If the guideline is quantitative, it must be specific. It is not necessary for 
the guideline to follow a theoretical distribution.  
Ranking for the criteria usually has a value based on 1 to 10 scales. It 
provides ease of interpretation, accuracy, and some precision in the quantification of the 
ranking. Ranking using scales from 1 to 5, if used, offers convenience but does not give 
an accurate “quantification because it reflects a uniform distribution.”68 
                                                 
66 The material from this section is taken (in some places verbatim) from: Stamatis, page 33, 
”Interpretation of FMEA.” 
67 Stamatis, page 33. 
68 Stamatis, page 35. 
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The failure’s priority is represented through the risk priority number 
(RPN), which is the product of occurrence times severity times detection. The value of 
RPN is used only to rank order the concerns of the system. If there are more than two 
failures with the same RPN, we first address the failure with the higher severity and then 
with the higher detection. Severity comes first because it has to do with the effects of the 
failure. Detection is next because user dependency is more important than the failure 
frequencies. 
The objective for product/design FMEAs is to reveal product problems 
that will result in safety hazards, malfunctions or shortened product life. FMEAs can be 
conducted at each phase in the design process (initial design, prototype, final design) or at 
the production process while it is occurring. “How can the product fail?” is the basic 
question asked in design FMEAs.69 
f. The Eight Steps Method for Implementing FMEA70 
The eight steps of the method are: 
(1) Select the team: The team should be “cross-functional and 
multidisciplinary and the team members must be willing to contribute.” After the team 
has been identified, it prioritizes the opportunities for improvement. 
(2) Do the functional block diagram: The first step for every 
attempt to solve any problem is to become familiar with the subject to ensure that 
everyone on the FMEA team has the same understanding of the process and the 
production phases. A blueprint, an engineering drawing, or a flowchart review is 
necessary. If it is not available, the team needs to create one. Team members should see 
the product or a prototype and walk through the production process exactly. A block 
diagram of the system provides an overview and a working model of the relationships 
and interactions of the system’s subsystems and components. 
                                                 
69 McDermott, page 25. The above part of section is a summary and paraphrase (in some places 
verbatim) of “Product/Design.” 
70 The material from this section is taken (in some places verbatim) from Stamatis, pages 42-44, “The 
Process of Conducting an FMEA,” and McDermott, pages 28-42, “The FMEA Worksheet.” 
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(3) Collect data: The team begins to collect and categorize data. 
Then they should start filling the FMEA forms. The failures identified are the failure 
modes of the FMEA. 
(4) Brainstorm and prioritize potential failure modes: Important 
issues of the problem are recognized by the team. The team can now begin thinking about 
potential failure modes that could affect the product function, quality or manufacturing. 
Brainstorm sessions place all ideas out on the table. The objective is to create dozens of 
ideas. The ideas should be organized by grouping them into similar categories. Grouping 
can be done by the type of failure, (e.g. mechanical, electrical, communication etc) or the 
seriousness of the failure. At that step, the FMEA team reviews the failure modes and 
identifies the potential effects of any failure. This step is like an “if-then statement” 
process. If that failure occurs, then what are the consequences? 
(5) Analysis: Assign a severity, occurrence and detection rating for 
each effect and failure mode. The sequence from data to information to knowledge to 
decision is followed. The analysis could be qualitative or quantitative and anything may 
be used (cause and effect analysis, mathematical modeling, simulation, reliability 
analysis etc). At this step, severity, occurrence, and detection ratings must be estimated. 
Those ratings are based on a 10-point scale, with number 1 being the lowest and 10 the 
highest in importance. Establishing clear and concise descriptions for the points on each 
of the scales is important so that all team members have the same understanding of the 
ratings.  
(a) The severity rating estimates how serious the effect 
would be if a given failure did occur. Each effect should be given its own severity rating, 
even if there are several effects for a single failure mode.  
(b) The most accurate way to determine the occurrence 
rating is by using actual failure data from the product. When this is not possible, failure 
mode occurrence must be estimated. Knowing the potential cause of failure can produce a 
better estimate. Once the potential causes have been identified for all of the failure 
modes, an occurrence rating can be assigned, even without failure data.  
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(c) By assigning the detection rating, we estimate how 
likely we are to detect a failure or the effect of a failure. We start by identifying controls 
that may detect a failure or the effect of a failure. In case there are no controls, the 
likelihood of detection will be low and the item would receive a high rating (9-10). 
(6) Results: Results are derived from the analysis. RPNs must be 
calculated and all FMEA forms are completed. The RPN is the product of severity, times 
occurrence, times detection for all of the items. The total RPN is the sum of all RPNs. 
This number is used as a metric to compare the revised total RPN against the original 
RPN, once the recommended actions have been introduced. From the highest RPN to the 
smallest, we can now prioritize the failure modes. A Pareto Chart or other diagram helps 
to visualize the differences between the various ratings and enables decision regarding on 
which items to work. Usually it is useful to set a threshold RPN such that everything 
above that point is addressed. 
(7) Confirm, evaluate and measure: After the results have been 
recorded, confirmation, evaluation, and measurements of the success or failure are done. 
Using an organized process, we can identify and implement actions to eliminate or reduce 
the problem of high-risk failure modes. It is very common to manage a reduction on a 
high-risk failure mode. After doing that, we refer back to the severity occurrence and 
detection ratings. Often the easiest approach to make a process or product improvement is 
to increase detectability of the failure, thus lowering the detection rating. This is not the 
best approach because increasing failure-detectability only makes it easier to detect 
failures once they occur. Reducing severity is important, especially in situations leading 
to injuries. The best way for improvement is by reducing the likelihood of the occurrence 
of the failure. And if it is highly unlikely that a failure will occur, there is less need for 
detection measures. Evaluation answers the question: “Is the situation better, worse or the 
same as before?” 
(8) Do it all over again: The team must pursue improvement until 
the failures are completely eliminated, regardless of the answer from Step 7, because 
FMEA is a process of continual improvement. The long-term goal is to eliminate or 
mitigate every failure completely. The short-term goal is to minimize the effects of the 
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most serious failures, if not eliminate them. Once action has been taken to improve the 
product, new ratings should be determined and a resulting RPN calculated. For the failure 
modes that have been corrected, there should be a reduction in the RPN. Resulting RPNs 
and total RPNs can be organized in diagrams and compared with the original RPNs. 
There is no target RPN for FMEAs. It is up to the organization to decide on how far the 
team should pursue improvements. Failures happen sooner or later. The question is how 
much relative risk the team is willing to take. The answer, again, depends on 
management and the seriousness of failure. 
g. FMEA Team 
“A team is a group of individuals who are committed to achieving 
common organizational objectives.” They meet regularly to identify, to solve problems, 
and to improve processes. They work and interact openly and effectively together and 
produce the desired results for the organization. “Synergy,” which means that “the sum of 
the total is greater than the sum of the individuals,” is the characteristic of a team. 71 
“One person typically is responsible for coordinating the FMEA process 
but all FMEAs are team-based.” Team members “bring a variety of perspectives and 
experiences to the project.” They are “formed when needed and disbanded” after the 
FMEA is completed. 72 The first priority for the team is to define the scope of FMEA. A 
clear definition of the product or process to be studied should be written and understood 
by all team members. 
h. Limitations Applying FMEA73 
(1) “FMEA analysis may be very effective when applied to a 
system in which system failures most probably are the results of single-component 
failures.” In that way, “each failure is considered individually as an independent 
occurrence.” So, an FMEA is not the best approach for analyzing systems with a fair 
degree of redundancy (dependency). For such systems, a Fault Tree Analysis (FTA) is a 
better alternative. 
                                                 
71 Stamatis, pages 85-88. The above part of section is a summary and paraphrase (in some places 
verbatim) of “What Is a Team?” and “Why Use a Team?” 
72 McDermott, page 15. The above part of section is a summary and paraphrase (in some places 
verbatim) of “The FMEA Team.” 
73 Hoyland, page 80, the above part of section is a summary of “Applications.” 
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(2) FMEA gives inadequate attention to human errors because the 
focus is on hardware failures. 
(3) The amount of insignificant work that must be done is also a 
disadvantage. Component failures, including those with insignificant consequences, are 
examined and documented. For large complex systems with a high degree of redundancy, 
the amount of trivial and unnecessary work is huge. 
i. FMEA Types 
Generally there are four types of FMEA: System, design, process and 
service. In the SUAV case, we deal with the system and design FMEA. Failure modes are 
caused by system deficiencies in the functions of the system. Deficiencies include 
interactions among subsystems and elements of the system.  
j. System and Design FMEA74 
We focus on system/design FMEA once we begin to analyze the reliability 
for SUAVs. A system FMEA is usually accomplished in steps, which “include 
conceptual design, detailed design and development, and testing and evaluation.” 
Establishing a system FMEA, uses a system engineering process as well as a product 
development methodology, or research and development, or a combination of all these. 
During the early stages of development, the main focus is to 
• Turn an operational need into a demand for system performance 
parameters and system configuration through “the use of an interactive 
process.” 
• “Integrate related technical parameters and assure compatibility of 
physical, functional, and program interfaces” optimizing the total system. 
• “Integrate reliability, maintainability, engineering support, human factors, 
safety, liability, security, and other related specialties into the total 
engineering effort.”  
                                                 
74 The material from this section is taken (in some places verbatim) from: Stamatis, pages 101-129, 
“System FMEA,” “Design FMEA.” 
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The first step in conducting the system FMEA is a feasibility study to find 
solutions to a problem. The outcome of the system FMEA is an initial design with a 
baseline configuration and operational specifications. 
Design FMEA is a method of “identifying potential or known failure 
modes and providing corrective actions” before the production line starts. Initial sample 
runs or prototype runs and trial runs are excluded. The milestone for the first production 
run is important because after that point any modification and/or change in the design it 
would be a major problem due to the amount of effort, time and cost required to do the 
changes in that stage. The design FMEA is a “dynamic process” involving the 
implementation of numerous “technologies and methods to produce an effective design.” 
This result will be an input for the process, and/or the service FMEA.  
The first step in conducting the design FMEA should be a “feasibility 
study and/or a risk-benefit analysis.” The objective of this early stage is to optimize the 
system, which means to maximize the system quality, reliability and maintainability, and 
minimize cost. The outcome of the design FMEA is a preliminary design, which can be 
used as baseline configuration and functional specifications.  
k. Analysis of Design FMEA75 
There are two main methods of design: design-to-cost and design-to-
customer requirements. In the first approach, the main goal of the design is to keep costs 
within a certain budget. This is also called value-engineering analysis and it is suitable 
for commercial products with minimum safety standards. In the design-to-customer 
requirements approach, the primary designer’s concern is to satisfy the customer’s 
requirements and safety and regulatory obligations. This is common for products related 
with military applications and with high safety standards. 
A design FMEA starts with two requirements: 
• Identifying the appropriate form, and 
• Identifying the rating guidelines 
                                                 
75 Stamatis, page 129-130. 
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The form and the rating guidelines for the design FMEA (or any kind of 
FMEA) are not standardized. Each one performing FMEA makes his own forms and 
rating guidelines, which correspond to the project’s special requirements and 
characteristics, as well as the designer’s vision and experience.  
There are also two ways that the rating guidelines can be formulated: The 
qualitative method and the quantitative method. In both cases, the numerical values can 
be from 1 to 5 or 1 to 10, which is most common.  
An example of design FMEA form is in Table 1. The form is divided into 
three parts. The first part with item numbers from 1 to 10 is the introduction part. The 
second part of the form includes items 11 to 24 which are the body items of any design 
FMEA. The third part items 25 and 26 concern authority and responsibility of the FMEA 
team. Definition of terms is in Appendix A. 
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(1) Subsystem Name (4) Supplier Involvement (8) FMEA Date 
(2) Design Responsibility (5) Model/Product (9) FMEA Revision Date 
(2A) The Head of the System Design Team (6) Engineering Release Date (10) Part Name 
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(25) Approval Signatures (26) Concurring Signatures 
 
 
Table 1. An Example of Design FMEA (From Stamatis, page 131)
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l. FMEA Conclusion 
Technology can develop complex systems today. UAVs are an example of 
the increased automation built into a complex system. To be able to develop these 
systems efficiently, a number of appropriate system development processes can be used. 
Implementing such a process from the early stages of design is important for total 
development, cost, and time. 
The objective of a FMEA is to look for all the ways a system or product 
can fail. Failure occurs when a product or system does not function as it should, or when 
the user makes a mistake. Failure modes are ways in which a product or process can fail. 
Each failure mode has a potential effect. Some effects are more likely to occur than 
others. Each effect has a risk associated with it. The FMEA process is a way to identify 
failure modes effects and risks within a process or product, and eliminate or reduce them. 
The most important reason for conducting an FMEA is the need to 
improve. FMEAs have a positive impact because of their preventive role. The purpose of 
FMEA is preventing system and product problems before they occur. Used in the design 
and manufacturing process, they reduce cost and efforts by identifying product and 
system improvements early in the development phase when it is easier, faster and cheaper 
to make changes. 
m. Other Tools76 
(1)  Fault Tree Analysis (FTA).  This is a reasoned-conclusion 
“analytical technique for reliability and safety analysis used for complex dynamic 
systems.” It provides an “objective basis” for further analysis and changes. It was 
developed in 1961 by Bell Telephone Company and is widely used in many applications 
in industry. FTA is a logical tree in which the “various combinations of possible events” 
are represented graphically. It shows the “cause and effect relationships” between a 
single failure and its causes. At the top of the tree is the failure, and the various 
contributing causes are at the bottom branches of the tree. “The FTA always supplements 
the FMEA.” 
                                                 
76 The material from this section is taken (in some places verbatim) from Stamatis, pages 51-67, 
“Relationships of FMEA and Other Tools.” 
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This thesis develops a FTA for SUAVs. FTA process outline 
follows: 
(a) Identify the system fault state(s) or undesired events. 
The top event must be quantifiable, definable, noticeable, controllable and inclusive from 
the lower events. 
(b) Proceed with Fault tree construction. Determine the 
level to which the examination should be conducted and fully describe all events that 
immediately caused this event. With each lower level fault, describe its immediate causes 
until a component level failure or human error is exposed. 
(c) Fault tree analysis is the last step in which we must 
determine the minimal cut sets for tree simplification and the probability of each input 
event. For the AND logic gates the probability of the output is the product of the inputs 
probabilities while for the OR logic gates it is the sum if and only if the events are 
mutually exclusive. Finally we must determine the top event probability. 
(2) Functional flow diagrams or block diagrams “illustrate the 
physical or functional relationships” within a system under analysis. They are used to 
give a quick and comprehensive view of the system design requirements illustrating 
series and parallel relationships, hierarchy and other relationships among the system’s 
functions. The types of block diagrams used in FMEA are: 
(a) System Diagrams, used for identifying relationships 
between major components and other system components in large systems composed of 
several assemblies or subsystems, 
(b) Detail Diagrams, used for identifying relationships 
between each part within an assembly or subsystem, and  
(c) Reliability Diagrams, used for identifying the series 
dependence or independence of major components, subsystems or detail parts in 
achieving required functions.  
(3) FMA.  “Failure mode analysis (FMA) is a systematic approach 
to quantify failure modes, failure rate and root causes of known failures.” FMA is based 
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only on historical field and process data. It is a diagnostic tool because it concerns itself 
with only known and/or occurred failures. “Both FMA and FMEA deal with failure 
modes and causes.” FMA may be conducted first and then the outcome becomes input for 
the FMEA.  
(4) FMECA, FAMECA.  An FMEA becomes (FMECA or 
FAMECA) Failure Mode, Effects and Critically Analysis if criticalities are assigned to 
the failure mode effects.77 An analysis like that identifies any faulty components in the 
system so their reliability, or safety of operation, can be improved early enough so the 
designer can make corrections and set limitations in the design. FMECA results may also 
be useful when modifying the system and for maintenance planning. In a complex system 
all components cannot be redesigned. The most critical components are scientifically 
selected, and only these should be improved. FMECA is usually conducted during the 
design phase of a system. 
(5) FMCA.  “Failure mode and critical analysis (FMCA) is a 
systematic approach to quantify failure modes, rates and root causes from a criticality 
perspective.78” It is similar to the FMEA in all other details. An FMCA analysis is used 
“where the identification of critical, major and minor characteristics is important.” By 
focusing on criticality one can identify the single-point failure modes, which are a human 
error or hardware failure that can result in an accident. 
(6) QFD.  Quality function deployment (QFD) is a systematic 
methodology that unites the various working groups within a corporation and guides 
them to focus on customer’s choices, demands and expectations. QFD “encourages a 
comprehensive, holistic approach to product development.” It is a tool that interprets the 
customer’s requirements, through specific characteristics, manufacturing operations and 
production requirements. QFD and FMEA have much in common. They both target 
continual improvement by eliminating failures and looking for customer satisfaction. 
Usually, QFD occurs first and based on the results FMEA follows. 
                                                 
77 Hoyland, page 74. 
78 Stamatis, page 62. 
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(7) RCM. 79  Reliability-centered maintenance (RCM) has its roots 
in the aviation industry.80 Airlines and airplane manufacturers developed the RCM 
process in the late 1960’s. The initial development work was started by North American 
civil aviation industry. The airlines at that time began to realize that existing maintenance 
philosophies were not only too expensive but very dangerous as well. In 1980, an 
international civil aviation group developed an inclusive basis for different maintenance 
strategies. This basis is known as the Maintenance Steering Group-3 (MSG-3) for the 
aviation industry.81  
The earliest view of failure in the 1930’s was that as products aged, 
due to wear and tear, they were more likely to fail. So the best way to optimize system 
reliability and availability was by providing maintenance on a routine basis. During 
World War II, awareness about infant mortality led to the widespread belief in the 
“bathtub curve”. In that case, overhauls or component replacements should be done at 
fixed time intervals to optimize system reliability and availability. This is based on the 
assumption that most systems operate reliably for a period of “X” and then wear out. 
Keeping records on failures enables us to determine “X” and take preventive actions just 
before deterioration starts. This model is true for certain types of simple systems and 
some complex ones with age-related failure modes. However, after 1960, due to 
complexity of the systems, research revealed that six failure patterns actually occur in 
practice. Data collection and analysis will enable NAVAIR to determine which apply to 
SUAVs. 
(a) The bathtub curve. It begins with high 
occurrence/incidence of failure, which is the infant mortality, followed by constant or 
gradually increasing conditional probability of failure, and ends up in a wear-out zone 
due to age. 
                                                 
79 The material from this subsection is taken (in some places verbatim) from: Aladon Ltd, Specialists 
in the application of Reliability-Centered Maintenance, “Reliability Centred Maintenance-An 
Introduction,” Internet, February 2004. Available at: www.aladon.co.uk/10intro.html 
80 Hoyland, page 79. 
81 Aladon Ltd, Specialists in the application of Reliability-Centered Maintenance, “About RCM,” 
Internet, February 2004. Available at: www.aladon.co.uk/02rcm.html 
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(b) Constant or slowly increasing conditional probability of 
failure, ending in a wear-out zone. 
(c) Slowly increasing conditional probability of failure, but 
no recognizable wear-out zone. 
(d) A low conditional probability of failure when the system 
is new and then a rapid increase to a constant level. 
(e) A constant conditional probability of failure at all ages. 
(f) A high infant mortality during the early period and then 
constant or slowly decreasing conditional probability of failure. 



















































(c) (f)  
Figure 1.   The Six Failure Patterns 
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The idea of RCM is based on the realization that what users want depends 
on the operating context of the system. So RCM is “a process used to determine what 
must be done to ensure that any physical asset continues to do what its users want it to do 
in its present operating context.” The RCM process asks seven questions about the 
system under review. Any RCM process should ensure that all of the following seven 
questions are answered satisfactorily in the sequence shown below: 
• What are the functions and associated desired performance standards of 
the system in its present operating context? (Functions). 
• In what ways can it fail to fulfill its functions? (Functional failures). 
• What causes each functional failure? (Failure modes) 
• What happens when each failure occurs? (Failure effects). 
• In what way does each failure matter? (Failure ramifications) 
• What should be done to predict or prevent each failure? (Proactive tasks 
and task intervals). 
• What if a convenient solution cannot be found? (Default actions) 
Definitions of terms related to functions, functional failures, failure 
modes, and failure effects are presented in appendix C. 
(8) TAAF.  The Test-Analyze And Fix (TAAF) philosophy is 
accomplished in an iterative manner by conducting tests, collecting data, analyzing data, 
making the appropriate modifications and starting the tests again. The process starts by 
conducting tests on the prototypes. The failure data are collected and the causes are 
sought. Corrective actions are then taken to reduce the occurrence of future failures. The 
same process is repeated until the tests results are acceptable. 
Some characteristics of TAAF process are 
• All failures are fully analyzed. 
• Actions are taken in the design and/or production phase to ensure that 
failures do not recur. 
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• Tests are done at high level since improvements at that level have the 
maximum effect on system reliability. 
• Corrective actions must be taken as soon as possible on all components in 
the development program. 
In general, TAAF is a time consuming and costly reliability growth 
process, which resembles the spiral method of project development.82 
(9) FRACAS.  A Failure Reporting Analysis and Corrective Action 
system (FRACAS)83  or Data Reporting Analysis and Corrective Action System 
(DRACAS) is commonly referred as a “closed loop reporting system.” Implemented for a 
program during production, integration, testing, and field deployment phases, it allows 
for the collection and analyses of reliability and maintainability data for the hardware and 
software items. For a successful reliability improvement program, all failures should be 
considered. Every hardware and software failure, including the most simplistic ones, such 
as those caused by loose nuts and bolts or loose cables, should be investigated. Corrective 
action for each one should be developed. The manufacturer can use FRACAS results to 
“incorporate the corrective actions into the product.” 84 We develop a FRACAS for 
SUAVs in this thesis. 
2. Manned Aviation Specific: RCM, MSG-3 
a. Introduction to RCM 
Reliability centered maintenance (RCM) originated in the aviation 
industry in the late 60s. In the mid 70s, the US Department of Defense wanted to know 
more about aviation maintenance. As a result, Stanley Nowlan and Howard Heap of the 
United Airlines wrote a report titled “Reliability Centered Maintenance.” It was 
published in 1978, and it is still one of the most important documents in the history of 
physical asset management.85 RCM is “a process used to determine what must be done to 
                                                 
82 Blischke, R. W., and Murthy D. N. Prabhakar, Reliability Modeling, Prediction, and Optimization, 
John Wiley & Sons, 2000, page 547-548. 
83 Pecht, M., Product Reliability Maintainability and Supportability Handbook, CRC Press, 1995, 
page 322. 
84 Ibid, page 324. 
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ensure that any physical asset continues to do what its users want it to do in its present 
operating context.”  
b. The Seven Questions 
The RCM process answers seven questions about the system under review. 
Any RCM process should ensure that all of the following seven questions are answered 
satisfactorily and are answered in the sequence shown below: 
(1) What are the functions and associated desired performance 
standards of the system in its present operating context (functions). 
(2) In what ways can it fail to fulfill its functions? (Functional 
failures) 
(3) What causes each functional failure? (Failure modes) 
(4) What happens when each failure occurs? (Failure effects) 
(5) In what way does each failure matter? (Failure ramifications) 
(6) What should be done to predict or prevent each failure?  
(7) What if a preventative approach cannot be found? (Default 
actions) 
While defining the functions and desired standards of performance of a 
system, the objectives of maintenance are defined. Defining functional failures enables 
exact explanation of the meaning of failure. The functions and functional failures were 
addressed by the first two questions of the RCM process. The next two questions 
identified the failure modes, which are more likely to cause each functional failure, and to 
find out the failure effects associated with each failure mode. This is done by performing 
an FMEA for each functional failure.86  
c. RCM-287 
                                                 
85 Moubray, John summarized by Sandy Dunn, Plant Maintenance Resource Center, “Maintenance 
Task Selection-Part 3,” Revised September 18, 2002, Internet, May 2004. Available at: http://www.plant-
maintenance.com/articles /maintenance_tak_selection_part2.shtml 
86 The material from this part of section is taken (in some places verbatim) from: Aladon Ltd, 
“Introduction.” 
87 The material from this section is taken (in some places verbatim) from: Aladon Ltd, “About RCM.” 
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Nowlan and Heap’s report and MSG-3 have been used as a basis for 
various military RCM standards and for non-aviation derivatives. Of these, by far the 
most widely used is RCM-2. 
RCM-2 is a process used to decide what must be done to ensure that any 
physical asset, system or process continues to perform exactly as its user wants it to. The 
process defines what users expect from their assets in terms of 
(1) Primary performance parameters such as output, throughput, 
speed, range and carrying capacity, and 
(2) Risk (safety and environmental integrity), quality (precision, 
accuracy, consistency and stability), control, comfort, containment, economy, customer 
service and so on. 
The second step in the RCM-2 process is to identify the ways the system 
can fail, followed by an FMEA to associate all the events that are likely to cause each 
failure. 
The last step is to identify a suitable failure management policy for dealing 
with each failure mode. These policy options may include predictive maintenance, 
preventive maintenance, failure finding, or changing the design and/or configuration of 
the system. 
The RCM-2 process provides rules for choosing which of the failure 
management policies is technically appropriate and presents criteria for deciding the 
frequency of the various routine tasks.  
d. SAE STANDARD JA 1011 
RCM-2 complies with SAE Standard JA 1011 or “Evaluation Criteria for 
Reliability-Centered Maintenance (RCM) Process.” It was published in August 1999 by 
the Society of the Automotive Engineers (SAE). It is a brief document setting out the 
minimum criteria that any process must include to be called an RCM process when 
applied to any particular asset or system.88  
                                                 
88 The material from this section is taken (in some places verbatim) from: Aladon Ltd, “About RCM.” 
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The standard says that in order to be called an “RCM” process, a process 
must get satisfactory answers to the seven questions above, which must be asked, in that 
particular order. The rest of the standard identifies the information that must be gathered, 
and the decisions that must be made in order to answer each of these questions 
satisfactorily. 89 
e. MSG-390 
In July 1968, Handbook MSG-1, “Maintenance Evaluation and Program 
Development,” was developed by various airlines and air manufacturers’ representatives. 
Decision logic and airline/manufacturer procedures for scheduled maintenance 
development for the new Boeing 747 were the main part of the document. 
In the 1970’s the “Airline/Manufacturer Maintenance Program Planning 
Document” or MSG-2 was released. It was a universal document that updated the 
decision logic for the latest aircraft. 
In 1979, after a decade of MSG-2 implementation, “experience and events 
indicated” that MSG procedures needed updating. In addition, new generation aircraft 
maintenance requirements, new regulations on maintenance programs, the high price of 
fuel and spare parts greatly influenced maintenance program development. Various areas 
that where “most likely candidates for improvement” were the difficulty of the decision 
logic, the clarity of the difference between economic and safety issues, and the 
effectiveness of the hidden functional failures solutions. 
With the participation and combined efforts of the Federal Aviation 
Authority (FAA), Civil Aviation Administration from the UK (CAA/UK), the American 
Engineering Association (AEA), US and European aircraft engine manufacturers, 
airlines, and the US Navy created the MSG-3 document. 
                                                 
89 The material from the above part of section is taken (in some places verbatim) from: Athos 
Corporation, Reliability-Centered Maintenance Consulting, “SAE RCM Standard: JA 1011, Evaluation 
Criteria for RCM Process,” Internet, February 2004. Available at: http://www.athoscorp.com/SAE-
RCMStandard.html 
90 The material from this section is taken (in some places verbatim) from: Air Transport Association of 
America, “ATA MSG-3, Operator/Manufacturer Scheduled Maintenance Development, Revision 2002.1,” 
Nov 30, 2001, pages 6-8. 
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Some of the major improvements presented by MSG-3 as compared to 
MSG-2 were 
(1) For systems and powerplant treatment: 
(a) MSG-3 provides a “more rational procedure for task 
definition” and “linear progression through the decision logic.” 
(b) “MSG-3 logic took a top-down or consequence of 
failure approach.” At the beginning, the functional failure was evaluated for the 
consequences of failure and was assigned one of two basic categories, safety or 
economic. 
(c) Further classification established sub-categories based 
on “whether the failure was evident to or hidden from the operating crew.” 
(d) “Task selection questions were arranged in a sequence” 
so that the “most easily accomplished task, was considered first.” If the task was not 
applicable or effective, then “the next task in sequence was considered, down to and 
including possible redesign.” 
(2) Structures treatment, “fatigue, corrosion, accidental damage, 
age exploration” and other considerations were incorporated in the logic diagram. 
(3) “MSG-3 recognized the new damage tolerance rules and the 
supplemental inspection programs and provided a method by which their purpose could 
be adapted to the Maintenance Review Board (MRB) process instead of relying on type 
data certificate restrains.” The MRB is discussed in Appendix B. 
(4) MSG-3 logic was “task-oriented and not maintenance process 
oriented.” With the task-oriented concept, “one would be able to view the MRB 
document and identify the initial scheduled maintenance for a given item.” Definitions 
for the MRB are in appendix B. 
(5) Servicing/lubrication was included as part of the logic diagram 
to emphasize its severity. 
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(6) Treatment of hidden functional failures was more thorough 
because of their distinct separation from the evident functional failures. 
(7) “The effect of concurrent or multiple failures was considered.” 
(8) “Structures decision logic no longer contained a specific 
numerical rating system.” 
f. MSG-3 Revision91 
In 1987, after seven years of MSG-3 experience, the first revision was 
undertaken and released, and in 1993 revision two followed. In 2001, MSG-3 revision 
2001 was incorporated and in 2002, revision 2002 was issued and is now in effect. 
MSG-3 is intended to facilitate the development of initial 
scheduled maintenance. The remaining maintenance (that is non-
scheduled or non-routine maintenance) consists of maintenance actions to 
correct discrepancies noted during scheduled maintenance tasks, other 
non-scheduled maintenance, normal operation or data analysis. 
The analysis process identifies all scheduled tasks and intervals based on 
the aircraft’s certificated operating capabilities. 
“The management of the scheduled maintenance development activities” 
should be accomplished by an Industry Steering Committee (ISC), which consists of 
members from representatives of operators, and prime airframe and engine 
manufacturers. “The ISC should see that the MSG-3 process identifies 100% 
accountability for all Maintenance Significant Items (MSI’s) and Structural Significant 
Items (SSI’s).” 
An MSI is an item that has been identified by the manufacturer whose 
failure 
• can affect ground or flight safety, and/or 
• is undetectable during operation time, and/or 
• could have significant operational and/or economic impact.92 
                                                 
91 The material from this section is taken (in some places verbatim) from: ATA MSG-3, pages 9-13. 
92 ATA MSG-3, page 87. 
48 
A SSI is any “element or assembly,” related to significant flight, ground, 
pressure or control loads. An SSI failure could affect the structural integrity of the 
aircraft.93 
“One or more working groups, composed of specialist representatives 
from the participating operators, the prime manufacturer and the Regulatory Authority, 
may be constituted.” The ISC will approve analyses, technical data and information, 
which will be “consolidated into a final report for presentation to the Regulatory 
Authority.” 
g. General Development of Scheduled Maintenance94  
For each new type of aircraft, it is necessary to develop scheduled 
maintenance prior to its introduction into airline service. The MSG-3 (revision 2002) 
document has the primary purpose “to develop a proposal to assist the Regulatory 
Authority in establishing initial scheduled maintenance tasks and intervals for new types 
of aircraft and/or powerplants.” The intention is to maintain and to enhance the inherent 
“safety and reliability levels of the aircraft.” As operating experience is gained, the 
operator may make additional adjustments to maintain and to enhance safety and 
reliability. 
The objectives of efficient aircraft scheduled maintenance are 
• To ensure the inherent safety and reliability levels of the aircraft; 
• “To restore safety and reliability to their inherent levels when deterioration 
has occurred;” 
• “To obtain the information needed for design improvement of those items 
whose inherent reliability proves insufficient;” 
• To achieve the above goals at a minimum total cost. 
From the above objectives, obviously, scheduled maintenance can only 
prevent deterioration of inherent levels. If the inherent levels are unsatisfactory, then 
redesign is necessary to achieve the desired safety and reliability levels. 
                                                 
93 Ibid, page 89. 
94 The material from this section is taken (in some places verbatim) from: ATA MSG-3, pages 14-16. 
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Scheduled maintenance consists of two groups of tasks: 
(1) “A group of scheduled tasks to be accomplished at specified 
intervals. The objectives of these tasks are to prevent deterioration of the inherent safety 
and reliability levels of the aircraft.” They may include lubrication/servicing (LU/SV), 
operational/visual check (OP/VC), inspection/functional check (IN/FC), restoration (RS) 
and discard (DS). 
(2) A group of non-scheduled tasks that result from the scheduled 
tasks accomplished at specified intervals, and reports of malfunctions usually created by 
the operating crew and data analysis. The objectives of these tasks are to bring the aircraft 
to a desired condition. 
An efficient program schedules only those tasks necessary to meet the 
fixed objectives. Additional tasks, which will increase cost without any significant 
improvement in reliability, are not scheduled. The MSG-3 document “describes the 
method for developing the scheduled maintenance” using a “guided logic approach.” The 
logic flow of analysis is “failure-effect oriented” while the result must be a task-oriented 
program. Items with no scheduled task specified may be monitored by an operator’s 
reliability program. Finally, assumptions that can result in a change must be documented. 
h. Divisions of MSG-3 Document95 
The working portions of MSG-3 are contained in four sections. They are a 
section for System/Powerplant, including components and Auxiliary Power Units 
(APU’s); a section for aircraft structure; a section for zonal inspection; and finally a 
section for lightning/high intensity radiated field (L/HIRF) analysis. “Each section 
contains its own explanatory material and decision logic diagram, and it may be used 
independently of other MSG-3 sections.” 
In the following sections (i through p), Aircraft Systems/Powerplant 
Analysis is further discussed because it obviously has the closest potential relationship 
with SUAVs applications. 
i. MSI Selection96 
                                                 
95 The material from this section is taken (in some places verbatim) from: ATA MSG-3, page 16. 
96 The material from this section is taken (in some places verbatim) from: ATA MSG-3, pages 22-23. 
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Progressive logic diagram is the evaluation technique applied to each 
maintenance significant item (MSI) using the technical data available. An MSI may be a 
system, a subsystem, module, component, accessory, unit or part. In general, the 
evaluations are based on the item’s functional failures and causes of the failure. 
Before MSG-3 logic can be applied to an item, the aircraft’s significant 
systems and components must be identified. Then using the top-down approach MSIs 
must be identified. To select MSIs, the process is as follows: 
(1) The manufacturer divides the aircraft into the main functional 
areas, Air Transport Association (ATA) systems, and subsystems. This division continues 
“until all the aircraft’s replaceable components have been identified.” 
(2) “The manufacturer establishes the list of items to which MSI 
selection questions will be applied.” 
(3) Those questions applied to the items in the lists are 
(a) “Could failure be undetectable or not likely to be 
detected by the operating crew during normal duties?” (Detectability) 
(b) Could failure affect safety on ground or in flight? 
(Safety part of severity) 
(c) “Could failure have a significant operational impact?” 
(Operational part of severity) 
(d) “Could failure have a significant economic impact?” 
(Economic part of severity) 
(4)  Subsequent analysis. 
(a) If at least one of the above four questions is answered 
with “yes,” MSG-3 analysis is required. “An MSI is usually a system or subsystem,” and 
in most cases is “one level above the lowest level identified” on (1). “This level is 
considered the highest manageable level; i.e. one that is high enough to avoid 
unnecessary analysis, but low enough to be properly analyzed.” 
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(b) For those items for which all four questions are 
answered with a “no,” MSG-3 analysis is not required. “The lower level items should be 
listed to identify those that will not be further assessed.” This list must be reviewed and 
approved by the Industry Steering Committee (ISC). 
(5) The resulting list for the highest manageable level items is 
considered the “candidate MSI list” and is presented by the manufacturer to the ISC. The 
ISC reviews and approves this list, which is passed to the working groups (WGs). 
(6) The WGs review the candidate MSI list in order “to verify that 
no significant items have been overlooked, and that the right level for the analysis has 
been chosen.” By applying MSG-3 analysis, the WGs can “validate the selected highest 
manageable level or propose modification of the MSI list to the ISC.” 
j. Analysis Procedure97 
For each MSI, the following must be identified: 
• Function(s), the “normal characteristic actions of an item” 
• Functional Failure(s), the failure of an item to perform its planned 
function(s) 
• Failure Effect(s), the result of a functional failure 
• Failure Cause(s), the reason for the functional failure occurrence 
Analysis should take special care to “identify the functions of all 
protective devices,” and include economic and safety related tasks in order to “produce 
initial scheduled maintenance tasks and intervals.” Vendor recommendations (VR) that 
are available should be “considered and discussed in the WGs meetings and accepted if 
they are applicable and effective.” 
A preliminary work sheet, prior to applying the MSG-3 logic diagram to 
an item, clearly defines the MSI, its function(s), functional failure(s), failure cause(s) and 
additional data for each item. 
k. Logic Diagram98 
                                                 
97 The material from this section is taken (in some places verbatim) from: ATA MSG-3, pages 23-24. 
98 The material from this section is taken (in some places verbatim) from: ATA MSG-3, pages 24-25. 
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The decision logic diagram, illustrated in Figure 2 and 3, assists in 
analyzing systems in general and powerplant items in particular. The logic flow follows a  
top-down approach and answers the “yes” or “no” questions giving the direction of the 
analysis flow after each answer. 
There are two levels in the decision analysis: 
“(1) Level 1 requires the evaluation of each functional failure in 
order to determine the failure effect category; i.e. safety, operational, economic, hidden 
safety or hidden non-safety. 
(2) Level 2 then takes the failure cause(s) for each functional 
failure into account for selecting the specific type of task(s).”  
In Level 2, regardless of the answer to the first question about 
lubrication/servicing (LU/SV), the next task selection question must always be asked. 
When following the hidden or evident safety effects path, all successive questions must 
be asked. In the remaining categories that follow the first question, a “yes” answer 
permits exiting the logic. 
Default logic concerns areas paths that do not affect safety. If there is no 
“adequate information to a clear ‘yes’ or ‘no’ to the questions in the second level, then 
default logic dictates a ‘no’ answer.” “No,” as an answer in most cases, provides a more 
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Figure 2.   Systems Powerplant Logic Diagram Part1 (After ATA MSG-3, page 18) 
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This procedure requires consideration of the functional failures, 
failure causes, and the applicability or effectiveness of each task. Each 
functional failure processed through the logic will be directed into one of 




• Hidden safety 
• Hidden non-safety100 
m. Fault Tolerant Systems Analysis101 
“In MSG-3 analysis, a fault tolerant system is one that has redundant 
elements that can fail without impacting safety or operating capability.” These faults are 
not very noticeable to the operating crew and the aircraft’s safety and airworthiness is not 
impaired. So, “functional failures, in fault tolerant systems, are hidden non-safety.” The 
“fault-tolerant” faults can be “detected by interrogation of the system.” 
The method for analyzing MSIs that include fault-tolerant functions has 
the following steps: 
• “The manufacturer identifies and lists all functions, highlighting those that 
are fault-tolerant.” 
• The basis for identifying fault-tolerant functions must be provided. 
• “For non-fault-tolerant functions, the standard analysis process must be 
used.” 
• “For fault-tolerant functions, the WGs must determine and select an 
applicable and effective task and interval, based on the available data from 
the manufacturer.” 
                                                 
99 ATA MSG-3, page 25. 
100 Ibid, page 21. 
101 The material from this section is taken (in some places verbatim) from: ATA MSG-3, page 26. 
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n. Consequences of Failure in the First level102 
There are four first-level questions. 
(1)  Evident or Hidden Functional Failure.  Question: “Is the 
occurrence of a functional failure evident to the operating crew during the performance of 
normal duties?” 
The intention for this question is to separate the evident from the 
hidden functional failures. The operating crew is the pilots and air crew on duty. The 
ground crew is not part of the operating crew. A “yes” answer indicates the functional 
failure is evident and leads to Question 2. A “no” answer indicates the functional failure 
is hidden and leads to Question 3. 
(2)  Direct Adverse Effect on Safety.  Question: “Does the 
functional failure or secondary damage resulting from the functional failure have a direct 
unfavorable effect on operating safety?” 
A direct functional failure or resulting secondary damage 
“achieves its effect by itself, not in combination with other functional failures.” If the 
consequences of the failure condition would “prevent the continued safe flight and 
landing of the aircraft and/or might cause serious or fatal injury to human occupants,” 
then safety should be considered as unfavorably affected. A “yes” answer indicates that 
this functional failure must be considered within “the Safety Effects category” and task(s) 
must be developed accordingly. A “no” answer indicates the effect is either “operational 
or economic” and leads to question 4. 
(3)  Hidden Functional Failure Safety Effect.  Question: “Does the 
combination of a hidden functional failure and one additional failure of a system related 
or back-up function have an adverse effect on operating safety?” 
This question is asked of each hidden functional failure, identified 
in Question 1. A “yes” answer indicates that there is a “safety effect and task 
development must proceed in accordance” with the hidden-function safety-effects 
category. A “no” answer indicates that there is a “non-safety effect and will be handled in 
accordance” with hidden-function non-safety effects category. 
                                                 
102 The material from this section is taken (in some places verbatim) from: ATA MSG-3, pages 26-30. 
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(4)  Operational Effect.  Question: “Does the functional failure 
have a direct unfavorable effect on operating capabilities?” 
In this question, considerations must be taken concerning the 
operating restrictions, correction prior to further dispatch, and abnormal or emergency 
procedures from the flight crew. A “yes” as an answer means that the effect of the 
functional failure has an unfavorable effect on operating capability, and task selection 
will be handled in evident operational effects category. A “no” as an answer means that 
there is an economic effect and should be handled in accordance with evident economic 
effects category. 
o. Failure Effect Categories in the First Level103 
After the analysts have answered the applicable first-level questions, “they 
are directed to one of the five effect categories.” 
(1)  Evident Safety:  The Evident Safety Effect category concerns 
the safety operation assurance tasks. “All questions in this category must be asked.” In 
case no effective task(s) results from this category analysis, “redesign is mandatory.” 
(2)  Evident Operational:  In this category, a task is “desirable if it 
reduces the risk of failure to an acceptable level.” Analysis requires the first question 
(LU/SV) to be answered and regardless of the answer, to proceed to the next level 
question. From that point a “yes” as an answer completes the analysis and “the resultant 
task(s) will satisfy the requirements.” If all answers are “no,” then no task has been 
generated and if operational penalties are severe, redesign may be desirable. 
(3)  Evident Economic:  In that category, a task(s) is desirable if its 
cost is less than the repair cost. Analysis has the same logic as the operational category. If 
all answers are “no,” then no task has been generated and if economic penalties are 
severe, a redesign may be desirable. 
(4)  Hidden Safety:  “The hidden function safety effect requires a 
task(s) to assure the availability necessary to avoid the safety effect of multiple failures.” 
All questions must be asked and “if there are no tasks found effective, then redesign is 
mandatory.” 
                                                 
103 The material from this section is taken (in some places verbatim) from: ATA MSG-3, pages 31-38. 
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(5).  Hidden non-Safety:  “The hidden function non-safety category 
indicates that a task(s) may be desirable to assure the availability necessary to avoid the 
economic effects of multiple failures.” Analysis has the same logic as the operational 
category. If all answers are “no,” no task has been generated and if economic penalties 
are severe, a redesign may be desirable. 
p. Task Development in the Second level104 
For each of the five-effect categories, task development is used in a similar 
manner. “It is necessary to apply the failure causes for the functional failure to the second 
level of the logic diagram” for the task resolution as in Table 2. There are six possible 
task follow-on questions in the effect categories. 
(1)  Lubrication/servicing (in all categories).  Question: “Is the 
lubrication or servicing task applicable and effective?” 
“Any act of lubrication or servicing for the purpose of maintaining 
the inherent design capabilities” is considered. 
(2)  Operational/visual check (hidden functional failure categories 
only).  Question: “Is a check to verify operation applicable and effective?” 
“The operational check is a task to determine that an item is 
fulfilling its intended purpose.” It is a failure-finding task and does not require 
quantitative tolerances. “A visual check is an observation to determine that an item is 
fulfilling its intended purpose.” It is also a failure-finding task and does not require 
quantitative tolerances. 
(3)  Inspection/functional check (All categories).  Question: “Is an 
inspection or functional check to detect degradation of function applicable and 
effective?” 
An inspection could be general and visual, detailed with surface 
cleaning or elaborate access procedures, special detailing with excess surface cleaning 
and substantial access and disassembly procedures. “A functional check is a quantitative 
check to determine if one or more functions of an item performs within specified limits.” 
                                                 
104 The material from this section is taken (in some places verbatim) from: ATA MSG-3, pages 31-47. 
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(4)  Restoration (All categories).  Question: Is a restoration task to 
reduce the failure rate applicable and effective? 
Restoration is the “work necessary to return the item to a specific 
standard.” The scope of each assigned restoration task has to be clearly specified. 
(5)  Discard (All categories).  Question: Is a discard task to avoid 
failures or reduce the failure rate applicable and effective? 
Discard is the “removal from service of an item at a specified life 
limit.” It is a typical task applied to single celled parts such as cartridges, canisters, 
filters, engine disks, etc. 
(6)  Combination (Safety categories only).  Question: Is there a 
task or combination of tasks applicable and effective? 
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Table 2. Task Selection Criteria (After ATA MSG-3, page 46) 
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3. Comparison of Existing Methods 
a. RCM 
It is clear that maintenance activity must help ensure that the inherent 
levels of safety and reliability of the aircraft are maintained.  
The days of doing maintenance just for the sake of maintenance or 
because it makes us “feel good” are past. Studies have revealed that 
technicians performing maintenance based on “trivial knowledge” rather 
than the air carrier’s approved maintenance program have generated 
errors. In other cases, technicians performing approved maintenance that 
was not necessary have also generated maintenance errors. Each time we 
provide technicians access to an aircraft, we also provide the potential for 
that technician to inadvertently induce an error.105  
We may say in simple words that the RCM goals are to: 
• Ensure realization of the equipment’s inherent safety and reliability. 
• Restore equipment’s safety and reliability to required levels when 
deterioration occurs. 
• Obtain the information necessary for design improvements where inherent 
reliability is insufficient. 
• Accomplish these goals at a minimum total life-cycle cost. 106 
The RCM logic is simply to: 
• Determine the function of the system/component; 
• Find out what the functional failures are; 
• Evaluate the consequences of each failure; and, 
• Assign the least expensive but adequate maintenance task to prevent each 
failure.107 
                                                 
105 Nakata, Dave, White paper, “Can Safe Aircraft and MSG-3 Coexist in an Airline Maintenance 
Program?”, Sinex Aviation Technologies, 2002, Internet, May 2004. Available at: http://www.sinex.com/ 
products/Infonet/q8.htm 
106 The above part is taken (in some places verbatim) from: Nakata. 
107 The above part is taken (in some places verbatim) from: National Aeronautics and Space 
Administration (NASA), “Reliability Centered Maintenance & Commissioning,” slide 5, February 16, 
2000, Internet, May 2004. Available at: http://www.hq.nasa.gov/office/codej/codejx/Intro2.pdf 
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b. Conducting RCM Analysis 
Some managers, who see RCM as a quick, cheap and easy route to 
obtaining the particular maintenance policies they are seeking, frequently overrule junior 
staff taking part in RCM analysis. This is a poor approach to the conduct of any analysis. 
RCM is better conducted by a review group, which may involve senior staff alongside 
more junior staff. An experienced analyst with a developed background in RCM and in 
managing groups should lead it. If the group functioning is wrong, it is improper to blame 
RCM for what project management is failing to achieve.108  
c. Nuclear Industry & RCM109 
The initial maintenance programs in US nuclear power plants were 
developed in conventional fashion, mainly depending on vendor recommendations. 
“Continuing efforts to enhance safety and reliability” resulted in “utility management at 
some plants” questioning if the overall outcome was a “significant degree of over-
maintenance.” By the early 80s, the nuclear power industry seemed to be “faced with a 
choice of either generating power or doing the prescribed planned maintenance (PM).” 
They were seeking a way to reduce the PM workloads without impairing safety or 
reliability. This is the same type of question applicable to SUAV maintenance. 
The Electric Power Research Institute (EPRI) became aware of the 
Nowlan & Heap report on RCM published in 1978. However, after the initial applications 
of RCM, many plants developed their own methods for maintenance optimization, which 
deviated from RCM principles. “They took the view that high levels of redundancy in 
their safety systems, high levels of regulations imposing failure-finding tasks, and the 
fairly simple mission of the power generating systems at such plants could validly 
support certain simplifications of the methodology.” They also took the view that in older 
plants the existing experience had found all potential failure modes, and there was a very 
detailed record keeping conducted by the nuclear power industry. So “they felt that the 
function analysis and the FMEA steps embodied in the RCM process could be 
simplified.” 
                                                 
108 The above part is taken (in some places verbatim) from: Clarke Phill, “Letter to the Editor of New 
Engineer Magazine regarding Professor David Sherwin at ICOMS 2000,” question 10, August 2000, 
Internet, May 2004. Available at: http://www.assetpartnership.com/downloads.htm-13k 
109 The material from this section is taken (in some places verbatim) from: Moubray, page 3. 
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“The most abbreviated approach,” recommended by EPRI in TR-105365 
in September 1995, “modified the RCM process by setting up a list of simple functional 
questions,” without further functional analysis, the question is whether the component 
failure leads to: 
(1) plant trip (shutdown), 
(2) power reduction of more than 5% (degradation), 
(3) loss of a safety function, 
(4) plant transient (recoverable), 
(5) personnel hazard, or 
(6) delay in start-up (mission delay)? 
“These processes achieved their limited objectives in the nuclear industry” 
and they led to a very substantial reduction in the PM workload without impairing safety 
or reliability. Effects (1), (2), (3), and (5) are noticeable in SUAV operations. Event (4) is 
rarely tracked. Event (6) occurs routinely but rarely recorded. 
d. RCM in NAVAIR110 
“As reported by US Naval Air Command (NAVAIR), current operation 
and support (O&S) costs for naval aviation weapon systems consume 50 to 60 percent of 
the Navy’s total operating account” with a tendency to increase every year by a rate of 5 
percent.  
NAVAIR, which was one of the sponsors of the original Nowlan & Heap 
report, found that some vendors were using all sorts of unique and custom-made 
processes, which they described as “RCM processes,” to develop maintenance programs 
for equipment that they were selling to NAVAIR. “In this age of ‘do more with less,’ 
there is a problem that has infected the discipline of physical asset management. In the 
interest of saving time and money, corrupted versions of RCM, versions that 
                                                 
110 The material from this section is taken (in some places verbatim) from: Regan, Nancy, RCM Team 
Leader, Naval Air Warfare Center, Aircraft Division, “US Naval Aviation Implements RCM,” undated, 
Internet, February 2004. Available at: http://www.mt-online.com/articles/0302_navalrcm.cfm 
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irresponsibly shorten the process, continue to flood the market. These tools are 
incorrectly called RCM.” 
These wayward RCM processes led NAVAIR to approach the Society of 
Automobile Engineers (SAE) as a recognized standard-setting institution with close 
relations to the US Military and to the aerospace industry, and SAE JA 1011 was 
published in August 1999. It is a brief document setting out all the minimum criteria that 
any process must include to be called an RCM process when applied to any particular 
asset or system.111 
When NAVAIR initially implemented RCM in some systems, the 
economic savings included, on average: 
• Scheduled maintenance reduced by 75 percent per year. 
• Consumable usage decreased 88 percent per year. 
• Disposal of hazardous material decreased 84 percent per year.  
e. RCM in Industries Other Than Aviation and Nuclear Power112 
RCM has been applied in many industrial sites in many countries. “These 
applications have embodied the performance of several thousand RCM analyses.” RCM 
applications have not been successful in every case. It can be said to have failed in about 
one-third of the cases. None of the initiatives that failed was due to technical reasons but 
for organizational ones. The two most common reasons for failure are 
(1) The head internal sponsor of the effort “quit the organization or 
moved to a different position before the new ways of thinking embodied in the RCM 
process” could be absorbed. 
(2) The internal sponsor and/or the consultant, who was the acting 
change agent, “could not generate sufficient enthusiasm for the process,” so it was not 
applied in a way which would yield results. 
                                                 
111 The material from the above part of section is taken (in some places verbatim) from: Aladon Ltd, 
“About RCM.”  
112 The material from this section is taken (in some places verbatim) from: Moubray, page 5. 
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Of course, the other two-thirds have been successful. There is “a high 
correlation between the success rate of RCM-2 (MSG-3) applications and the change 
management capabilities of the consultants involved.” For example, the (British) Royal 
Navy (RN), which is a major user of SAE-compliant RCM, “has come to understand that 
the capabilities of individual consultants are as important as the track record of their 
employers.” So the “RN now insists on interviewing at great length every RCM 
consultant that is at their disposal” to verify the commercial sincerity of the employers. 
When discussing RCM, both the economic benefits and the question of 
risk are considerations. For the economic benefits in some cases, “the payback period has 
been measured in days and sometimes one or two years.” The normal period is weeks to 
months. “These economic benefits flow from improved plant performance”  mostly, 
although in some cases users (especially military) have achieved very substantial 
“reductions in direct maintenance costs”.  
It is often said that RCM “is a good tool for developing maintenance 
programs in ‘high risk’ situations” and that “some equipment items have such low impact 
on business risk that the effort required to perform RCM analysis on them is greater than 
the potential benefits.” The truth is that “no physical asset or system can be deemed to be 
‘low risk’ unless it has been subjected at the very least to a zero-based FMECA” that 
proves it is in fact low risk. 
(1) From the results of thousands of RCM-2 (MSG-3) analyses that 
are being performed around the world, and incidents in supposedly “low risk,” some 
industries have avoided very serious business consequences. 
(2) On average about 4% of the failure modes have direct safety or 
environmental implications. Frequently, findings showed that as many as 25% of the 
failure modes are not currently receiving any form of preventive maintenance. Most of 
those failure modes concern protective devices that had not been receiving proper 
attention prior to the RCM-2 analysis. 
About the supposedly “low risk” industries: automobile and food plants 
are frequently said to be “low risk,” and therefore not worth strict and rigorous analysis. 
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The truth is that you cannot characterize these industries as low risk as the following 
examples indicate: 
(1) The boiler that exploded during a maintenance inspection at 
Ford’s River Rouge plant in Detroit in February 1999, killing six and shutting the plant 
down for 10 days, 
(2) The failure of the Firestone tires on Ford Explorers, which has 
been charged to the design, the operating pressure and to manufacturing process failures. 
These failures put the existence of Firestone as a company at risk, 
(3) The failure of a filter used in the Perrier water bottling in 
France, leading to the recall of thousands of Perrier products and an enormous cost to the 
company. 
Although rare events, it is wrong to characterize a task or a component or a 
failure as “low risk,” especially if all failure modes had not being considered. 
f. FMEA and RCM113 
“An FMEA, usually conducted in the design phase of an equipment or 
system, can also be used as a tool for analysis in RCM.” While defining the functions and 
desired standards of performance of an asset, the objectives of maintenance with respect 
of that asset are defined. Defining functional failures enables us to explain what we mean 
by “failed.” These two issues were addressed by the first two questions of the RCM 
process. The next two questions seek to identify the failure modes that are reasonably 
likely to cause each functional failure and to find out the failure effects associated with 
each failure mode. This is done by performing an FMEA for each functional failure. An 
FMEA contains: 
• Description and detection for each failure mode 
• Cause and effects of each failure 
• Probability of failure (occurrence) 
• Criticality of failure (severity) 
                                                 
113 The material from this section is taken (in some places verbatim) from: NASA, slide 13. 
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• Corrective/preventive measures 
FMEA is the key to a successful commissioning program. For newly 
developed systems with not much experience gained by the developing parties, 
insufficient oversight, and many unknown potential circumstances, requirements are not 
standard and certain. Requirements in systems under development, like the UAVs, are a 
matter of research, experience and technology advances. 
g. FMECA 
Trying to perform an FMEA to a new system under development, such as 
SUAVs, is not an easy task because a lot of details keep changing. Instead, an FMECA is 
better since critical issues are those considered first priority. FMECA is a first-step effort 
that can be done in such a case.  
h. FTA, FMEA, FMECA114 
“The question to be addressed when considering the most appropriate 
system analysis tool is whether to conduct a FMECA/FMEA or a FTA.” The most 
obvious answer to that decision making question is “it depends”. The “criticality of a 
mission and/or personnel safety” matters are the primary driving concern and the initial 
reason for a FTA. The FTA’s target is “finely focused” to a point compared to that of a 
FMECA’s which is not focused only to one point but to a broader area.  
“If there are many different areas of concern and all of them need to be 
revealed, then a FMECA is more effective because it has a greater chance of finding the 
critical failure modes.” If only a single event or a few events that can be clearly defined 
are of crucial concern, then FTA is favored.  
The desire for either a qualitative and/or a quantitative analysis is not the 
distinguishing factor for selecting a FTA or a FMECA/FMEA. Either approach can give 
qualitative or quantitative results. The following table gives guidance for choosing 
between FTA and FMECA/FMEA. 
                                                 
114 The material from this section is taken (in some places verbatim) from: Reliability Analysis Center 
(RAC), Fault Tree Analysis (FTA) Application Guide, 1990, pages 8-10. 
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Safety of personnel or public as the primary concern X  
A small number of explicitly defined “top events” X  
Inability to clearly define a small number of “top events”  X 
Mission completion is of critical importance X  
Any number of successful missions  X 
“All possible” failure modes are of concern  X 
“Human errors” contributions are of concern X  
“Software errors” contributions are of concern X  
A numerical “Risk evaluation” is the primary concern X  
System is highly complex and interconnected X  
System with linear architecture and little human or software 
intervention 
 X 
System is not repairable X  
 
Table 3. FTA and FMECA/FMEA (After RAC FTA, page 10) 
 
i. FTA115 
For any reliability program, FTA is an effective tool. It is a quick way of 
“understanding the causes of a system’s inherent problems” and also a way to “identify 
potential safety hazards during the design phase.”  
Tailoring the FTA to fit the specific type of analysis that is necessary for a 
certain scope requires two decisions. The selection of the “top event,” which is the target 
upon which the FTA is to focus is the first decision, and the concern of whether the 
analysis is about to yield qualitative or quantitative or both types of results is the second 
decision. 
j. RCM Revisited 
“RCM is better in the operating and support phase of the life cycle of a 
system” This is true when considering how and why RCM was created. For example, 
airplanes were used from the beginning of the previous century. The general concept of 
the airplane has been known for many years. Legal requirements and special regulations 
controlling manned-aviation have also been in place for many years. Thus, in this case, 
                                                 
115 The material from this section is taken (in some places verbatim) from: RAC FTA, pages 9-11. 
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RCM provided solutions to certain manned-aviation problems mainly related to 
operations and maintenance issues with safety and economics as backgrounds. Similarly, 
many other industries also employed RCM to solve such problems. 
By definition, RCM is a methodology for determining the most cost-
effective maintenance strategy for a given item of equipment taking into account its 
operating environment. When a product is in design phase, the designers have little 
historical experience so the whole effort is focused on developing something that works 
and is not focused on cost-effective strategies. The following table gives guidance for 
choosing between MSG-3 and FMEA/FMECA. 
 





Safety of personnel or public as the primary concern X  
Top-down approach of failure analysis X  
Bottom-up approach of failure analysis  X 
System is highly complex and interconnected X  
Early design and development phase  X 
Implementation cost  X 
Implementation timescale  X 
Economy issues are of critical importance X  
“All possible” failure modes are of concern X X 
“Human errors” contributions are of concern X X 
“Software errors” contributions are of concern X  
Systems with little human and a lot of software intervention X  
First tool for initial failure analysis  X 
Available for the entire system life-cycle (long-term) X  
Available for the entire system life-cycle (short-term)  X 
Implementation effort  X 
Operational phase X  
Conducted by experienced personnel  X  
Training requirements X  
Extensive and conclusive X  




Table 4. MSG-3 and FMECA/FMEA 
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k. UAVs, SUAVs versus Manned Aircraft 
The primary difference between manned piloted aircraft and UAVs is that 
piloted aircrafts rely on the presence of humans to detect (sense) and respond to changes 
in the vehicle’s operation. The human can sense the condition of the aircraft, say with 
unusual vibration that may indicate structural damage or impending engine failure. 
Humans can sense events within and outside the vehicle, gaining what is known as 
“situational awareness.”  
For manned military aviation the philosophy is pilot and aircraft-oriented. 
The valuable life of the pilot who spends so much time in studies, training, and gaining 
the experience of hundreds of flight hours, is the number one factor. The expensive, state-
of-the-art multi-mission-capable aircraft is the number two factor. For UAVs, the 
philosophy is mission and cost-oriented. Different missions require different systems, 
different platforms with different capabilities. It is also desired that the cost should 
remain as low as possible. Technology helps to achieve both those goals for UAVs. 
Better, cheaper technologies can be adapted very easily and very quickly to UAVs. 
UAVs can be remotely piloted (“controlled”) from the ground. It is 
difficult for the pilot (operator) to feel and sense having the same or better situational 
awareness than if he was piloted a manned aircraft. For SUAVs, specifically, volume, 
weight, cost, duration of flight, and sensor capabilities are the primary factors of interest. 
Personnel safety is approached differently than manned aviation. With costs starting from 
$15K up to $300K per platform, SUAVs are considered expendables, but reusables, and 
treated accordingly. Thus SUAV reliability is low since they are designed to be 
inexpensive and have a relatively short life circle. 
During the last few years, commanders no longer want their SUAVs to be 
“toys” that uncertainly expand their capabilities. Commanders want their SUAVs to be 
operationally effective assets to help win battles. “Operationally, the same case may be 
made for ensuring the missions are completed if we rely on UAVs to accomplish mission 
critical tasks once done using manned assets.”116  
                                                 
116 Clough, Bruce, “UAVS-You Want Affordability and Capability? Get Autonomy!” Air Force 
Research Laboratory, 2003. 
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There are some facts about SUAV systems that require consideration: 
(1) They are potentially valuable on battlefields. 
(2) Unreliability creates operational ineffectiveness. 
(3) SUAV design philosophy remains mission and cost oriented. 
(4) Software and hardware reliability improvement is desirable. 
(5) Tracking reliability of SUAVs provides insight on operational 
availability. Currently, there is not any system to track SUAVs reliability in use. 
(6) Most of the SUAVs are not maritime systems; they are in design phase 
or operational testing.  
(7) Sensor and miniaturization technology for SUAVs changes rapidly. 
(8) Systems are not highly complex. 
(9) The new unmanned aviation “community” has started to develop; 
experience operating SUAVs has just started to accumulate. 
(10) Human factors for the GCS are critical since they are the linkage 
between the system and its effective employment. 
l. Conclusions-Three Main Considerations about UAV- RCM  
The reliability tracking and improvement system for SUAVs must be 
inexpensive, easily and quickly adapted, and implemented by a few, relatively  
inexperienced personnel. It must also cover the entire system’s issues of hardware, 
software and human factors. The safety requirements for personnel apply only to the 
ground operators and maintainers and the main source of data for hidden failures during 
flight can only be provided by telemetry. Finally, because sensor technology is rapidly 
developing and easily implemented due to low cost, the reliability tracking and 
improvement system for SUAVs must be easily adaptable to changes. 
From the above we can construct the following table which summarizes 






















1 Reliability improvement needed X X 
2 Mission and cost oriented  X 
3 Operational testing and development phase  X 
4 Rapid changes in technology  X 
5 Inexpensive and easily adapted methodology   X 
6 Telemetry is used a lot (Hidden failure difficult to identify)  X 
7 Safety for operating personnel is not a critical issue  X 
8 Experienced personnel difficult to find  X 
9 Human factors for GCS is critical X X 
 
Table 5. Comparing RCM MSG-3 and FMEA/FMECA for SUAVs. 
 
So, the main considerations about RCM implementation for SUAVs are: 
(1) Safety has an important role in RCM methodology because of 
the nature of civil aviation. The primary goal for civil aviation is to transport people and 
goods safely. Safety standards and strict rules are the top priority and, so they become a 
priority in RCM analysis. For industries where RCM has been applied, safety has almost 
the same role as in the aviation case because of strict regulations and standards for the 
operators and the employees. In the UAV case, however, there are no people onboard, so 
safety for travelers and crew is not as critical an issue. 
(2) In the RCM process, the key factor for the initial identification 
of the hidden failure is the flight crew. In the UAV case, there is no crew aboard and so 
there is no chance for crew to sense hidden failures. The only indication that might be 
available is the platforms’ control sensors reading while in-flight and the system’s 
performance while a platform is tested on the ground prior to take-off. 
(3) Experience gained in civil aviation cannot be applied directly to 
UAVs. 
From the above it is clear that RCM MSG-3 is not suitable for 
SUAVs. These leaves fault tree analysis and FMEA as the remaining methods. We 
develop both in detail for the SUAV in the subsequent chapters of this thesis. 
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B. SMALL UAV RELIABILITY MODELING 
During recent urban operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, SUAVs that provide 
over-the-hill or around-the-corner information were invaluable for operating teams. Some 
systems have been tested with very good results, but controversy surrounds the 
capabilities of such systems. A generic SUAV system must provide military forces with 
real-time around the clock surveillance, target acquisition, and battle assessment. Such a 
system must be capable of detecting any desired tactical information in a designated 
sector. 
Each service component (Navy, Army, and Marines) requires versatile, easy to 
handle, and user-friendly systems that enable the commander to conduct reconnaissance 
on the battlefield in real-time. SUAVs are being seriously considered for this role. This 
entails a small-scale operation over a city block, or more extensive surveillance missions. 
Requirements of the system include locating and identifying targets, then relaying the 
information to a higher command. The detection accuracy should be sufficient to select 
and to deploy weapons, and then to maintain contact after engagement with such 
weapons. The system must be able to survey a large area rapidly using multiple platforms 
simultaneously. The configuration of the system should enhance the fighting capabilities 
of the force, minimizing the time for precise control movements and maximizing 
mobility, robustness and functionality. Due to previous experience with similar systems, 
reliability and interoperability are most important considerations. 
1. System’s High Level Functional Architecture  
As illustrated in Figure 4, SUAV battlefield systems high-level architecture 
consists of the following: 
(1). Platform(s) 
(a) Navigation with Global Positioning System (GPS) and Inertial 
Navigation System (INS) 
(b) Flight control with remote manual, semi-auto, and full-auto 
(autonomous) mode of operation 
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(c) Onboard computer (OBC) 
(d) Payload with the appropriate sensors for the type of mission 
(2). Ground control station (GCS) with command, monitor and support 





















Figure 4.   High Level Architecture of a SUAV System (After Fei-Bin) 
 
For more detailed system architecture, refer to Figure 5: 
                                                 
117 Fei-Bin, Hsiao, and others, ICAS 2002, 23rd International Congress of Aeronautical Sciences, 
proceedings, Toronto Canada, 8 to 13 September, 2002, Article: “The Development of a Low Cost 

















































































9. Proximity to Sea








Figure 5.   Simple Block Diagram of a SUAV System 
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For the platform’s configuration, weight and volume are critical factors because 
of the limited size and the flight characteristics of the platform. The system is a complex 
one and reliability plays an important role for the operational effectiveness of the system. 
In general, there are two ways to increase reliability: Fault tolerance and fault 
avoidance.118 
(1) Fault tolerance can be accomplished through redundancy in hardware 
and/or in software. The disadvantage is that it increases the complexity of an already 
complex system, as well as increasing equipment costs, volume, weight, and power 
consumption. 
(2) Fault avoidance can be accomplished by improving reliability of 
certain components that constitute the system. In general, those components that 
contribute the most to reliability degradation are the most critical for fault avoidance.  
The SUAV system cannot implement fault tolerance, at least for the platforms, so 
fault avoidance is the better approach. To achieve this, at first we must conduct an FMEA 
in order to define and to identify each subsystem function and its associated failure 
modes for each functional output. 
In order to proceed in the FMEA, as analysts we will need the following: 
(1) System definition and functional breakdown, 
(2) Block diagram of the system, 
(3) Theory of operation, 
(4) Ground rules and assumptions, 
(5) Software specifications. 
As a second step, we conduct a criticality analysis in order to identify those 
mission critical elements that cause potential failures and weaknesses. 
                                                 
118 Reliability Analysis Center (RAC), Reliability Toolkit: Commercial Practices Edition. A Practical 
Guide for Commercial Products and Military Systems Under Acquisition Reform, 2004, page 115. 
77 
To perform these analyses, we will use the qualitative approach due to lack of 
failure rate data and a lack of the appropriate level of detail for part configuration.119 
2. System Overview 
The airborne system comprises the aerial platform and an onboard system. The 
ground system comprises a PC and a modem to communicate with the airborne system. 
All the onboard hardware is packed in a suitable model platform powered by a 1.5 
kilowatts (kw) aviation fuel (JP-5) engine with a wingspan of 1.5 meters (m) and a 
fuselage diameter of 12 centimeters (cm). The sensor’s payload is about two kilograms 
(kg). 
The onboard computing system is being developed on a PC based single-board-
computer. The onboard computer (OBC) is a multi-tasking real time operating system. 
The OBC can obtain data from the GPS, the INS, the communication system and the 
onboard flight and mission sensors. It computes the flight control and navigation 
algorithms, commands the sensor payload, and stores and downlinks data to the GCS in 
near real-time operation. 
The GCS PC is the equivalent of a pilot’s cockpit. It can display in near real time 
the status of the flying UAV or UAVs including: 




• Attitude and system health in visual pilot-like instruments 
• The actual position can also be displayed on an electronic moving map. 
• Output from the mission sensors such as near real time imagery displayed 
from various types of cameras like CCD, infrared (IR) and others. 
                                                 
119 Reliability Analysis Center (RAC), Failure Mode, Effects and Criticality Analysis (FMECA), 
1993, pages 9-13. 
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9. Proximity to Sea
10. Proximity to Desert











Figure 6.   Simple Block Functional Diagram of a SUAV System 
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Using the diagram in Figure 6, we give the following functional definitions to 
each element in the diagram. 
Platform Structure: The flying physical asset responsible for integration of all 
the necessary equipment for the mission profile. 
Antennas: Responsible for conducting the transmitted and received signals 
to/from the GCS and passing them from/to transmitters or receivers and the appropriate 
communication hardware and software. 
Payload, Cameras and Other Sensors: The actual physical assets for the type of 
desired mission consisting mainly of cameras and other special sensors like NBC agent 
detectors, magnetic disturbance, detectors, and much more. 
GPS: The primary navigation system based on a satellite network known as the 
Global Positioning System. 
INS: The support navigation system based on the inertial calculations of current 
speed and course in order to provide an accurate platform fix that will be used for piloting 
the platform and for target tracking. 
Engine: The unit responsible for providing mechanical power be used in 
conjunction with the propeller to provide thrust to the platform. 
Battery: The electric power supply asset for the entire platform’s equipment 
service. 
Flight Controls: The necessary flight sensors, like pittot tubes, hardware, 
ailerons, elevators, rudder, the relevant servo units and the flight controller together with 
the right software for manual, semi-auto and autonomous flight. 
Proper Software: The necessary software for platform mission control. 
Landing Gear: Responsible for platform mobility in ground during takeoff and 
landing. Not mandatory for use. 
Fuel Tank: Storage of fuel necessary for engine operation. 
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GCS: The manned shipboard or land-based component of the system responsible 
for command, control communication and support system center. 
GCS Flight Controls: The GCS hardware and software for flight controls. 
Sensors Control: Main factor responsible for mission performance. Manually 
operated with auto capabilities. 
Screen Output: The outcome of the systems’ performance presented on a 
monitor with all the relevant information for the mission and the system. 
GCS Antennas: Conducts the transmitted and received signals to and from the 
platform and other centers related to the mission and passes them to/from transmitters or 
receivers and the appropriate communication hardware and software. 
GCS Proper Software: The necessary software for GCS mission control. 
Battery Charger: Charges the platform battery. 
Start-up Device: Responsible for the initial start up of the engine’s platform prior 
to takeoff. 
Spare Parts: Necessary items for operating and supporting the system. 
Power Supply: Generator and batteries that provide the GCS electric power. 
Personnel: A pilot, a load/sensor operator, and maintainers who man the system 
for one shift. 
Launching Device: Launches the platform. 
Landing Auto Recovery Unit: Provides auto guidance to the platforms for auto-
landings.  
4. System Critical Functions Analysis 

































































 Flight  
1 Provide structural integrity x x x x x x x 
2 Provide lift and thrust  x x x x x  
 Provide controlled flight  
3        Manual control  x x x x x  
4        Semi auto  x x x x x  
5        Auto  x x x x x  
6 Navigate   x x x x  
7 Provide power to control 
and navigation equipment 
x x x x x x  
8 Withstand environmental 
factors (mainly wind) 
  x x x x  
 Mission  
9 Start systems x       
10 System’s backup x      x 
11 Communications  x x x x   
12 Line of sight   x x x x  
13 Provide power to sensors 
and communications 
  x x x x  
14 Detect, locate and identify 
targets 
  x x x   
15 Provide data   x x x   
16 Provide video image   x x x   
17 Monitor system’s functions x x x x x x x 
 
Table 6. System’s Essential Functions Analysis 
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5. System Functions 
The mission phase consists of the following functions: 
• Launch the platform 
• Fly the platform 
• Control, Command and Communicate with the platform 
• Control, Command and Communicate with the platform sensors 
• Perform surveillance and reconnaissance 
• Detect targets 
• Identify targets 
• Classify targets 
• Track targets 
• Perform battle assessment 
• Know platform’s position 
• Sustain flight mission for a certain time at a certain altitude at a certain 
speed and on a certain course 
• Return to base and land safely  
• Service the platform at a certain time and set it ready for the next mission 
These functions are the primary drivers for software development and among the 
factors for the hardware selection. 
6. Fault Tree Analysis 
In the following fault-tree analysis of a SUAV system a top-down analysis has 
been used to reveal the failure causes. The sub-analyses end with a circle, which means 
that further analyses are needed at a more detailed level, or end with a diamond, which 
means that the analysis stops there. Due to a lack of data, only the mechanical engine 
failure has been analyzed at more than one level. Using that analysis we formulate a 
model to use as an example for further analysis.  
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7. Loss of Mission 
The first attempt for the fault-tree analysis should be the loss of the mission tree. 
The reasons for mission loss may be: 
(1) Loss of platform 
(2) Loss of GCS 
(3) Unable to locate platform (loss of platform’s position) 
(4) Inappropriate mission for the sensors (wrong choice of sensors) 
(5) Sensor(s) failure 
(6) Unable to launch platforms for various reasons, such as weather or 
launching device failure 
(7) Unable to communicate with the platform 
(8) Loss of the operator(s) 
(9) Loss of the onboard platform’s or GCS’s computer 
(10) For out-of-the system reasons, such as weather conditions or 
situational reasons. 

































Figure 7.   Loss of Mission 
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8. Loss of Platform 
The reasons for loss of platform may be: 
(1) Loss of platform’s structural integrity 
(2) Loss of platform’s lift 
(3) Loss of thrust 
(4) Loss of platform’s control 
(5) Loss of GCS 
(6) Loss of platform’s position 























Figure 8.   Loss of Platform 
87 
9. Loss of GCS 
The reasons for loss of GCS may be: 
(1) GCS software failure 
(2) Loss of OBC 
(3) Loss of GCS power 
(4) Loss of GCS communication 
(5) Loss of GCS personnel 
(6) Environmental reasons (e.g. heavy weather conditions, earthquake) 
(7) Fire 






















Figure 9.   Loss of GCS 
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10. Loss of Platform’s Structural Integrity 
The reasons for loss of platform’s structural integrity include fuselage, wing, or 
empennage related problems, which could be due to: 
(1) Fracture  
(2) Pressure overload 
(3) Thermal weakening 
(4) Delamination or fiber buckling 
(5) Structural connection failure or 
(6) Operator error. 

























Figure 10.   Loss of Structural Integrity 
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11. Loss of Lift 
Reasons for loss of lift may be: 
(1) Loss of thrust 
(2) Operator error, or 
(3) Loss of wing surface, which could be due to loss of right or left wing 
surface, which in turn could be due to: 
(a) Fracture removal 
(b) Pressure overload 
(c) Thermal weakening 
(d) Delamination or fiber buckling 
(e) Structural connection failure or 
(f) Operator error 































Figure 11.   Loss of Lift 
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12. Loss of Thrust 
Reasons for loss of thrust may be: 
(1) Loss of engine control 
(2) Operator error 
(3) Loss of propeller that could be due to: 
(a) Propeller structural failure 
(b) Propeller disconnection 
(c) Operator error 
(4) Loss of engine, which could be due to: 
(a) Engine failure 
(b) Engine stalling, which could be due to: 
((1)) Failure of fuel system 
((2)) Operator error 
((3)) Air filter failure 
((4)) Air filter clogged 
((5)) Engine control failure 







































Figure 12.   Loss of Thrust 
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13. Loss of Platform Control 
Reasons for loss of control may be: 
(1) Loss of lift 
(2) Loss of control channel 
(3) Loss of power, which could be due to: 
(a) Total loss of platform’s power 
(b) Loss of control unit power 
(4) Loss of aileron forces that could be due to: 
(a) Loss of left wing aileron force that could be due to: 
((1)) Loss of onboard computer (OBC) 
((2)) Disruption of control cables 
((3)) Loss of servo unit 
((4)) Loss of aileron surface 
(b) Loss of right-wing aileron force for the same as the left-wing 
aileron reasons 
(5) Loss of rudder force for the same as the left-wing aileron reasons 
(6) Loss of elevator force for the same as the left-wing aileron reasons 























































Figure 13.   Loss of Platform’s Control 
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14. Loss of Platform Position 
Reasons for loss of platform position may be: 
(1) Loss of line of sight (LOS) 
(2) Loss of INS backup 
(3) Loss of GPS unit 
(4) Loss of GPS antenna 
(5) Loss of GPS signal 
(6) Platform failure to transmit 























Figure 14.   Loss of Platform’s Position 
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15. Loss of Control Channel 
The reasons for loss-of-control channel may be: 
(1) Operator or pilot control panel failure 
(2) Loss of LOS 
(3) Failure of control receiver 
(4) Failure of GCS control transmitter 
(5) Loss of power, which could be due to: 
(a) Loss of platform’s power 
(b) Loss of GCS power 
(6) Loss of platform control antenna, which could be due to: 
(a) Antenna disconnection 
(b) Short-circuit in antenna 
(c) Antenna failure 
(d) Structural damage 
(7) Loss of GCS control antenna the same as reasons for loss of  platform 
control antenna  
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Figure 15.   Loss of Control Channel 
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16. Engine Control Failure 
Engine control failure may be caused by: 
(1) Disruption of control cables 
(2) Loss of OBC 
(3) Loss of LOS 
(4) Loss of servo unit 
(5) Carburetor failure 
(6) Engine failure 























Figure 16.   Engine Control Failure 
101 
17. Engine Failure 
The reasons for engine failure may be: 
(1) Mechanical engine failure 
(2) Excessive engine vibration 
(3) Fuel/air improper mixture 
(4) Improper fuel 
(5) Engine fire 
(6) Loss of lubrication, which could be due to: 
(a) Gas and lubricant improper mixture 
(b) Excessive engine temperature rise 
(c) Improper lubricant 



































Figure 17.   Engine Failure 
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18. Failure of Fuel System 
The reasons for fuel system failure may be: 
(1) Failure of engine fuel system, which could be due to: 
(a) Fuel pump line failure 
(b) Fuel pump failure 
(c) Fire 
(d) Penetration of fuel lines 
(e) Carburetor failure 
(2) Loss of fuel supply, which could be due to: 
(a) Fuel tank lines failure 
(b) Fire and/or explosion 
(c) Fuel depletion 
(d) Penetration of fuel lines 
(e) Penetration of fuel tank 
(f) Hydrodynamic ram 










































Figure 18.   Fuel System Failure 
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19. Loss of Platform Power 
The reasons for loss of platform power may be: 
(1) Wiring short-circuit 
(2) Fuse failure that could be due to: 
(a) Circuit problem 
(b) Improper fuse 
(3) Battery failure that could be due to: 
(a) Battery discharge 
(b) Improper battery 
(c) Battery disconnection 
(d) Battery short-circuit 
(e) Battery exhaustion 
(f) Battery not fully charged 
Figure 19 illustrates the fault-tree analysis for loss of platform power. 
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Figure 19.   Loss of Platform Power 
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20. Loss of GCS Power 
Reasons for loss of GCS power may be: 
(1) Wiring short-circuit 
(2) Fuse failure that could be due to: 
(a) Circuit problem 
(b) Improper fuse 
(3) Main and auxiliary power failure 
(4) Power disconnection 
(5) Loss of GCS generator 
Figure 20 shows the fault-tree analysis for loss of GCS power. 
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Figure 20.   Loss of GCS Power 
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21. Operator Error 
Reasons for operator error may be: 
(1) Inadequate personnel training 
(2) Personnel fatigue 
(3) Personnel frustration and lack of experience 
(4) Inadequate man machine interface 
(5) Operator’s wrong reaction to failure 
(6) Misjudgment due to environmental reasons (mainly weather) 
(7) Poor documentation of procedures 
(8) Poor workload balance resulting in task saturation with resulting loss 
of situational awareness 
(9) Ergonomics (Human factors) of GCS 


































Figure 21.   Operator Error 
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22. Mechanical Engine Failure 
Reasons for mechanical engine failure may be: 
(1) Bad material of engine parts: 
(a) Engine block  
(b) Cylinder head  
(c) Connecting rod(s)  
(d) Piston(s)  
(e) Piston rings 
(f) Bearings 
(g) Crankshaft 
(2) Normal engine wear 
(3) Bad manufacture of engine parts 
(4) Bad design of the whole engine or engine parts 
(5) Insufficient or bad maintenance 
(6) Carburetor failure 
(7) Inappropriate engine operation 
(8) Overheating 
(9) Crash damage, which is due to operator’s error 
(10) Engine vibrations. 


































Figure 22.   Mechanical Engine Failure 
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23. Engine Vibrations 
Reasons for engine vibrations may be: 
(1) Broken piston 
(2) Bearing failure 
(3) Broken piston rings 
(4) Bad manufacture of engine parts like: 
(a) Cylinder head  
(b) Connecting rod(s)  
(c) Piston(s)  
(d) Piston rings 
(e) Bearings 
(f) Crankshaft 
(5) Bad design of the whole engine or engine parts 
(6) Improper engine mounting 
(7) Lack of propeller balancing 






























Reasons for engine overheating may be: 
(1) Broken piston rings 
(2) Bearing failure 
(3) Bad manufacture of engine parts like: 
(a) Cylinder head  
(b) Connecting rod(s)  
(c) Piston(s)  
(d) Piston rings 
(e) Bearings 
(f) Crankshaft 
 (4) Bad design of the whole engine or engine parts 
(5) Dirty cooling surfaces 
(6) Bad lubricant 
(7) Engine operating too fast due to: 
(a) Improper propeller size 
(b) Improper engine adjustments 
(c) Inappropriate fuel 
(8) Bad material of engine parts 



































Figure 24.   Overheating 
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25. Inappropriate Engine Operation 
Reasons for inappropriate engine operation may be: 
(1) Improper engine adjustment, mounting, disassembly 
(2) Inappropriate fuel/lubricant mixture 
(3) Improper propeller size 
(4) Inappropriate fuel and/or lubricant 
(5) Engine stall (during flight) 
(6) Bad carburetor adjustments 
(7) Inappropriate engine cleaning and/or storage after flights 
(8) Inappropriate lean runs (starting after a long period of storage without 
any precautions) such as rusted bearings, seized connecting rod or piston, dry piston rings 
(9) Propeller stops abruptly (due to external reason) while turning. 







































Figure 25.   Inappropriate Engine Operation 
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26. Follow-on Analysis for the Model 
The occurrence of the top event is due to different combinations of basic events. 
A fault tree provides useful information about these combinations. In this approach, we 
introduce the concept of the “cut set.” A cut set is “a set of basic events” whose 
occurrences result in the top event. A cut set is said to be a “minimal cut set” if any basic 
event is removed from the set and the remaining events no longer form a cut set.120 
For example, Figure 26 shows that the set {1, 2, 3, and 4} is a cut set because if 
















Figure 26.   Example for Cut Set. (After Kececioglu, page 223) 
                                                 
120 Kececioglu, D., Reliability Engineering Handbook Volume 2, Prentice Hall Inc., 1991, page 222. 
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This is not the minimal cut set, however, because if the basic event 1 or basic 
event 2 is removed from this set, the remaining basic events {1, 3 and 4} and {2, 3 and 4} 
still form cut sets. These two sets are the minimal cut sets in that example. 
In the SUAV case, there is an absence of AND gates. Only OR gates are present. 
For example, trying to find the minimal cuts for engine failure, gates in the following 
diagrams are involved: 
(1) Engine failure diagram (E1) 
(2) Mechanical engine failure (E3) 
(3) Engine vibrations (E5) 
(4) Operator error (L5) 
(5) Overheating (E4) 
(6) Inappropriate engine operation (E6) 
Naming the gates G1, G2, up to G8,we number each basic event related to each of 
the gates. For example, in the engine failure diagram we have gate G1 with the following 
basic events: 
(1) Mechanical engine failure that corresponds to gate G2 in Diagram E3. 
(2) 1G1, engine fire 
(3) 2G1, improper fuel 
(4) 3G1, fuel/air improper mixture 
(5) 4G1, excessive engine vibrations 
(6) G3, the gate that corresponds to loss of lubrication 
(a) 1G3, improper lubricant  
(b) 2G3, excessive engine temperature raises 
(c) 3G3, gas/lubricant improper mixture 


































































































Figure 27.   Engine Failure Combined Diagram 
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According to the MOCUS algorithm, which generates the minimal cut sets for a 
fault tree in which only AND and OR gates exist, an OR gate increases the number of cut 
sets while an AND gate increases the size of a cut set.121 MOCUS “algorithm is best 
explained by an example.”122 In the following paragraph, the steps of MOCUS algorithm 
were followed to determine the minimal cut sets. 
Locating the uppermost gate, which is the OR gate G1, we replace the G1 gate 
with a vertical arrangement of the inputs to that gate. Were it an AND type, then we 
should have replaced it with a horizontal arrangement of the inputs to that gate. 
Continuing in the next level to locate the gates, and replacing them in the above-
prescribed way yields Table 7. 
                                                 
121 Kececioglu, page 222. 
122 Hoyland, page 88. 
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1 2 3 4 5 …… …… Last 
G1 1G1 1G1 1G1    1G1 
 2G1 2G1 2G1    …… 
 3G1 3G1 3G1    4G1 
 4G1 4G1 4G1    1G2 
 G2 1G2 1G2    …… 
 G3 2G2 2G2    6G2 
  3G2 3G2    1G3 
  4G2 4G2    …… 
  5G2 5G2    …… 
  6G2 6G2    …… 
  G4 1G4    …… 
  G5 …..    …… 
  G6 7G4    …… 
  G7 1G5    …… 
  1G3 ……     
  2G3 9G5     
  3G3 1G6     
   ……     
   7G6     
   G8     
   1G7     
   ......     
   11G7     
   1G3    …… 
   2G3    …… 
   3G3    3G8 
        
        
        
 
Table 7. Cut Set Analysis. (After Kececioglu, page 229) 
 
In the last column of table 7, we have the set of minimal cuts for the engine 
failure, which is ({1G1},{2G1},{3G1},{4G1},{1G2},{2G2},…,{1G8},{2G8},{3G8}). 
The reason for the set of one element sets is the OR gates and the absence of AND gates. 
An equivalent approach for the MOCUS algorithm starts from the lowermost 
gates. It replaces an OR gate with the union (+) sign and a AND gate with the intersection 
(*) sign, and after all the expressions are obtained, it continues the procedure to the gates 
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one step above from the lowermost gates. It continues in this way until the expression for 
the top event is obtained.123 
Following this algorithm, we have to end up with the same result as the MOCUS 
algorithm, given as an expression of intersections and unions. In our case, we end up 
with: E1= 1G1+2G1+3G1+4G1+1G2+2G2….+1G8+2G8+3G8. The equivalent to that 

















Figure 28.   Equivalent Diagram 
                                                 
123 Kececioglu, page 230. 
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Trying to find the equivalent representation to a block diagram, we end up with a 
“chain like” representation that can be seen in Figure 29. A fault-tree representation of a 
system can be converted into a block-diagram representation by replacing the AND gates 







Figure 29.   Equivalent Block Diagram 
 
In a series structure, the component with the lowest reliability is the most 
important one. We can compare that with a chain. A chain is never stronger than its 
weakest link. So the most important element for reliability improvement is the one with 
the lowest reliability.125 Reliability for a series system can be also explained by the use of 
Structural Functions, which is summarized in Appendix D. 
27. Criticality Analysis 
For the criticality matrix, we need a metric for the severity-of-failure effect, so we 
can use the designations in Table 8. 
 
Description Classification Mishap definition 
Catastrophic I System or platform loss 
Critical II Major system damage 
Marginal III Minor system damage 
Minor IV Less than minor system 
damage. 
 
Table 8. Classification of Failures According To Severity (After RAC FMECA, page 
26) 
                                                 
124 Blischke, page 220. 
125 Hoyland, page 197. 
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Due to the absence of historic lack of data, it is appropriate to use a qualitative 
approach for the classification of failures according to their occurrence number which is 
the overall probability of failure during the item operating time internal, as illustrated in 
Table 9.126 
 
Level Occurrence Description Occurrence 
number 
A Frequent High probability of 
occurrence 
>0.20 
B Reasonably probable Moderate probability 
of occurrence 
>0.10  and 
<0.20 
C Occasional Occasional 
probability of 
occurrence 
>0.01  and 
<0.10 
D Remote Unlikely probability 
of occurrence 
>0.001  and 
<0.01 
E Extremely Unlikely Essentially zero <0.001 
 
Table 9. Classification of Failures According To Occurrence 
 
From our previous analysis for engine failure using FTA, we ended up with the 
following reasons: 
a. Excessive engine vibrations 
b. Fuel/air improper mixture 
c. Improper fuel 
d. Engine fire 
e. Gas and lubricant improper mixture 
f. Excessive engine temperature rise 
g. Improper lubricant 
h. Inadequate personnel training 
                                                 
126 RAC FMECA, page 60. 
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i. Personnel fatigue 
g. Operator’s frustration and lack of experience 
k. Inadequate man machine interface 
l. Operator’s wrong reaction to failure 
m. Environmental reasons 
n. Misjudgment due to environmental reasons (mainly weather) 
o. Poor documentation of procedures 
p. Poor workload balance resulting in task saturation with resulting loss of 
situational awareness 
q. Ergonomics (Human factors) of GCS 
r. Bad material 
s. Normal engine wear 
t. Bad manufacture 
u. Bad design 
v. Insufficient maintenance 
w. Carburetor failure 
x. Broken piston 
y. Bearing failure 
z. Improper engine mounting 
aa. Lack of propeller balancing 
bb. Broken piston rings 
cc. Bearing failure 
dd. Dirty cooling areas 
ee. Improper propeller size 
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ff. Improper engine adjustments 
gg. Broken piston rings 
hh. Engine stalls (during flight) 
ii. Bad carburetor adjustments 
jj. Inappropriate engine cleaning and/or storage after flights 
kk. Inappropriate lean runs such as rusted bearings, seized connecting rod 
or piston 
ll. Propeller stops while turning. 
From the above, we can derive the following issues about an engine failure 
criticality analysis, initially based on our own experience and judgment due to lack of 
tracking by current operators: 
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1 Excessive engine vibrations L1 D II 
2 Engine fire L2 D I 
3 Fuel type L3 D III 
4 Lubricant type L4 D III 
5 Fuel/air mixture adjustment L5 C III 
6 Gas and lubricant mixture L6 D III 
7 Personnel training P1 C II 
8 Operator’s frustration P2 C II 
9 Personnel experience P3 B III 
10 Poor documentation of procedures P4 C II 
11 Poor workload balance P5 C II 
12 Ergonomics of GCS P6 C II 
13 Misjudgment P7 B II 
14 Environmental reasons P8 C II 
15 Man machine interface P9 D III 
16 Maintenance P10 D II 
17 Engine adjustments P11 C III 
18 Usage P12 B II 
19 Manufacture P13 D III 
20 Software failure S D II 
21 Material M1 D I 
22 Hardware failure M2 E III 
23 Design M3 D II 
24 Engine wear M4 D II 
25 Carburetor M5 C II 
26 Piston M6 E II 
27 Bearing M7 C I 
28 Piston rings M8 E I 
29 Propeller size PR E II 
30 Engine temperature T1 D II 
31 Cooling areas T2 D II 
 
Table 10. Qualitative Occurrence and Severity Table 
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Our next step is to construct the criticality matrix based on the previous 



















































   
   







Figure 30.   Engine Failure Criticality Matrix. (After RAC FMECA, page 33) 
 
“The criticality matrix provides a visual representation of the critical areas” of our 
engine failure analysis.127 Items in the upper most right corner of the matrix require the 
most immediate action and attention because they have a high probability of occurrence 
and a catastrophic or critical effect on severity. Diagonally toward the lower left corner of 
the matrix, criticality and severity decreases. In case the same severity and criticality, 
                                                 
127 RAC FMECA, pages 33-34. 
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exists for different terms, safety and cost are the driving factors of the analysis. For 
SUAVs, we do not take safety under great consideration because we are dealing with 
unmanned systems, but we do have to consider cost. 
Table 11 shows the results from our analysis: 
 





1 Misjudgment P7 B II 
2 Usage P12 B II 
3 Bearing M7 C I 
4 Personnel training P1 C II 
5 Operator’s frustration P2 C II 
6 Personnel experience P3 B III 
7 Poor documentation of procedures P4 C II 
8 Poor workload balance P5 C II 
9 Ergonomics of GCS P6 C II 
10 Environmental reasons P8 C II 
11 Carburetor M5 C II 
12 Fuel/air mixture adjustment L5 C III 
13 Engine adjustments P11 C III 
 
Table 11. Results from Engine Failure Criticality Analysis. The most critical issues are 
highlighted. 
 
28. Interpretation of Results 
From the above, it is obvious how important the human factor is. The way the 
user operates the system: the ability to make the right decisions, frustration, training, 
experience, poor workload balance among the operators and poor documentation of 
procedures are among the most critical factors for our engine failure mode. The way the 
user maintains the system, also related to training and experience, the ability to adjust the 
engine and the fuel-air mixture properly are also among the critical contributors for 
engine failure mode. 
The importance of the bearing and carburetor are clearly shown. Those two parts 
are the most critical among all the parts composing the engine, according to our analysis. 
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Finally, environmental reasons conclude the most critical of the issues that could 
result in an engine failure. 
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III. DATA COLLECTIONS SYSTEMS 
A. RELIABILITY GROWTH AND CONTINUOUS IMPROVEMENT 
PROCESS  
SUAVs do not have a FRACAS system. In this section of the thesis we construct 
one. The FRACAS system is addressed to the Program Manager of any SUAV type 
during the phase of design, development or operation. 
1. Failure Reporting and Corrective Action System (FRACAS)128  
“The basic measure of FRACAS effectiveness is its ability to function as a 
closed-loop coordinated system” in identifying and repairing product and/or process 
failure modes, and identifying, implementing and verifying a corrective action to prevent 
repetition of the failure. “As a result, early elimination of causes of failure or trends,” 
greatly improves reliability. 
At each stage of product development, the closed-loop FRACAS should collect 
and evaluate information for each failure incident, as shown in Figure 31.  
 
                                                 
128 The material for this section is taken (in some places verbatim) from: RAC Toolkit, pages 284-289, 
and: National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA), “Preferred Reliability Practices: Problem 
Reporting and Corrective Action System (PRACAS),” practice NO. PD-ED-1255, Internet, February 2004. 











































Figure 31.   Closed-loop for FRACAS (After NASA, PRACAS, page 2) 
 
In order to conduct FRACAS, we need to follow a FRACAS flow and evaluation 
checklist: 
a. Failure Observation  
In the first step, we identify that a failure incident has occurred and we 
notify all required personnel about the failure. 
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b. Failure Documentation 
We record all relevant data describing the conditions in which the failure 
has occurred. A detailed description of the failure incident as well as supporting data and 
equipment operating hours is needed. 
c. Failure Verification 
If the failure is permanent, then we verify the incident by performing tests 
for failure identification. If the failure is not permanent, then we verify the incident by 
uncovering the conditions in which the failure has occurred. Finally, if the failure cannot 
be verified, we pay close attention to the reoccurrence of failure. 
d. Failure Isolation 
For failures that were verified, we perform testing and troubleshooting to 
isolate their causes. Isolating failure can identify a defective part or parts of the system, 
or it can relate the incident to other reasons, like operator’s error, test equipment failure, 
improper procedures, lack of personnel training, etc. 
e. Replacement of Problematic Part(s) 
For the above failures, we replace the problematic part or parts with a 
known good one and replicate the conditions under which the failure has occurred. By 
testing, we confirm that the current part (or parts) has been replaced. If failure reappears 
we repeat failure isolation in order to determine the cause of failure correctly. We have to 
tag the replaced part or parts, including all relevant documentation and data. 
f. Problematic Part(s) Verification 
We have to verify the problematic part(s) independent of the system. If the 
failure cannot be confirmed then we have to review failure verification and isolation to 
determine the right failure part(s). The isolation of the failure to the lowest possible level 
of the system’s decomposition is the key to reveal the root failure cause. 
g. Data Search 
In this step, it is necessary to look up historical databases and reports for 
similar or identical failure documentations. Databases could be from the implementation 
of FRACAS methodology itself or could be from a FMEA or other technical reports. 
Failure tendencies or patterns, if any, must be evaluated because they may reveal 
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defective lots of parts, or bad design, or bad manufacturing, or even bad usage. This is 
obviously absent for SUAV systems. 
h. Failure Analysis 
A failure analysis to determine the root failure cause follows next. The 
depth and the extension of failure analysis depend on the criticality of the mission, the 
system’s reliability impact and the related cost. The outcome of failure analysis should be 
specify failure causes and identify any external causes. 
i. Root-Cause Analysis 
This answers the question, “what could have been done to prevent 
failure?” It focuses more on the true nature of failure, which could be due to: 
• Overstress conditions 
• Design error 
• Manufacturing defect 
• Unfavorable environmental conditions 
• Operator or procedural error, etc 
j. Determine Corrective Action 
In this phase, we have to develop a corrective action. We have to rely on 
the failure analysis and root-cause analysis results and our solution should prevent 
reappearance of the failure in the long term in order to be effective. Corrective actions 
could be: 
• System redesign 
• Part(s) redesign 
• Selection of different parts or suppliers 
• Improvements in processes 
• Improvements in manufacturing etc 
k. Incorporate Corrective Action and Operational Performance Test 
Now, we can incorporate the identified corrective action in the failed 
system and perform initial baseline tests as a start in order to verify the desired 
performance. After the first successful results, our tests should become operational tests 
including conditions under which the failure had occurred. After the documentation of all 
test results, we can compare the pre-failure test results to identify alterations in baseline 
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data. Testing should be sufficient enough to give us the confidence level that the original 
failure mode has been successfully eliminated from reoccurring. For large-scale 
incorporation of a corrective action, verifying the action is first needed to avoid 
unnecessary delays and expenses. 
l. Determine Effectiveness of Corrective Action 
We have to verify that our corrective action: 
• Has successfully corrected the failure 
• Has not created or induced other failures 
• Has not degraded performance below acceptable levels 
If the original failure reoccurs, we have to repeat the FRACAS process 
from the beginning to determine the correct root cause. 
m. Incorporate Corrective Action into All Systems 
After verifying our corrective action in one system, we can implement our 
solution to all similar systems. We have to keep the FRACAS procedure running in order 
to track, document, report, and determine the correct root cause and the corrective action 
necessary for all failure modes that appear. Corrective actions involve changes to 
procedures, alterations to processes and personnel training, so tracking is necessary to 
assure that the new versions were implemented correctly and not confused with old ones. 
2. FRACAS Basics 
Basically, the system must provide exact information on: 
a. What was the failure?  
b. How did the failure occur? 
c. Why did the failure occur? 
(1) Was it an equipment or part design error? 
(2) Was it an equipment or part manufacturer workmanship error? 
(3) Was it a software error? 
(4) Was it a test operator error? 
(5) Was it a test procedure or equipment error? 
(6) Was it an induced failure? 
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d. How can we prevent such failures from reoccurring? 
From all the above we can simplify the procedure to the next checklist shown in 
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What could have happened to prevent failure ?
Document corrective action
Verify that our corrective action has:
1. Successfully corrected the failure
2. Not induced other failures














Figure 33.   FRACAS Methodology Checklist page 2/2 
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3. FRACAS Forms 
I have developed forms to implement the FRACAS methodology for SUAVs: 
a. Failure report as shown in Table 12 and 13 
b. Failure analysis report as shown in Table 14129 
c. Corrective action verification report as shown in Table 15 
d. Tag to problematic part as shown in Table 16. 
e. Failure Log-Sheet as shown in Table 17. 
During recent operations experimenting with the Surveillance and Tactical 
Acquisition Network (STAN) project at Camp Roberts, observers identified reliability 
and operational availability issues for SUAVs. As a result, I developed these forms for 
use during upcoming operations with the XPV 1-B TERN SUAV system.130 
These forms were presented to a VC-6 team for use during the STAN experiment 
during May 2004. The effort to implement these forms was not successful. The primary 
reason was lack of personnel training related to the FRACAS system itself, the form 
filling, and the general concept of reliability. The secondary reason was lack of 
coordination and control to fill these forms. It was obvious that a member of the 
operating team, assigned with the extra task to coordinate and control the proper data 
entry for the forms, was needed. 
“It is preferable to attempt to communicate the ‘big picture,’ so that each team 
member is sensitive to failure detection” and identification, and “the appropriate 
corrective action process.” 131 Nevertheless, it is typical especially in military 
applications to have overall control, so a centralized FRACAS administration within a 
team or teams is needed. 
The forms cover all aspects of SUAV design, development, production and 
operation with emphasis to experienced operation or test teams. All forms are addressed 
                                                 
129 RAC Toolkit, page 290. 
130 Gottfried.  
131 RAC Toolkit, page 284. 
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to the operating or test team. The Failure Analysis Report form is also addressed to the 
design and development team. 
Using the forms we can collect information and data to the level of detail 
necessary to identify design and/or process deficiencies that should eliminated, preferably 
before the SUAV released to its users in the battlefield. For that reason the forms can be 
used for other systems as well as SUAVs. 
The characteristics of the forms are: 
a. Simple and easy to implement even by one or two persons 
b. Brief in meanings and implementation time (time oriented) 
c. Suitable for cheap systems like SUAV (cost oriented) 
d. Focused on elimination of fault reoccurrence 
e. Generates data collection that can be used as data-base source 
There are no known forms of FRACAS or any other reliability tracking system 
that have been used for SUAV testing or operation in the past.  
4. Discussion for the Forms Terms 
Most of the terms in those forms are self-explanatory. Some discussion follows 
for some of them. 
a. For the Initial Failure Report in Table 12: 
(1) Total Operating Hours, in position (8), is the cumulative 
operation hours for the SUAV system 
(2) Current Mission Hours, in position (9), is the operation hours 
from the beginning of the current mission that the fault was been detected 
(3) Description of Failure, in position (15), is the full description of 
the observed failure. 
(4) Supporting data, in position (16) all available telemetry data 
related to the failure time must be listed. In position (16a) Environmental 
Parameters/Conditions, is the list of environmental conditions and parameters available 
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like temperature, wind speed, humidity/precipitation, cloudiness, lightning, and fog, icing 
condition, proximity to sea or desert or inhabited area. In position (16b) System 
Parameters/Conditions, is a list of system conditions and parameters like, flight altitude, 
platform speed, engine RPM, fuel level, battery status, communication status, LOS 
availability. 
(5) Actions for Failure Verification, in position (17), is a 
description of the operators’ actions that verify the failure. 
(6) Affected Subsystems, in positions (18) to (22) and (23) to (27) 
are references for the effected subsystems of the SUAV system, during the failure 
incidence. 
(7) System Condition after Failure, in position (29) is a description 
of the system general condition after the failure. For example, “platform crashed due to 
loss of control.” 
b. For the Failure Report continued in Table 13: 
(1) Problematic Parts Recognized, in position (16) is a list of the 
affected parts that have been recognized after the failure. 
(2) Problematic Parts Replaced, in position (17) is a list of the parts 
that have been replaced after the failure in an effort to isolate the failure cause. 
(3) Root Failure Cause, in position (18) is an estimate or the 
outcome of the previous efforts to isolate the failure cause. 
(4) Previous Similar or Same Cases (if any), in position (29) is a 
reference to similar or same failure cases based on historical data or other accurate 
sources. 
(5) Background, in position (30) is all background information 
related to the failure. For example it could be an explanation of a sensor subsystem, or a 
software function. 
c. For the Failure Analysis Report in Table 14: 
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(1) History, in position (31) is a complete description of the 
observed failure and all the events that followed. 
(2) Analysis, in position (32) is the failure analysis based on data, 
drawings and blueprints, manuals, and opinion from experts, designers, and operators. 
(3) Conclusions, in position (33) are the analysis outcome. 
(4) Corrective Action/Recommendation, in position (34) is the 
result of that form. This is the recommended solution to the problem. 
d. For the Corrective Action Verification Report: 
(1) Operating Hours after Previous Failure, in position (13), is the 
cumulative operation hours after the previous failure which resulted in corrective action 
taken for the SUAV system. 
(2) Tests for Corrective Action Verification Made, in position (17), 
is a reference to all tests that have been made to verify that the recommended solution is 
correct. 
(3) Alterations from Baseline Data, in position (22), is a list of all 
alteration from the initial data readings, after the implementation of the recommended 
solution. 
(4) Corrective Action Taken, in position (21), is a statement about 
the corrective actions that have been taken in order to solve the problem. 
e. For the Failure Log-Sheet: 
All entries in the Log-Sheet, like Date, Time, Number, Initial 
Report Number and Failure Description, must be consistent to the relevant entries in the 
other forms. In that way we can easily track the failure cases when is needed. 
In all forms, except the Log-Sheet form, there is a term for Comments. It covers 
any other detail that the operator or the tester estimates that is relevant to the failure and 




1. No Form type: 
Initial Failure Report 
2. Page 1 of 
_____ 


















11. Verified by 12. System 
Operated by: 
13. Type of System’s 
Mission 
14. Type of Failure 
(permanent/recoverable) 
 








16. Supporting Data: 





























23. Name 24. Reference Drawings 25. Part No 26. Manufacturer 27.Serial No 
28. Quick Failure Assessment (if any) 
 
 








31. Prepared by 
 
 
32 Date 33 Checked (reliability) 34.Date 35. Problem No 
36. Checked (engineering) 
 
 
37. Date 38. Checked (program) 39. .Date 40. Distribution 
 
Table 12. Initial Failure Report Form 
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1. No Form type: 
Failure Report (Continued) 
2. Page 1 of 
_____ 


















11. Verified by 12. System 
Operated by: 
13. Type of System’s 
Mission 
14. Number of Failure 
 


































25. Failure Verified 
by(reliability) : 
26. Failure Verified by 
(engineering) : 
27. Failure Verified by 
(program) : 

















321. Prepared by 
 
 
33. Date 34. Checked (reliability) 35. Date 36. Problem No 
37. Checked (engineering) 
 
 
38. Date 39. Checked (program) 40. Date 41. Distribution 
 
Table 13. Failure Report Continuation Form 
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1. No Form type: 
Failure Analysis Report 
2. Page 1 of 
_____ 
3. Project ID 
 
 
4. System 5. Serial 
No 





10. Name 11. Reference 
Drawings 
12. Part No 13. Manufacturer 14.Serial No 















25. Name 26. Reference Drawings 27. Part No 28. Manufacturer 29.Serial No 



























35. Corrective Action by 36. Document No 
 






39. Date 40. Approval (reliability) 41.Date 42. Problem No 
43. Approval (engineering) 
 
 
44. Date 45. Approval (program) 46. .Date 47. Distribution 
 
Table 14. Failure Analysis Report Form (From RAC Toolkit, page 290) 
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1. No Form type: 
Corrective Action Verification Report 
2. Page 1 of 
_____ 
3. Project ID 
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32. Approval (engineering) 
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1. No Form type: 
Tag to Problematic Part 
2. Page 1 of 
_____ 
3. Project ID 
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by(reliability) : 
26. Failure Verified by 
(engineering) : 











30. Verified by 31. Date 32. Document No 
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9. Checked by 10. Date 11. Mission Description 
 
Table 17. Failure Log-Sheet 
 
Use of these forms will allow detailed analysis of the causes of failure and 
detailed modeling of reliability by subsequent analysts. 
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5. Reliability Growth Testing 132 
It is almost certain that prototypes or new designs will not initially meet their 
reliability goals. Implementation of a reliability enhancement methodology such as 
FRACAS is the only way to overcome the initial problems that may surface in the first 
prototype performance tests and later. Therefore, failures are identified, and actions taken 
to correct them. As the procedure continues, corrective actions become less frequent. 
After a reasonable amount of time, one must check whether reliability has improved, and 
estimate how much additional testing is needed. 
Duane observed that there is a relationship between the total operation time (T) 
accumulated on a prototype or new design and the number of failures (n(T)) since the 
beginning of operation. 133 If we plot the cumulative failure rate (or cumulative mean 
time between failures MTBFc ) n(T)/T versus T in a log-log scaled graph, the observed 
data tends to be a linear regardless of the type of equipment under consideration.  
Duane’s plots provide a rough estimate of the increment of the time between 
failures. It is expected that time between failures at the early stages of development will 
be short. But soon after the first corrective actions they will gradually become longer. As 
a consequence Duane’s plots will show a rapid reliability improvement in the early stages 
of development. After the first corrective actions the reliability improvement would be 
less rapid. After a corrective action we can see whether there is a reliability improvement 
or not. So we can have a measure of effectiveness of our corrective actions, which 
corresponds to the growth of reliability. 
                                                 
132 The material for this section is taken (in some places verbatim) from: Lewis, E. E., Introduction to 
Reliability Engineering, Second Edition, John Wiley & Sons, 1996, pages 211-212. 
133 Duane, J. J., “Learning Curve Approach to Reliability Modeling,” Institute of Electrical and 

































Figure 34.   Duane’s Data Plotted on a Log-log Scale. 
 
Figure 33 illustrates a Duane’s data plot for a hypothetical system. Because of the 
straight line we get: ln[ ( ) / ] ln( )n T T T bα= ⋅ +  and then: 
ln[ ( ) / ] [ ln( ) ] ( ) /n T T T b be e n T T e Tα α⋅ += ⇔ = ⋅  (1 ) (1 )( )  if  b bn T e T K T K eα α+ +⇔ = ⋅ = ⋅ = , and so 
finally we have (1 )( )n T K T α+= ⋅ . Alpha (α) is the growth rate or the change in MTBF per 
time interval over which change occurred and K is a constant related with the initial 
MTBF. 
a. If α=0, there is no improvement in reliability because the straight line is 
parallel to the cumulative operating hours axis, which means that there is no change in 
the cumulative failure rate. 
b. If α<0, then the cumulative failure rate decreases, and the expected 
failures become less frequent as T increases. Therefore reliability increases. 
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c. If α=-1, ( ) constantbn T K e= = = . Therefore the number of failures is 
independent of time T. We can assume that α=-1 is the theoretical upper limit for 
reliability growth. 
d. If α>0, then the cumulative failure rate increases, and the expected 
failures become more frequent as T increases. Therefore reliability decreases. 
From (1 )( )n T K T α+= ⋅  we have: ( ) /n T T K T α= ⋅  which is the reciprocal of 
cumulative MTBF. And so the testing time required to achieve a given failure rate 
(MTBF), is ( ) 1K MTBF α−⋅ .  
6. Reliability Growth Testing Implementation 
In order to implement the above-mentioned methodology, we may consider the 
system as an entity and as a set of entities. In the first case, we just count all systems 
failures and the operational hours related to each failure. In the second case, we may 
consider that the system is the composition of: 
a. Propulsion and power 
b. Flight control and navigation 
c. Communication and sensors 
d. GCS (Human in the loop) 
e. Miscellaneous. 
Each failure can be assigned to one of the above categories and therefore we have 
to keep track of five different reliability tendencies. 
 
B. RELIABILITY IMPROVEMENT PROCESS  
1. UAVs Considerations  
For a reliability improvement process application in SUAVs we can consider the 
following: 
a. There is no officially accepted future system concept of operations for 
SUAVs. 
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b. There are many classified and unclassified reports published on many 
different types of SUAVs. 
c. Many systems have been tested and there are plans for future tests in 
battlefield environments and in deployments with the fleet. 
(1). The EWASP SUAV system.134 
(2). The XPV-1B TERN UAV system135  
(3). The Sea ALL (Sea Airborne Lead Line) SUAV system which is 
a variety of the USMC Dragon Eye UAV.136 
d. There is a real operational need for SUAVs during deployments of the 
fleet. For example, due to an urgent requirement to maintain a continuous recognized 
maritime picture of the Carrier Strike Group vital area, small UAVs are needed to assist 
the limited existing maritime patrol aircrafts. For that reason, a request for the SUAV 
Archangel to be used onboard USS Enterprise CSG has been released.137 
e. There is a real problem regarding the reliability of those systems. UAVs 
in general have roughly up to 100 times the failure rate of manned aircrafts, and SUAVs 
are even more failure prone than larger ones. The US Office of the Secretary of Defense’s 
UAV Roadmap, which was released in May 2003, recommends that more research be 
made into low Reynolds-number flight regimes, investigations be carried out for 
enhancing UAV reliability and therefore availability. It also recommends the 
incorporation and development of all-weather practices into UAV designs.138 
                                                 
134 Morris Jefferson, Aerospace Daily, December 8, 2003, “Navy To Use Wasp Micro Air Vehicle To 
Conduct Littoral Surveillance.” 
135 Message from COMMMNAVAIRSYSCOM to HQ USSOCOM MACDILL AFB FL, March 26, 
2004, “UAV Interim Flight Clearance for XPV-1B TERN UAV System, Land Based Concept of Operation 
Flights.” 
136 Sullivan Carol, Kellogg James, Peddicord Eric, Naval Research Lab, January 2002, Draft of 
“Initial Sea All Shipboard Experimentation.” 
137 Undated message from Commander, Cruiser Destroyer Group 12 to Commander, Second Fleet, 
“Urgent Requirement for UAVs in Support of Enterprise Battle Group Recognized Maritime Picture.” 
138 UAV Rolling News, “UAV Roadmap defines reliability objectives,” March 18, 2003, Internet, 
February 2004. Available at: http://www.uavworld.com/_disc1/0000002 
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2. UAVs and Reliability 
The U.S. military UAV fleet (consisting of Pioneers, Hunters, and Predators) 
reached 100,000 cumulative flight hours in 2002. This milestone is a good point at which 
to assess the reliability of these UAVs. Reliability is an important measure of 
effectiveness for achieving routine airspace access, reducing acquisition system cost, and 
improving UAVs mission effectiveness. UAV reliability is important because it supports 
their affordability, availability, and acceptance.139 
UAV reliability is closely tied to their affordability primarily because UAVs are 
expected to be less expensive than manned aircraft with similar capabilities. Savings are 
based on the smaller size of the UAVs and the omission of pilot or aircrew systems.  
a. Pilot Not on Board140 
With the removal of the pilot and the tendency to produce a cheaper UAV, 
redundancy was minimized and component quality was degraded. Yet UAVs became 
more prone to in-flight loss and more dependent on maintenance. Therefore, their 
reliability and mission availability were decreased significantly. Being unmanned, they 
cannot provide flight cues to the user such as: 
• Acceleration sensation, 
• Vibration response, 
• Buffet response, 
• Control stick force feedback, 
• Any higher longitudinal, directional and lateral control sensitivities. 
• Direct feeling of the failure, in general. 
Ground testing and instrumentation data analysis are the only source for 
such cues. 
b. Weather Considerations141 
                                                 
139 OSD 2002, Appendix J, page 186. 
140 The material for this section is taken from: Williams Warren, Michael Harris, “The Challenges of 
Flight –Testing Unmanned Air Vehicles,” Systems Engineering, Test & Evaluation Conference, Sydney, 
Australia, October 2002. 
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Experience has shown that the most important operational consideration 
for flight is the weather, regardless of other technical characteristic, such as engine type, 
power or wingspan. Meteorological conditions affect both the platform and the GCS. 
Factors include winds, turbulence, cold temperatures at designated altitudes, icing, rain, 
fog, low cloudiness, humidity in general and lightning strikes. Meteorological conditions 
affect the GCS include extreme ambient temperatures, icing, rain, fog, low cloudiness, 
humidity and lightning strikes. These considerations can be mitigated because of the 
relaxed constraints of ground units compared to the restricted constraints for small aerial 
units. 
For the platform the most important weather condition is wind speed and 
direction at surface (the lowest 100 meters of the atmosphere) and upper levels. Other 
weather conditions are important but do not affect the flight unless they are extreme. 
Surface winds affect air-platforms during takeoff and landings, but also during preflight 
and post flight ground handling. Light winds are most favorable for routine operation and 
testing. High winds during flight can cause significant platform drift, which results in 
poor platform position controllability. This can render a mission profile infeasible and 
result in flight cancellation. 
Prior to deploying any UAV system, a study must be made of the 
prevailing meteorological conditions. If conditions are extreme (such as very high winds, 
extreme cold, or high altitude), then the UAV system may not be mission capable, and a 
different asset may be better suited. Alternate UAVs or manned systems should be 
considered in this case.  
                                                 
141 Teets, Edward H., Casey J. Donohue, Ken Underwood, and Jeffrey E. Bauer, National Aeronautics 
and Space Administration (NASA), NASA/TM-1998-206541, “Atmospheric Considerations for UAV 
Flight Test Planning,” January 1998, Internet, February 2004. Available at: 
http://www.dfrc.nasa.gov/DTRS /1998/PDF/H-2220.pdf 
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c. Gusts and Turbulence  
The high susceptibility of the platform to gusts and turbulence makes 
stabilizing flight operation points very difficult. The platform’s low-wing loading can 
lead to high-power loading due to gusts, and turbulence and the low inertia are the main 
reasons for that behavior142. 
During the development test and evaluation period (DT&E), an SUAV can 
be tested in aerodynamic/wind tunnels to establish its general flight characteristics. A 
basic flight manual can be produced during DT&E that will be tested and refined during 
the operational test and evaluation period (OT&E). The advantage of SUAVs is that the 
actual airframe can be tested in the wind tunnel, without any analogy or other factor 
involved in the calculations because the original platform (and not any miniaturized 
model) is being tested. 
d. Non Developmental Items (NDI) or Commercial Off-the-shelf 
(COTS)  
One of the factors in lack of reliability of inexpensive UAVs is the 
use of NDI/COTS components that were never meant for an aviation 
environment. In many cases, it would have been better to buy the more 
expensive aviation-grade components to begin with than to retrofit the 
system once constructed. Do not assume COTS components/systems will 
work for an application they were not designed for. In other words, they 
have to be COTS for that specific use.143 
Using NDI/COTS items may save money but require testing in order to 
ensure compatibility and to reduce uncertainty in mission efficiency.144 
e. Cost Considerations145 
By using COTS technology, distributed sensors, communications 
and navigation, it is also proposed that the total system reliability may be 
increased. It must be noted however that this approach does not currently 
account for issues of airworthiness certification. 
                                                 
142 NASA 1998. 
143 Clough. 
144 Hoivik, Thomas H., OA-4603 Test and Evaluation Lecture Notes, Version 5.5, “The Role of Test 
and Evaluation,” presented at NPS, winter quarter 2004. 
145 The material for this section is taken (in some places verbatim) from: Munro Cameron, and Petter 
Krus, AIAA’s 1st Technical Conference & Workshop on Unmanned Aerospace Vehicles, Systems, 
Technologies and Operations; a Collection of Technical Papers, AIAA 2002-3451,“A Design Approach for 
Low cost ‘Expendable’ UAV system,” undated. 
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It is a fact that the primary cost item in UAVs is not the vehicles but the 
guidance, navigation, control and sensor packages that they carry. Typically all those 
technology “miracles” can represent 70% of the system’s cost. Although sensors continue 
to decrease in cost, size and power consumption, the demands for more capabilities and 
mission types are increasing. As a result, cost is increasing. 
We can assume that acquisition cost is proportional to reliability, and wear 
out is not proportional to reliability. Then, a generic reliability trade-off can be seen as in 
Figure 35. We can conclude that a highly reliable UAV does not coincide with an overall 
low system cost. 
Another point of interest related to cost and reliability is that reliability is 
low for SUAVs because SUAVs are designed to be inexpensive. This statement is true 
because reliability is expensive and one truly gets what one pays for.146 

























Figure 35.   Generic Cost Relationship. (After Munro) 
 
f. Man in the Loop  
The man-in-the-loop can be accomplished “through nearly all of the 
potential controlling equipment available.” UAV control equipment is the link between 
man and machine together with the data display mechanisms. Controlling equipment can 
be remotely piloted, semi-autonomous with a combination of programmed and remote 
piloted, and fully autonomous (full-auto) with pre-flight and/or in-flight programmed.147 
Another point of interface between man and machine is maintenance and 
pre-flight and after-flight servicing. Piloting a UAV resembles an instrumented manned 
flight. For that reason there are four main considerations: 
                                                 
147 Carmichael, Bruce W., and others, “Strikestar 2025,” Chapter 4, “Developmental Considerations, 
Man-in-the-Loop,” August 1996, Department of Defense , Internet, February 2004. Available at: 
http://www.au.af.mil/au/2025/volume3/chap13/v3c13-4.htm 
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(1) Collision avoidance 
(2) Multiple platforms control 
(3) Landing (recovery) 
(4) Loss of flight control and regain of it. 
g. Collision Avoidance  
For UAVs, a system is needed that can weigh tasks and put priorities only 
on the flight requirements or mission requirements. It is essential to have the capability, 
like the pilot does, to sense and to avoid obstacles that most of the time the remote pilot 
cannot see.148  
If an accurate collision avoidance system were developed, UAVs could 
become more responsive to the demanding needs of the battle commander.149 “NASA, 
the U.S military, and the aerospace community have joined forces to develop detect, see, 
and avoid (DSA) technologies for UAVs.”150 These technologies will also increase safety 
operations above residential areas and allow UAVs to join the piloted aerial vehicles in 
national airspace.   
h. Landing  
A lot of UAV mishaps are related to landing. The usual ways for UAVs to 
land are: 
• Using landing gear on runways or airstrips 
• Using landing gear and arresting gear on ship flight-decks 
• Making a calculated crash landing without using landing gear 
• Recovering in an arresting net 
                                                 
148 Finley, Barfield, Automated Air Collision Avoidance Program, Air Force Research Laboratory, 
AFRL/VACC, WPAFB,“Autonomous Collision Avoidance: the Technical Requirements,” 0-7803-6262-
4/00/$10.00(c)2000 IEEE. 
149 Coker, David, Kuhlmann, Geoffrey, “Tactical-Unmanned Aerial Vehicle ‘Shadow 200’ 
(T_UAV),” Internet, February 2004. Available at: http://www.isye.gatech.edu/~tg/cources/6219/assign 
/fall2002 /TUAVRedesign/ 
150 Lopez, Ramon, American Institute of Aeronautics and Astronautics (AIAA), “Avoiding Collisions 
in the Age of UAVs,” Aerospace America, June 2002, Internet, February 2004. Available at: 
http://www.aiaa.org /aerospace/Article.cfm?issuetocid=223&ArchiveIssueID=27 
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• Landing in sea water 
• Using a parachute 
• Vertical take-off-and-landing (VTOL) 
The most common problems with recovery are lack of experience by the 
remote pilot and low altitude winds, even for the VTOL UAVs. To resolve or mitigate 
this problem, automated recovery systems can be used. Those systems have been 
developed to improve precision, ease and safety of UAV recoveries, on land and sea, and 
in a variety of weather conditions.151 
i. Losing and Regaining Flight Control 
The need for uninterrupted communication between the operator in the 
GCS and the platform is a critical capability.152 An interruption of that link is always 
possible due to loss of Line-of-Sight (LOS), communication failure related to platform or 
GCS, and electromagnetic interference (EMI). The only way to overcome this problem is 
autonomy with dependable autopilot and mission control software.153 
Autonomy for a UAV platform is based on an onboard computer, which is 
responsible for most of the platform’s performance and “behavior”. Subprograms for 
time-related loss of communications, regaining communications, points of regaining 
communication efforts, and other functions related with mission effectiveness are very 
common among UAV software. Additionally, emission control applications help allocate 
bandwidth for different uses and may decrease the EMI hazard. For UAVs, which use 
different sensor configurations in the same type of platform, there is also a need for 
reconfigurable multi-mission processing.154 
j. Multiple Platforms Control  
                                                 
151 UAV Annual Report FY 1997: Subsystems, Key subsystem program, “UAV common recovery 
system (UCARS),” Internet, February 2004. Available at: http://www.fas.org/irp/agency/daro/uav97 
/page36.html 
152 Coker. 
153 Puscov, Johan, “Flight System Implementation,” Sommaren-Hosten 2002, Royal Institute of 
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154 Robinson, John, Technical Specialist Mercury Computers, COTS Journal, “UAV Multi-Mission 
Payloads Demand a Flexible Common Processor,” June 2003, Internet, February 2004. Available at:  
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Demands for piloting a UAV require two operators in general. The aviator 
operator (AVO) is responsible for aviating and navigating, and the mission payload 
operator (MPO), or Sensor Operator (SENSO), is responsible for target search and 
system parameters monitoring. In smaller UAVs there may be only one operator who 
does both tasks. Requiring two operators limits the number of operators available for 
other missions. Is it possible for those two operators to control two or more platforms 
simultaneously?155 Is it also possible for the single operator for the smaller UAV to do 
the same? 
The SUAV operators are part of a battle team and their primary skill and 
training is to fight and then to operate the SUAVs. They operate SUAVs from a distance 
yet in the proximity of the battlefield. So, care must be taken in making excessive 
workload demands on the SUAV operators. Instead, by making the platform control and 
operation more user-friendly, we can optimize the benefits of SUAVs capabilities. When 
the operators can stand far enough from the battlefield, user-friendly control of SUAVs is 
advantageous, and multiple platform control can become a more realistic capability if 
SUAV autonomy is high.  
k. Reliability, Availability, Maintainability of UAVs  
Reliability is the probability that a UAV system or component will operate 
without failures for a specified time (the mission duration) as well as the preflight tests 
duration. This probability is related to the mean time between failures (MTBF) and 
availability.  
Availability is defined as the ability of a system to be ready for use when 
needed at an unknown (random) time. It is the natural interpretation of reliability of our 
everyday life. Availability is a function of reliability and maintainability.  
As discussed earlier, redundancy plays an important role to keep reliability 
high. Keeping redundancy at a high level increases system complexity and cost, however. 
                                                 
155 Dixon, Stephen R., and Christopher D. Wickens, “Control of multiple UAVs: A Workload 
Analysis,” University of Illinois, Aviation Human Factors Division, Presented to 12th International 
Symposium on Aviation Psychology, Dayton, Ohio 2003. 
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Volume, weight, and cost are also important for UAVs system’s operational usage and 
real system needs. There is a trade off as indicated in Figure 36.156 
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Figure 36.   Reliability Trade-Offs. (After Sakamoto, slide 8) 
 
Where redundancy is difficult to implement, fault avoidance or parts 
quality is the solution to improve reliability. In some cases adding redundancy in critical 
subsystems, like navigation aids, is unavoidable. Thus, cost and complexity increases.157 
Maintainability is a system effectiveness concept that measures the ease and rapidity with 
which a system or equipment is restored to its operational state after failing. Reliability, 
availability, and maintainability are discussed in Appendix D. 
3. Reliability Improvement for Hunter 
                                                 
156 Sakamoto, Norm, presentation: “UAVs, Past Present and Future,” Naval Postgraduate School, 
February 26, 2004. 
157 Clough. 
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The Army’s acquisition of the Hunter RQ-5 system is an example of reliability 
improvement after the implementation of a reliability improvement program. In 1995, 
during acceptance testing, three Hunter platforms crashed within a three week period. As 
a result, full rate production was canceled. The Program Management Office and the 
prime contractor Thompson Ramo Wooldridge (TRW) performed a Failure Mode Effect 
and Criticality Analysis (FMECA) for the whole system. Failures were identified and 
design changes were made after failure analyses and corrective actions were 
implemented. As a result, Hunter’s Mean Time Between Failures (MTBF) for its servo 
actuators, which were the main cause for many crashes, increased from 7,800 hours to 
57,300 hours.  
Hunter returned to flight status three months after its last crash. Over the next two 
years, the system’s MTBF doubled from four to eight hours and today stands close to 20 
hours. Prior to the 1995, Hunters mishap rate was 255 per 100,000 hours; afterwards 
(1996-2001) the rate was 16 per 100,000 hours. Initially canceled because of its 
reliability problems, Hunter has become the standard to which other UAVs are compared 
in reliability.158 
4. Measures of Performance (MOP) for SUAVs 
In manned aviation, the usual Measures Of Performance (MOPs) used for 
reliability tracking are 
• Accidents per 100,000 hours of flight 
• Accidents per 1,000,000 miles flown 
• Accidents per 100,000 departures159  
In the Vietnam War, the MOPs used for the Lightning Bug were 
• The percent of platforms returned from a mission, calculated as the 
number of platforms recovered from similar successful missions divided 
                                                 
158 OSD 2002, Appendix J. 
159 National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB), Aviation Accident Statistics,”Table 6. Accidents, 
Fatalities, and Rates, 1984 through 2003, for U.S. Air Carriers Operating Under 14 CFR 121, Scheduled 
Service (Airline), Internet, April 2004. Available at: http://www.ntsb.gov/aviation/Table6.htm 
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by the number of platforms launched for that mission in a certain time 
period.  
• Missions accomplished per platform per mission type in a certain time 
period.160  
The frequency of mishaps is the primary factor for choosing a MOP. In the SUAV 
case, we can use the following MOPs for reliability tracking: 
a. Crash Rate (CR): The total number of crashes divided by the total 
number of flight hours. A crash results in loss of platform. 
b. Operational CR: The total number of crashes divided by the total 
number of operating flight hours. 
c. Mishap Rate (MR): The total number of mishaps divided by the total 
number of flight hours. This thesis defines a mishap for a SUAV as significant platform 
damage or a total platform loss. A mishap requires repair less than or equal to a crash 
depending on the condition of the platform after the mishap. 
d. Operational MR: The total number of mishaps divided by the total 
number of operating flight hours. 
e. Current Crash Rate (CCR): The total number of crashes from the last 
system modification divided by the total number of flight hours from the last system 
modification. 
f. Operational CCR: The total number of crashes from the last system 
modification divided by the total number of operating flight hours since the last 
modification. 
g. Current Mishap Rate (CMR): The total number of mishaps from the last 
system modification divided by the total number of flight hours from the last 
modification. 
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h. Operational CMR: The total number of mishaps from the last system 
modification divided by the total number of operating flight hours from the last 
modification. 
i. Crash Rate “X” (CRX): The crash rate for the last “X” hours of 
operational flight hours, as in “CR50” which is the CR for the last 50 flight hours. 
j. Mishap rate “X”: The MR for the last “X” hours of operational flight 
hours, as in “MR50” which is the MR for the last 50 flight hours. 
k. Achieved Availability (AA): The total operating time (OT) divided by 
the sum of OT, plus the total corrective maintenance time, plus the total preventive 
maintenance time. 
l. Percent Sorties Loss: The total number of sorties lost (for any reason) 
divided by the total number of sorties assigned. 
m. Percent Sorties Mishap: The total number of sorties with a mishap 
divided by the total number of sorties assigned. 
SUAVs are generally low cost systems with prices from $15K to $300K. For that 
reason there is no official data collecting system in effect detailed enough to provide 
reliability data. Usually, only the number of flight hours and the number of crashes is 
known. For that reason, the most suitable reliability MOPs currently are CR, CCR and 
CRX. 
5. Reliability Improvement Program on SUAVs 
A reliability improvement program seeks to achieve reliability goals by improving 
product design. The objective of an improvement program is to identify, locate and 
correct, faulty and weak aspects of the design, manufacturing process, and operating 
procedures. For the SUAV, we first applied existing techniques for improving system 
reliability. 
Starting with the FMEA, which is the basis for the most common methodologies 
for improving reliability; we also discussed FMECA and FTA. After that, reliability 
centered maintenance, specifically MSG-3, was presented as the prevailing methodology 
for enhancing civil aviation reliability and maintenance preservation methodology. We 
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showed that MSG-3 is not suitable for UAVs applications because of its dependence on 
an in-board operator. We highlighted the need for a data collection system and presented 
FRACAS. FRACAS is best suited for SUAVs especially during their initial phases of 
development or operational test development. Finally, a method or technique is needed to 
keep track of reliability growth. Duane’s plots presented and recommended for their 
simplicity. 
6. Steps for Improving Reliability on SUAVs 
We can consider a FRACAS system as a part of a generic reliability improvement 
program. The first step of such a program is an environmental stress screening (ESS). 
ESS is a process that uses random vibration within certain operational limits, and 
temperature cycling to accelerate part and workmanship imperfections. Identification of 
infant mortality failures can be identified in a short time and relatively easily. 
In addition to ESS, the next actions should be taken: 
a. Verify/calibrate the instruments for the field tests or field operations. 
With calibrated instruments we can substantially reduce instrumentation errors. A rule of 
thumb is to use another instrument that is at least 10 times more accurate than the 
instrument we want to calibrate.161 
b. Set the initial weather restrictions for UAVs flights.  
c. Conduct a FMEA of the system and/or perform an FTA if it is necessary 
when we want to focus on a certain failure. For that purpose, we have tailored a form as 
in Table 18.162  
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UAVs FMEA Form FMEA Date 
System Name Page          of          Pages 
Part Name Prepared by 
Reference Drawing Approved by 
Mission Revisited by/Revision Date 
 






















Table 18. UAVs FMEA Form (After MIL-STD-1629A, Figure 101.3) 
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The cell definitions are: 163 
(1). ID Number, given to each entry on the FMEA form for record-
keeping purposes. 
(2). Item/Functional Identification, for the item or the functional 
block or subsystem, such as the carburetor or the fuel tank, for example. 
(3). Design Function, a brief statement about the item’s design 
function. State that the carburetor mixes fuel and air in order to feed the engine with the 
proper fuel-air density, for example. 
(4). Failure Modes and Causes, a brief statement about the way(s) 
in which the item may fail. In the case of the carburetor, the failure modes are improper 
adjustment, plugged needle valve, jammed leverage, servo failure, excess vibrations, 
throttle failure, insufficient fastening to the frame, etc. 
(5). Operational Phase, a brief statement about the item’s objective 
or task must be written; in the case of the carburetor, it controls engine running speed.  
(6). Local Failure Effects, explaining the immediate consequences 
of the item’s identified failure mode. In the case of the carburetor, we can state “Engine 
cannot be controlled.” 
(7). Next Higher Level, about the effect of the local failure on the 
next higher functional system level; in the case of the carburetor, we can state “Loss of 
engine.” 
(8). End Effects, explaining the effects of the indicated failure 
mode on the whole system. In the case of the carburetor, we can state “Loss of thrust.” 
(9). Failure detection method, explaining the way(s) by which a 
failure can be detected. In the case of the carburetor, it could be detected by the operator 
or by the control system itself. 
                                                 
163 The material from the following part of section is taken (in some places verbatim) from: RAC 
FMECA, pages 60-66. 
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(10). Fault Acceptance, statement of the ways that the system can 
overcome or bypass the effects of failure.  In the case of the carburetor the system design 
does not provide any alternatives so the word “None” can be placed under fault 
acceptance. 
(11). Severity Classification, representing the degree of damage 
that will be caused by the occurrence of the failure mode. It could be any of the following 
categories: 
(a) Classification I, for complete loss of system 
(b) Classification II, for degraded operation of the system 
(c) Classification III, for a failure status that still needs to be 
investigated 
(d) Classification IV, for no effect on systems functions. 
The failure effect for the carburetor can be classified as a Category I 
severity. 
(12). Remarks, relating details about the evaluation of the given 
failure mode. 
d. Establish a FRACAS. Implementation of FRACAS through the 
system’s life cycle, even for the ESS tests, should continue for all failures occurring 
during developmental and operational testing. 
For a reliability improvement program, FRACAS is the most critical 
facet.164 Failures must be identified and isolated to the root failure mode. After the failure 
analysis is complete, corrective actions are identified, documentation is completed and 
data is entered into FRACAS. The system’s manufacturer can use the information in 
FRACAS to incorporate the corrective actions into the product. We can use the same 
FRACAS forms we presented in the previous subsection. 
e. Track of reliability improvement by using Duane’s theory, MTBFs 
and/or achieved availability of the system. 
                                                 
164 Pecht, page 323. 
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f. Complete a reliability improvement plan. This plan must be completed, 
approved and coordinated by the manufacturer’s engineers and reliability manager in 
cooperation with the military personnel who operate the systems. The following need to 
be addressed in the plan: 
• Resources, 
• Test schedule and test equipment, 
• Personnel, 
• Test environment, 
• Procedures, 
• Data base establishment, and 
• Corrective action implementation program. 




















Figure 37.   Reliability Improving Process on SUAVs 
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IV. EXAMPLE 
A. RQ-2 PIONEER 86 THROUGH 95  
From the US Navy’s Airborne Reconnaissance Office, 15 March 1996, come the 





































Table 19. RQ-2 Pioneer data 
As discussed in Chapter 3, we can calculate only the Mishap Rate (MR) and the 
Current Mishap Rate (CMR) because we have data only for mishaps and total flight 
hours. Assuming that each year we have modifications in the system, we calculate the 
following: 
Mishap Current Mishap





























Current Mishap Rate (CMR)
 
Table 20. MR and CMR 
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It is obvious that both MOPs provide the notion of rapid improvement during the 
first two years followed by a much slower rate of improvement. 
1. We follow Duane’s theory and analyze the data as seen in Table 21. We assume 
that reliability improvement efforts have been implemented every year on all similar 
systems. 
N T
Cum Mish Cum flight hours N/T ln(T) ln(N/T) Regression exp(regression)
5 96.3 0.051921 4.567468 -2.95803 -3.0499928 0.047359265
14 543.4 0.025764 6.297846 -3.658788 -3.4840591 0.030682613
38 1594.3 0.023835 7.37419 -3.736604 -3.7540609 0.023422437
59 2904.8 0.020311 7.97412 -3.896582 -3.9045536 0.020149947
80 4312.7 0.01855 8.369319 -3.987293 -4.0036897 0.018248183
108 6469.3 0.016694 8.774823 -4.092692 -4.1054106 0.016483249
128 7648.6 0.016735 8.942278 -4.090248 -4.1474168 0.015805192
136 8924.2 0.015239 9.096522 -4.183867 -4.186109 0.015205334
152 10492.2 0.014487 9.258387 -4.234507 -4.226713 0.014600302
168 12244.2 0.013721 9.412808 -4.288844 -4.2654495 0.014045553  
Table 21. Duane’s Theory Data Analysis 
 










df SS MS F Significance F
Regression 1 1.351526748 1.351526748 247.6023 2.65748E-07
Residual 8 0.043667661 0.005458458
Total 9 1.39519441
Coefficients Standard Error t Stat P-value
Intercept -1.90424026 0.129763159 -14.6747372 4.57E-07


















Table 22. Regression Results 
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In that case α is -0.25 for the total 12,244.2 hours of operations. In the next figure, 
















Figure 38.   Duane’s Regression and Failure Rate versus Time 
 
From the residual and the Duane’s plots we see a steeper descent for the failure 
rate in the first years followed by a short period of constant failure rate. The last year’s 
failure rate is not as steep as the first year’s. 
2. Using the same data set, we concentrate on the last six years, from 1990 to 
1995. 



























Table 23. RQ-2 Pioneer Data, 1990 to 1995 
 




Cum Mish Cum flight hours N/T ln(T) ln(N/T) Regression exp(regression)
21 1407.9 0.014916 7.249855 -4.205332 -4.173563 0.015397302
49 3564.5 0.013747 8.178779 -4.286959 -4.2891601 0.013716442
69 4743.8 0.014545 8.464594 -4.230487 -4.3247274 0.013237158
77 6019.4 0.012792 8.702743 -4.358937 -4.3543631 0.012850622
93 7587.4 0.012257 8.934244 -4.401645 -4.3831715 0.012485697
109 9339.4 0.011671 9.141997 -4.450649 -4.4090247 0.012167039  
Table 24. Duane’s Theory Data Analysis for 1990 to 1995 
 










df SS MS F Significance F
Regression 1 0.035481414 0.035481 11.83689 0.026282253
Residual 4 0.011990116 0.002998
Total 5 0.047471531
Coefficients Standard Error t Stat P-value
Intercept -3.271377559 0.306285094 -10.68083 0.000435















Table 25. Regression Results for 1990 to 1995 
 
Now the parameter α is -0.12 for the last 9,339.4 hours of operations. That means 
we have less rapid reliability growth the last six years. Figure 39 depicts Duane’s 

















Figure 39.   Duane’s Regression and Failure Rate versus Time for 1990 to 1995 
 
Comparing the two time periods, we can say that rate of reliability growth for the 
last six years (factor of -0.12) from 1990 to 1995 decreased compared to the overall 
factor -0.25 for the whole ten-year period from 1986 to 1995. 
3. Using the same data set, we concentrate in the first six years from 1986 to 
1991. 
 


























Table 26. RQ-2 Pioneer Data, 1986 to 1991 
 
We follow Duane’s theory and analyze the data as seen in the next table: 
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N T
Cum Mish Cum flight hours N/T ln(T) ln(N/T) Regression exp(regression)
5 96.3 0.051921 4.567468 -2.95803 -3.0470131 0.047500591
14 543.4 0.025764 6.297846 -3.658788 -3.4860799 0.030620672
38 1594.3 0.023835 7.37419 -3.736604 -3.7591921 0.023302559
59 2904.8 0.020311 7.97412 -3.896582 -3.9114186 0.020012093
80 4312.7 0.01855 8.369319 -3.987293 -4.0116967 0.018102654
108 6469.3 0.016694 8.774823 -4.092692 -4.1145894 0.016332645  
Table 27. Duane’s Theory Data Analysis for 1986 to 1991 
 









df SS MS F Significance F
Regression 1 0.786578144 0.786578144 79.54973601 0.000873629
Residual 4 0.039551515 0.009887879
Total 5 0.826129659
Coefficients Standard Error t Stat P-value
Intercept -1.888061479 0.209552206 -9.009981407 0.000840246
ln(T) -0.25374049 0.028449223 -8.919065871 0.000873629

















Table 28. Regression Results for 1986 to 1991 
 
Now α is -0.25 for the first 6469.3 hours of operations. In the next figure, we see 












failure rate vs time
Duane's regression line
 
Figure 40.   Duane’s Regression and Failure Rate versus Time for 1986 to 1991 
 
If we compare the first six years with the last six years, we can say that reliability 
growth for the last six years has increased according to the factor of -0.12, instead of the 
factor -0.25, which related to the first six years. We do not know why the reliability 
growth rate has decreased, but it has. 
4. We can use the Duane curve to predict the MTBF for the future. From the 
previous discussion on Duane’s plots on IIIB4, MTBF is K Tα⋅  where bK e= . Using the 
results for the last six years we have a is -0.1244 and b is -3.2714. So the equation for the 
curve is 3.2714 0.1244MTBF e T− −= ⋅ . This curve can be used as the prediction curve for the 
MTBF. For example, in 12,000 hours of operation after 1990, the MTBF will be 
0.011793 failures per hour of operation or 12 failures per 1,000 hours of operation. 
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V. CONCLUSION 
A. SUMMARY  
From the material presented in this thesis, we can conclude the following: 
1. There is a real need for reliability improvement in Small UAV systems.  
2. RCM (or MSG-3) is a system suitable for civil and military manned 
aviation and other industry fields in which experience is prevalent, hidden failures can be 
easily identified by personnel, and safety considerations are the primary factor. For small 
UAV systems in military applications, safety is not the primary factor. Experience has not 
reached the manned aviation levels and hidden failures for unmanned systems are very 
difficult to be observed. Therefore MSG-3 is not a suitable standard for SUAVs. 
3. FMEA may be used for almost any kind of reliability analysis that 
focuses on finding the causes of failure. A good and complete knowledge of the system is 
necessary prior to proceeding with the FMEA. FMEA is an appropriate method for 
SUAVs. This thesis has developed FMEA forms for the SUAV. 
4. FTA is another useful method of analysis based on the top-down 
approach and can be used to focus only on the weak points that need enhancing. It is 
appropriate for SUAVs, and can be used to focus on engine, control, and navigation 
subsystems that are among the most critical elements. We developed FTA diagrams for 
the SUAV in this thesis. 
5. Functional flow diagrams or block diagrams are used to give a quick 
and comprehensive view of the system design requirements illustrating series and parallel 
relationships, hierarchy and other relationships among system’s functions. Since a SUAV 
is essentially a series system it is less useful. 
6. FRACAS, a failure reporting analysis and corrective action system, 
should be implemented for a program during production, integration, test, and field 
deployment phases to allow for the collection and analyses of reliability and 
maintainability data for the hardware and software items. For a successful reliability 
improvement program, all failures should be considered. SUAVs need FRACAS system. 
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This research effort developed the framework of one aircraft, including the necessary 
forms. 
7. For SUAVs we have to use fault avoidance due to size and weight 
limitations. Redundancy cannot be easily implemented, especially due to platform cost 
and size constrains. 
8. In a series structure, like SUAVs, the component with the lowest 
reliability is the most important one for reliability improvement. Currently, there is no 
bans for estimating the reliability of a system for operational planners. 
9. We can track the overall reliability of a system for SUAVs under 
experimental development by implementing a method that records failure data. By 
analyzing the data we can calculate and predict reliability growth.  
10. Similarly we can track the reliability of subsystems of a SUAV 
system. We divide the system into: 
• Propulsion and power 
• Flight control and navigation 
• Communication 
• GCS (Human in the loop) 
• Miscellaneous 
and keep track of the reliability for each subsystem separately. The forms that we have 
developed can be used as data source for subsystem reliability separation. 
12. For a reliability improvement program, we need to: 
• Conduct an Environmental Stress Screening (ESS), 
• Calibrate and verify the instruments for the field tests or field operations, 
• Set the initial weather restrictions for UAVs flights, 
• Execute a FMEA of the system and/or perform an FTA, 
• Establish a FRACAS, 
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• Track of reliability improvement, 
• Complete a reliability improvement plan. 
13. Reliability costs, and benefits, are like an investment. One truly gets 
what one pays for. 
This thesis is a qualitative approach to the issue of reliability and UAVs. In order 
to obtain further benefit and value from that research effort, we must have data. For a 
specific type of UAV, we can start implementing FRACAS and collecting data. A 
database can be created easily after the implementation of FRACAS, and we can start 
analyzing and interpreting reliability improvement, if any, quite soon. 
 
B. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FUTURE RESEARCHERS  
This thesis outlines methods of improving SUAV reliability. Methods must be 
defined for better data collections. Real data from SUAV systems must be collected in 
order to formulate reliability databases. The quantitative reliability analysis follows and 
detailed information about reliability improvement results. 
Researching many issues would be worthwhile. 
1. SUAVs are considered expendables since no pilot is onboard. As we 
increase their reliability, their cost, and their importance in the battlefield operations, we 
have to start considering their survivability. Being small in size may be is not enough to 
cope with enemy-fires. Researching survivability issues for SUAVs is another field of 
interest with many extensions and relations to design philosophy and cost. 
2. Some experts believe that difficult problems can be solved with better 
software, but software is not free. In the near network-centric future, software will 
probably be one of the most expensive parts of a UAV system. Additionally, software is a 
dynamic part of the system. It must be constantly upgraded to meet new expectations, or 
to integrate new equipment technologies. For that reason software reliability is another 
critical issue that will become more intense in the near future. The emerging question is 
how we can find the best means to maintain software reliability at acceptable levels. 
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3. Similar to the above issue, micro-technologies are quickly evolving.  
New ones are rapidly being inserted into UAV systems. In what way can our reliability 
tracking methodology cope with new subsystems?  
4. If there is a need to achieve a certain level of reliability, what would the 
economic consequences be? 
5. Generally, it would be of great interest to research the potential 
mechanisms for incorporating new equipment into a reliability improvement program. 
6. What is the best number of maintenance personnel to keep the system at 
a given level of availability?  
7. What should the spares policy be for SUAVs? 
8. What fraction of failures are due to software instead of hardware 
failures? 
Data collected using the methods developed in this thesis will provide the 
material with which to answer these essential questions. 
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APPENDIX A:  DEFINITION OF FMEA FORM TERMS 
 
1. First Part of the Analysis of Design FMEA166 
(1) Subsystem Identification: Name the subsystem or identification title of 
the FMEA. 
(2) Design Responsibility: Name the system design team and for (2A) 
name the head of the system design team. 
(3) Involvement of Others: Name other people or activities within the 
company that affect the design of the system. 
(4) Supplier Involvement: Name other people, suppliers and/or outside 
organizations that affect the design of the system. 
(5) Model/product: Name the model and/or the product using the system. 
(6) Engineering Release Date: This is the product release date. 
(7) Prepared by: The name of the FMEA design engineer. 
(8) FMEA Date: Record the date of the FMEA initiation. 
(9) FMEA Date, revision: Record the date of the latest revision. 
(10) Part Name: Identify the part name or number. 
2. The Second Part of the Analysis of Design FMEA167 
(11) Design Function: This is the objective function of the design. The 
function should be described in specific terms. Active verbs defining functions and 
appropriate nouns should be used.  
(12) Potential Failure Mode: The defect refers to the loss of a design 
function or a specific failure. “For each design function identified in Item 11 the 
corresponding failure of the function must be listed. There can be more than one failure 
from one function. ” To identify the failure mode ask the question: “How could this 
                                                 
166 The material from this section is taken (in some places verbatim) from: Stamatis, pages 130-132. 
167 Ibid, pages 132-149. 
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design fail?” or “Can the design break, wear, bind and so on?” Another way to identify a 
failure mode is through a FTA. In a FTA the top level is the loss of the part function and 
the lower levels are the corresponding failure modes. 
(13) Potential Effect(s) of failure: This is the ramification of the failure on 
the design. The questions usually asked are “What does the user experience as a result of 
that failure?” or “What are the consequences for the design?” To identify the potential 
effects, documents like historical data, warranty documents, field-service data, reliability 
data and others may be reviewed. If safety is an issue, then an appropriate notation should 
be made. 
(14) Critical Characteristics: Examples of critical items may be 
dimensions, specifications, tests, processes etc. These characteristics affect safety and/or 
compliance with rules and regulations and are necessary for special actions or controls. 
An item is indicated critical when its severity is rated 9 to 10 with occurrence and 
detection is higher than 3. 
(15) Severity of Effect: Indicates the seriousness of a potential failure. For 
critical effects severity is high while for minor effects severity is very low. Usually there 
is a rating table, which is used for evaluation purposes. This table is made in such a way 
that all designing issues have been taken into consideration. The severity rating should be 
based on the worst effect of the failure mode. An example of the severity guideline table 
for design FMEA is in Table 29. 
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Effect Rank Criteria 
None 1 No effect 
Very slight 2 User not annoyed. Very slight effect on the product performance. 
Non-essential fault noticed occasionally 
Slight 3 User slightly annoyed. Slight effect on the product performance. 
Non-essential fault noticed frequently. 
Minor 4 User’s annoyance is minor. Minor effect on the product 
performance. Non-essential faults almost always noticed. Fault 
does not require repair. 
Moderate 5 User has some dissatisfaction. Moderate effect on the product 
performance. Fault requires repair. 
Significant 6 User is inconvenienced. Degradation on product’s performance 
but safe and operable. Non-essential parts inoperable. 
Major 7 User is dissatisfied. Major degradation on product’s performance 
but safe and operable. Some subsystems are inoperable. 
Extreme 8 User is severely dissatisfied. Product is safe but inoperable. 
System is inoperable. 
Serious 9 Safe operation and compliance with regulations are in jeopardy. 
Hazardous 10 Unsafe for operation, non-compliance with regulations, 
completely unsatisfactory. 
 
Table 29. Example of Severity Guideline Table for Design FMEA (After Stamatis, page 
138) 
 
(16) Potential Cause of Failure: This identifies the cause of a failure mode. 
For a failure mode there may be a single cause or numerous causes, which in that case are 
symptoms, with one root cause. A good understanding of the system’s functional analysis 
is needed at that stage. Trying to find the real cause can identify the root cause. Asking 
“Why?” five times is the rule of thumb for finding the cause of a failure mode. It is 
essential to identify all potential failures while performing the FMEA. There is not 
always a linear or “one-to-one relationship” between the cause and failure mode. Listing 
as many causes as possible makes FMEA easier and less error prone. If the severity of a 
failure is rated 8 to 10, then an effort should be made to identify as many root causes as 
possible. 
(17) Occurrence: This is the value that corresponds to the estimated 
frequency of failures for a given cause over the life of the design. To identify the 
frequency for each cause, we need reliability mathematics, expected frequencies or the 
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cumulative number of component failures per 100 or 1000 components (CF/100 or 
CF/1000). If expected frequencies and/or the cumulative number of failures cannot be 
estimated, then alternative systems or components could be examined for similar data that 
could be used as a surrogate. Usually, the assumption of a single-point-failure is used in 
design FMEA. It is a component failure, which could cause the system to fail and is not 
balanced by an alternative method. So occurrence referred to a single-cause-failure. A 
guideline for occurrence is shown in Table 30. 
 
Occurrence Rank Criteria CF/1000 
Almost impossible 1 Failure unlikely. Historical data indicate 
no failures 
<0.00058 
Indifferent 2 Rare number of failures likely       0.0068 
Very slight 3 Very few failures likely       0.0063 
Slight 4 Few failures likely       0.46 
Low 5 Occasional number of failures likely       2.7 
Medium 6 Medium number of failures likely     12.4 
Moderately high 7 Moderately high number of failures 
likely 
    46 
High 8 High number of failures likely   134 
Very high 9 Very high number of failures likely   316 
Almost certain 10 Failure almost certain >316 
 
Table 30. Example of Occurrence Guideline Table for Design FMEA (After Stamatis, 
page 142) 
 
(18) Detection Method: This is a procedure, test, design or analysis used to 
detect a failure in a design or part. It can be very simple or very difficult, to identify 
problems before they reach the end user. If there is no method, then “None identified at 
this time” is the answer. Two of the leading questions are “How can this failure be 
discovered?” and “In what way can this failure be recognized?” A checklist may be 
helpful. Nevertheless, some of the most effective ways to detect a failure are simulation 
techniques, mathematical modeling, prototype testing, specific design tolerance studies 
and design and material review. The design review is an important way to revisit the 
suitability of the system or design. A design review can be quantitative or qualitative, 
using a systematic methodology of questioning and design. 
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(19) Detection: Is the “likelihood that the proposed design controls will 
detect” the root cause of a failure mode before it reaches the end user. The detection 
rating estimates the ability of each of the controls in (18) to detect failures before it 
reaches the customer. A typical detection guideline is shown in Table 31. 
 
Effect Rank Criteria 
Almost 
certain 
1 Has the highest effectiveness 
Very high 2 Has very high effectiveness 
High 3 Has high effectiveness 
Moderately 
high 
4 Has moderately high effectiveness. 
Medium 5 Has medium effectiveness 
Low 6 Has low effectiveness 
Slight 7 Has very low effectiveness. 
Very slight 8 Has the lowest effectiveness 
Indifferent 9 It is unproven, or unreliable, effectiveness unknown 
Almost 
impossible 
10 There is no design technique available or known 
 
Table 31. Example of Detection Guideline Table for Design FMEA (After Stamatis, page 
147) 
 
(20) Risk Priority Number (RPN): This is the product of severity, 
occurrence, and detection. RPN is just a number that represents the priority of the failure. 
Reducing RPN is the FMEA’s goal, and this is the result after the reduction in severity 
and/or occurrence and/or detection. So, changing the design, one can reduce the severity 
rating. By improving the requirements and engineering specifications while focusing on 
“preventing causes or reducing their frequencies,” one can reduce the occurrence rating. 
Adding detection equipment and tools or “improving the design evaluation technique” 
can reduce the detection rating. 
(21) Recommended Actions: These may be specific actions or suggestions 
for further study. Recommended actions intend to reduce the RPN for the different failure 
modes. Prioritization of failure modes according to their RPN, severity and occurrence, is 
needed while conducting a FMEA. 
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(22) Responsible Area or Person and Completion Date: Name the 
responsible person/area and the completion date for the recommended action. 
(23) Action Taken: This is about the follow-up actions. 
(24) Revised RPN: This is the reevaluation of RPN after the corrective 
actions have been implemented. If the revised RPN is less than the original then that 
indicates an improvement. 
3. Third Part of the Analysis of Design FMEA168 
(25) Approval signatures: Name the authority to conduct the FMEA. 
(26) Concurrence signatures: Names there responsible for carrying out the 
FMEA. 
                                                 
168 Stamatis, page 149. 
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APPENDIX B:  THE MRB PROCESS 
 
The Maintenance Review Process (MRB process) “is broadly defined as all of the 
activities necessary to produce and maintain a Maintenance Review Board Report 
(MRBR).” The process involves three major objectives, which are to ensure that: 
1. Scheduled maintenance instructions (tasks and intervals) which are 
developed for a specific aircraft, contribute to the continuing airworthiness and 
environmental requirements of the Regulatory Authorities and the Standards and 
Recommended Practices (SARPs) as published by the International Civil Aviation 
Organization (ICAO). 
2. The tasks are realistic and capable of being performed. 
3. The developed scheduled maintenance instructions may be performed 
with a minimum of maintenance expense.169 
“MRBRs are developed as a joint exercise involving the air operators, the type of 
certificate applicant,” ATA and other Regulatory Authorities. The MRB process  
consists of a number of specialist working groups who use an 
analytical logic plan to develop and propose maintenance/inspection tasks 
for a specific aircraft type. The proposed tasks are presented to an Industry 
Steering Committee (ISC) who, after considering the working group 
proposals, prepares a proposal for the MRBR. 
The MRB chairperson reviews the proposed MRBR, which is then published as 
the MRBR.170  
                                                 
169 Transport Canada Civil Aviation (TCCA), Maintenance Instruction Development Process, TP 
13850, Part B, “The Maintenance Review Board (MRB) Process(TP 13850), Chapter 1. General,” last 
updated: April 19, 2003, Internet, February 2004. Available at: http://www.tc.gc.ca/civilaviation 
/maintenance/aarpd/tp13850/partB.htm 
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APPENDIX C:  FAILURES 
 
1. Functions171 
A function statement should consist of a verb, an object and a desired standard of 
performance. For example: A SUAV platform flies up to 4,000 feet at a speed of at least 
on 55 knots sustained. The verb is “fly” while the object is “a SUAV platform” and the 
standard is “up to 4,000 feet at a sustained speed of at least 55 knots.” 
2. Performance Standards172 
In our example: One process that degrades the SUAV platform, in other words 
one failure mode for the SUAV, is engine failure. Engine failure happens due to many 
reasons. The question is how much an engine failure can impair the ability of the UAV to 
fly at the desired altitude on the designated sustained speed.  
In order to avoid degradation, the SUAV must be able to perform better than the 
minimum standard of performance desired by the user. What the asset is able to deliver is 
known as its “initial capability,” say 4,500 feet on 60 knots sustained speed. This leads 
one to define performance as: 
• Desired performance, which is what the user wants the asset to do (4,000 
feet on 55 knots sustained speed in our case). 
• Built-in capacity, which is what the asset really is (4,500 feet on 60 knots 
sustained speed in our case). 
3. Different Types of Functions173 
Every physical asset usually has more than one function. If the objective of 
maintenance is to ensure that the asset can continue to fulfill these functions, then they 
must all be identified together with their current standards of performance. 
Functions are divided in two main categories: primary and secondary functions. 
                                                 
171 Moubray, John, an excerpt of the first chapter of the book “Reliability-centered Maintenance,” 
Plant Maintenance Resource Center, “Introduction to Reliability-centered Maintenance,” Revised 
December 3, 2002, Internet, May 2004, Available at: http://www.plant-maintenance.com/RCM-intro.shtml 
172 Moubray, “Introduction.” 
173 The material from this section is taken (in some places verbatim) from: Moubray, “Introduction.” 
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a. Primary functions are fairly easy to recognize and most industrial assets 
are based on their primary functions. For example, the primary function of a “printer” is 
to print documents, and of a “crusher” is to crush something, etc. In the SUAV example 
the primary function is to provide lift and thrust so as the platform flies up to 4,000 feet at 
a sustained speed of at least 55 knots. 
b. In addition to their primary functions, most assets are expected to fulfill 
one or more additional functions, which are the secondary functions. For example, the 
primary function of the SUAV platform in the example, is to provide thrust and lift so as 
to fly up to 4,000 feet on 55 knots sustained speed at least. A secondary function could be 
to use an auto-recovery system. Secondary functions could include environmental 
expectations, safety, control, containment, and comforts aspects, appearance, protection, 
economy, efficiency and other extra functions. 
4. Functional Failure174 
If, for any reason, the asset is unable to do what the user wants, the user will 
consider it to have failed. “Failure is defined as the inability of any asset to do what its 
users want it to do.” This definition treats the concept of failure as if it applies to an asset 
as a whole.  
However, each asset has more than one function, and each function often has 
more than one desired standard of performance. It is possible for the asset to fail for each 
function, so the asset can fail in different states. Therefore, it is required that failure can 
be defined more accurately in terms of loss of specific functions rather than the failure of 
an asset as a whole. 
According to British Standard (BS) 4778 failure is defined as “The termination of 
an item’s ability to perform a required function.” 
5. Performance Standards and Failures175 
The limit between satisfactory performance and failure is specified by a 
performance standard. Failure can be defined by defining a functional failure as follows: 
                                                 
174 The material from this section is taken (in some places verbatim) from: Moubray, “Introduction.” 
175 The material from this section is taken (in some places verbatim) from: Hoyland, pages 11-12. 
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A functional failure is defined as the inability of any “asset to fulfill a function to a 
standard of performance, which is acceptable to the user.” 176 
A failure could have different aspects of functional failure: 
• Partial and total failure 
• Upper and lower limits 
• Gauges and indicators 
• The operating context 
Failures may be classified in many different ways: 
a. Sudden versus gradual failures 
b. Hidden versus evident failures 
c. According to effects of severity 
(1). Critical failure: A failure that is sudden and causes termination 
of one or more primary functions. 
(2). Degraded failure: A failure that is gradual and/or partial. 
(3). Incipient failure: A deficiency in the condition of an item so 
that a critical or degraded failure can be expected unless corrective action is not taken.  
d. Another classification according to the effects of severity by US Mil-Std 
882, “System Safety Program Requirements”: 
(1) Catastrophic, which results in loss of life and/or loss of system. 
(2) Critical, which results in severe injury and/or illness and/or 
severe system damage. 
(3) Marginal, which results in minor injury and/or illness and/or 
minor system damage. 
(4) Negligible with less than minor results.  
                                                 
176 The material from this part of section is taken (in some places verbatim) from: Aladon Ltd, 
“Introduction.” 
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e Another classification according to the effects of severity: 
(1) Primary failure due to aging. 
(2) Secondary failure due to excessive stresses. 
(3) Command fault or transient failures due to improper control 
signal or noise. 
6. Failure Modes177 
“Once each functional failure has been identified, the next step is to try to identify 
all the events that are reasonably likely to cause each failed state. These events are known 
as failure modes.” Failure modes are those that have occurred on the same or similar 
equipment operating with the same parameters and conditions, failures that can be 
prevented by existing maintenance policies, and failures that have not yet happened but 
they can be considered as likely to happen.178 
Failure mode is “the effect by which a failure is observed on the failed item.” 
Technical items are designed to perform one or more functions. So a failure mode can be 
defined as nonperformance of one of these functions. Failure modes may generally be 
subdivided as “demanded change of state is not achieved” and “change of conditions.” 
For example, an automatic valve may show one of the following failure modes: 
a. Fail to open on command 
b. Fail to close on command 
c. Leakage in closed position 
The first two failure modes are “demanded change of state is not achieved” while 
the third one is “change of condition.” 
7. Failure Effects179 
                                                 
177 The material from this section is taken (in some places verbatim) from: Hoyland, page 10. 
178 The material from this part of section is taken (in some places verbatim) from: Aladon Ltd, 
“Introduction,” page 5. 
179 The material from this section is taken (in some places verbatim) from: Aladon Ltd, 
“Introduction,” page 5. 
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The fourth of the seven questions in the RCM process, as previously mentioned in 
IIA2b of this thesis, is listing “What happens when each failure occurs?” These are 
known as “failure effects.” 
Failure effects describe what happens when a failure occurs. While describing the 
effects of a failure, the following should be recorded: 
a. What is the evidence that the failure has happened? 
b. In what way does it pose a threat to safety or the environment? 
c. In what way does it affect production or operation? 
d. What physical damage is caused by the failure? 
e. What must be done to repair the failure? 
8. Failure Consequences180 
Failures affect output, but other factors such as product quality, customer service, 
safety or environment also influence output. The nature and severity of these effects 
govern the consequences of the failure. The failure effects tell us what happens, and when 
a failure occurs. The consequences describe how and how much it matters. For example, 
if we can reduce the occurrence (frequency) and/or severity of failure effects, then we can 
reduce the consequences. 
Therefore, if a failure matters very much, efforts will be made to mitigate or 
eliminate the consequences. On the contrary, if the failure is of minor consequence, no 
proactive action may be needed. 
A proactive task is worth doing if it reduces the consequences of the failure mode 
and justifies the direct and indirect costs of doing the task. 
Failure consequences could be classified as: 
a. Environmental and safety consequences, when it is not able to fulfill the 
local and/or national and/or international environmental standards, or if the failure causes 
injury and/or death. 
                                                 
180 The material from this section is taken (in some places verbatim) from: Aladon Ltd, 
“Introduction,” page 5. 
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b. Operational, if the failure affects the operation, production output, 
quality, cost or customer satisfaction. 
c. Non-operational, when only maintenance and/or repair is involved, 
without affecting the environmental, safety or production. 
d. Hidden, when failures have no direct impact, but they expose the 
organization to multiple failures with serious and often catastrophic consequences.  
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APPENDIX D:  RELIABILITY 
 
1. Introduction to Reliability181 
Reliability is a concept that has dominated systems design, performance and 
operation for the last 60 years. It appeared after WWI, when it was used to compare 
operational safety of one, two, three, and four-engine airplanes. At that time reliability 
was measured as the number of accidents per flight hour. 
During WWII, a group of scientists, under Wernher von Braun in Germany, 
developed the V-I missile. After the war it was reported that the first ten V-I missiles 
were all ridiculous failures. All of the first missiles either exploded on the launching rail, 
or landed earlier than planned, in the English Channel. It was the mathematician Robert 
Lusser who analyzed the missile system and derived the “product probability law of 
series components.” The theorem states that “a system is functioning only if all the 
components are functioning and is valid under special assumptions.” It simply says that 
the reliability of the system is equal to the product of the system’s individual components 
reliabilities. If the system has many components, then its reliability is rather low, even 
though the individual components have high reliabilities. 
In order to avoid low system reliability, engineers in the USA, at that time tried to 
improve the individual system’s components. They used “better” materials and “better” 
designs for the products. The result was higher system reliability but broad and further 
analysis of the problem was not performed. 
By the end of 1950s and early 1960s, interest in the USA focused on production 
of the intercontinental ballistic missile and space research like the Mercury and Gemini 
programs. In the race to put a man on the moon, a reliable program was very important. 
The first association for engineers working with reliability issues was established. IEEE-
Transactions on Reliability was the first journal published on the subject in 1963. After 
that, a number of textbooks were published and in the 1970s many countries from Europe 
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and Asia began dealing with the same issues. Soon it became clear that a low reliability 
level cannot be compensated by extensive maintenance. 
2. What is Reliability? 
“Until the 1960s, reliability was defined as the probability that an item will 
perform a required function under stated conditions for a stated period of time.” 
According to the International Standard Organization (ISO) 8402 and British Standard 
(BS) 4778, “reliability is the ability of an item to perform a required function, under 
given environmental and operational conditions and for a stated period of time.” The term 
“item” is used to denote any component, subsystem or an entity system. A “required 
function” may be a single function or a combination of functions necessary to provide a 
certain service.182 
For a defense acquisition system, reliability is a measure of effectiveness.183 It is 
one of the “ilities” that a system needs to comply with, in order to be operationally 
suitable. 
We can keep track of reliability by measuring or calculating some measures of 
performance such as: 
a. The probability of completing a mission  
b. The number of hours without a critical failure under specified mission 
conditions or mean time between critical failures (MTBCF) 
c. The probability of success as the number of successes divided by the 
total number of attempts 
d. The mean time to failure (MTTF) 
e. The failure rate (failures per unit time) 
f. The probability that the item does not fail in a time interval. 
3. System Approach  
A system is a group of elements, parts, or components that work together for a 
specified purpose. A failure of the system is related at least to one of its parts or elements 
                                                 
182Hoyland, page 3. 
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or components failure. A part starts at its working state and for various reasons changes 
to a failed state after a certain time. The time to failure is considered a random variable 
that we can model by a failure-distribution function.184 
Failure occurs due to a complex set of interactions between the material properties 
and/or physical properties of the part and/or stresses that act on the part. The failure 
process is complex and is different for different types of parts or elements or 
components.185 
The strength or endurance of a part may be significantly and unpredictably varied 
because of manufacturing variability. So that strength, say “X”, must be modeled as a 
random variable. When the system is being used it is subjected to a stress, say “Y”. If 
“X” is less than “Y”, then the part fails immediately because its strength is not enough to 
withstand the magnitude of stress “Y”. If “Y” is less than “X”, then the strength of that 
part is enough to withstand the stress and the part is functional. 
Even though the failure mechanisms vary, they are basically divided into two 
categories, the overstress and the wear-out. The overstress failures are those due to 
fracture, yielding, buckling, large elastic deformation, electrical overstress, and thermal 
breakdown. Wear-out failures are those due to wear, corrosion, metal migration, inter-
diffusion, fatigue-crack propagation, diffusion, radiation, fatigue-crack initiation and 
creep.186 
For multi-component systems like a SUAV the number of parts may be very large 
and a multilevel decomposition of such a system is necessary. 
4. Reliability Modeling 
a. System Failures187 
System failures for a multi-component system can be modeled in several 
ways. A system failure is due to the failure of at least one of its components. So analysis 
                                                 
184 Hoyland, page 18. 
185 Pecht, page 93. 
186 Ibid, page 96. 
187 The material from this section is taken (in some places verbatim) from: Blischke, pages 204-205. 
200 
of failures at the component level is the initial point of a failure system analysis. “Henley 
and Kumamoto (1981) propose the following classification of failures: 
(1) Primary failure 
(2) Secondary failure 
(3) Command fault”  
Primary or “natural” is when the component fails due to natural causes 
like aging. In that case, replacement of the aging component is the remedy.  
Secondary or “induced” is the failure of a component due to excessive 
stress resulting from the primary failure of some other component(s) and/or 
environmental factors and/or user actions.  
“Command fault occurs when a component is in not working state because 
of improper control signals or noise.” This can be due to a user’s faulty operation or a 
logic controller’s faulty operation signal. 
b. Independent vs Dependent Failures188  
The failure times of components are often influenced by environmental 
conditions. As the environment becomes “harsher, the time it takes to reach a failure 
decreases.” Thus if the system’s components share the same environment their failure 
times are statistically dependent. If the dependence is weak, it can be ignored and failure 
times can be treated as statistically independent. In that way failure times can be modeled 
separately using univariate failure-distribution functions. But in case of significant 
dependence, multivariate failure distributions must be used and modeling becomes much 
more complicated. 
c. Black-Box Modeling189 
A system failure is due to the failure of one or more of its components. 
“The number of failed components that must be restored to their working state is usually 
small relative to the total number” of the system’s components. Replacing or repairing 
the defective component(s) restores the system to its operational state. If the restoration 
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time is very small relative to the mean time between failures, then it can be ignored, and 
we can model the failure system as a function reflecting the effect of age. In other words, 
the model function can be viewed as the failure rate of the system through time.  
After overhauls or major repairs or design alterations the failure rate of the 
system can be significantly reduced. Usually, it becomes smaller than the failure rate 
before.  
Therefore, in black-box modeling we can collect data through the life 
cycle time of a system and find a function that is the failure rate through time. A lot of 
data is needed in order for the function to be precisely estimated, so black-box modeling 
is not recommended for the design and development phase of a system because of the 
changes that continuously alter the failure rate.  
d. White-Box Modeling190 
“In a white-box modeling, system failure is modeled in terms of the 
failures of the components of the system.” We can reach system failures from component 
failures using the bottom-up (or forward) approach or the top-down (or backwards) 
approach. In the forward approach, we start with part-level failures, and then we proceed 
to the system level to evaluate the consequences of such failures on the system’s 
performance. FMEA uses this approach. In the backward approach, we start at the system 
level failures, and then we proceed downward to the part level to relate pure-system 
performance to part-level failures. FTA uses this approach. 
“The linking of the system performance to failures at the part level can be 
done either qualitatively or quantitatively.” In the qualitative case, we are interested in the 
causal relations between failures and system performance. In the quantitative case, we 
can use many measures of system effectiveness, like reliability, in terms of component 
reliabilities.  
For an example assuming independent failures, if a machine has a failure 
rate of 1 failure every 100 days then the probability of having a failure on any day is 
1/100. If a second redundant machine has the same failure rate, then a system that 
                                                 
190 Blischke, pages 206-207. 
202 
consists of both those machines has a probability that both machines fail on the same day 
as 1/100 squared or 1/10,000. 
e. Reliability Measures191  
In order to understand the reliability measures, we must determine the 
“time-to-failure” as a basic step. Time-to-failure of a system or component or part or unit 
or element (system) is the time elapsing from when the system is put into operation until 
the first failure. Let t=0, the operation starting time. The time to failure is subject to many 
variables. Consequently, we can represent time-to-failure as a random variable T. We can 
describe the condition or state of the system at time t by the condition random variable 
X(t) where 
1 if the system is functioning at           
( )
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Figure 42.   Condition Variable Versus Time.(From Hoyland, page 18) 
 
The time-to-failure may not always be measured in time but can also be 
measured in numbers of repetitions of operation, or distance of operation, or number of 
rotations of a bearing, etc. We can assume that the time-to-failure T is continuously 
distributed with a probability density f(t) and distribution function : 
                                                 




( ) ( ) ( )    for 0F t P T t f u du t= ≤ = >∫ . 
The probability density f(t) is defined as : 
0 0
( ) ( ) ( )( ) ( ) lim lim
t t
d F t t F t P t T t tf t F t
dt t t∆ → ∆ →
+ ∆ − < ≤ + ∆= = =∆ ∆ . 
If ∆t is small then: 
( ) ( )f t t P t T t t⋅∆ = < ≤ + ∆ . 
A typical distribution function F(t) and the corresponding density function 











Figure 43.   Distribution and Probability Density Functions (From Hoyland, page 18) 
 
There are three important measures of reliability: 
(1) The reliability or survivor function R(t) 
(2) The failure rate z(t) 
(3) The mean time to failure (MTTF) 
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(1).  Reliability or Survivor Function R(t). The reliability function 
of a system is defined as: 
( ) 1 ( ) ( ) for 0R t F t P T t t= − = > > .                                             (A) 
So R(t) is the probability that the system has operated without 
failure in the time interval (0,t]. Equivalently we can say that R(t) is the probability that 
the unit survives in the time interval (0,t]. The reliability function R(t) is also called the 
“survivor function”. A typical reliability function that corresponds to the distribution 












   
   
   
   
   





Figure 44.   Typical Distribution and Reliability Function 
 
(2).  Failure-rate or Hazard Function.  The probability that a system 
will fail in the time interval (t, t+∆t], given that it is in operating condition at time t, is 
( ) ( ) ( )( | )
( ) ( )
P t T t t F t t F tP t T t t T t
P T t R t
< ≤ + ∆ + ∆ −< ≤ + ∆ > = => . 
Failure-rate z(t) is the limit as 0t∆ →  of probability that a system will fail in the interval 
(t, t+∆t], given that it is in operating condition at time t, per unit length of time. If this 
unit length of time approaches 0, then we have the following expression for the failure 
rate:
0 0
( | ) ( ) ( ) 1( ) lim lim
( )t t
P t T t t T t F t t F tz t
t t R t∆ → ∆ →





=  (B)                              
because it is known that 
0
( ) ( )( ) lim
t
F t t F tf t
t∆ →
+ ∆ −= ∆  or equivalently    
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( ) ( )df t F t
dt
= .                                                                            (C) 
From the above it is implied that when ∆t is small: 
( | ) ( )P t T t t T t z t t< ≤ + ∆ > ≈ ⋅∆ . So the conditional probability is approximately equal to 
the failure rate z(t) at time t, times the length of the interval ∆t. 
From (A) and (C) we get: ( ) (1 ( )) '( )df t R t R t
dt
= − = − . 
So (B) becomes: 
1
0
'( )( ) ln ( )  since R(0)=1, ( ) ln ( )
( )
R t dz t R t z t dt R t
R t dt







−∫= . Finally we have: 
0 0
( ) ( )
( ) '( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
t t
z u du z u dudf t R t e f t z t e
dt
− −∫ ∫= − = − ⇔ = , t>0. 
So the failure-rate or hazard function is very useful for modeling, 
because everything else can be derived from that. 
In the following table the relationships between the distribution 
function F(t), the density function f(t), the reliability or survivor function R(t), and the 
failure-rate or hazard function z(t) are presented.192  
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Table 32. Relationships Between Functions F(t), R(t), f(t), z(t) (From Hoyland, page 22) 
 
For the most mechanical and electronic systems the failure rate 
over the life of the system has three discrete periods, characterized by the well known 
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Figure 45.   The Bathtub Curve 
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Infant mortality is the first phase of the bathtub curve where the 
failure rate is high because of early manufacturing tolerances and inadequate 
manufacturing skills. The failure rate is decreasing through time because of the maturity 
of the design and the manufacturing process. Useful life is the second phase, which is 
characterized as a relative constant failure rate. Wear-out is the last phase where 
components start to deteriorate to such a degree that they have reached the end of their 
useful life. This can be modeled either piece-wise or as the sum of three failure-rate or 
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These concepts are illustrated in Figure 45. 
(3).  Mean-Time-to-Failure (MTTF).  The MTTF of a system is the 
expected value of T, which is given by the density function f(t) and is defined as: 
0
( ) ( )MTTF E T tf t dt
∞
= = ∫ .                                                                                           (D) 
If the time needed to repair or replace a failed system is very short 
relative to MTTF, then the mean time between failures (MTBF) is represented by MTTF. 
If the repair time is comparable to MTTF, then the MTBF also includes the mean time to 
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Figure 46.   MTTF, MTTR, MTBF. (From Hoyland, page 25) 
 
Because f(t)=-R’(t) (D) becomes : 
0
0 0 0
( )'( ) [ ( )] ( ) ,  by partial integrationdR tMTTF tR t dt t dt tR t R t dt
dt
∞ ∞ ∞
∞= − = − = − +∫ ∫ ∫ , and if 
MTTF < ∞  which is what is happening in reality, then 0[ ( )] 0tR t ∞− =  and so 
0
( )MTTF R t dt
∞
= ∫  also.                                                                                              (E) 
f. Structure Functions  
The system and each component may only be in one of two states, 
operable or failed. Let xi indicate the state of component i, for 1 i n≤ ≤  , and 
1 if component  works
0 if component  failedi
i
ix
⎧= ⎨⎩  where 1 2( , ,... )nx x x=x  is the component state vector. 
The state of the system is also a binary random variable, which is 
determined by the states of its components. 
{1 if system works0 if system failed( ) system stateΦ =Φ = =x , and 
1 2( ) ( , ,... )nx x xΦ =Φ =Φx  is the structure function of the system.194 
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A series system with n components, works if and only if each of its n 
components work, and fails whenever any of its components fails. The structure function 









⋅ ⋅ =Φ =Φ = ⋅ ∏x 195. 
It cannot usually be predicted with certainty whether or not a given 
component will be in a failed state after t time units. So we interpret the state variables of 
the n components at time t as random variables, and we denote them 
as 1 2( ), ( ), ( )... nt t tX X X . 
Now we focus on the following probabilities: 
( ( ) 1) ( ) for 1,2,...iiP t p t i nX = = = , which is the component’s i reliability, 
and ( ( )) 1) ( )( sP t p tX = =Φ , which is the system’s reliability. 
For the state variables ( )i tX  for 1,2,...i n= , we have 
( ) [ ( )] 0 ( ( ) 0) 1 ( ( ) 1),  for 1,2,...i i iip t t P t P t i nX X X= Ε = ⋅ = + ⋅ = =  
For the system reliability at time t, we have: 
( ) [ ( ))](Xsp t t= Ε Φ  where 1 2( ) ( ( ), ( ), ( ))X ... nt t t tX X X= , 
Assuming that 1 2( ), ( ), ( )... nt t tX X X  are independent, the system 
reliability is 
1




sp t p t
=








=∏ , where R(t) is the 
system’s reliability and ri(t) is the ith component’s reliability for a series system.196 
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g. Series System Reliability Function and MTTF197 
From Table 32 we find the failure rate function for the system is 
1 2( ) ln( ( )) ln( ( ) ( ) ( ))n
d dz t R t r t r t r t
dt dt
= − = − + + ⋅⋅⋅+  
which is 1 2( ) ( ) ( ) ( )nz t z t z t z t= + + ⋅⋅⋅+ . 
So the failure rate for a series system equals the sum of the failure rates of 
all its components. As a result, the failure rate of the system is greater than the failure rate 
of any of its components, and the whole system is driven by the worst component, which 
is the one with the larger failure rate or the least reliability. 
From the above, we can conclude that if we want to optimize a series 
system reliability, we must reduce the number of the components, and if that is not 
possible, then we must enhance the reliability for the worst component. 
For example, and to simplify, we may assume that each of the components 
in our system has an exponential lifetime distribution. Then the system also has an 
exponential lifetime distribution. If ( )i iz t λ=  is the failure rate for component i, then the 






Z t λ λ
=
= =∑ , and the reliability function of the system 
becomes: ( ) s tR t e λ− ⋅= . Then (E) becomes: 
0
1/s ts sMTTF e dt
λ λ
∞
− ⋅= =∫ . 
h. Quantitative Measures of Availability 
The quantitative measures of availability are listed in the following 
table.198 
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A =     Assures operation under declared conditions in an ideal customer service 
environment. 












A =     Extends Ai to include delays    Reflects the real world operating 
environment 
   Not specified as a manufacturer-
controllable requirement  
MTBF = Mean Time between Failure 
MTTR = Mean Time to Repair 
MTBM = Mean Time between Maintenance 
MTTRactive = Mean Time to Repair 
MDT = Mean Downtime 
(corrective maintenance only) 
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APPENDIX E:  LIST OF ACRONYMS AND DEFINITIONS 
 
AAV - Advanced Air Vehicle 
ACTD - Advance Concept Technology Demonstrations 
AEA - American Engineering Association  
APU - Auxiliary Power Units  
ATA - Air Transport Association  
BDA - Battle Damage Assessment 
BS - British Standard  
CAA/UK - Civil Aviation Administration from the UK  
CHAE - Conventional High-Altitude Endurance 
CP – Counter-proliferation 
DARPA - Defence Advanced Research Projects Agency 
DS - Discard  
EO - Electro-Optical 
EPRI - Electric Power Research Institute  
ERAST - Environmental Research Aircraft and Sensor Technology 
FAA - Federal Aviation Authority 
FMA - Failure Mode Analysis  
FMCA - Failure Mode and Critical Analysis  
FMEA - Failure Mode and Effect Analysis  
FMECA - Failure Mode Effect and Criticality Analysis 
FRACAS – Failure Reporting And Corrective Action System 
214 
FTA - Fault Tree Analysis  
GCS – Ground Control Station 
GPS - Global Positioning System 
HAE - High-Altitude Endurance 
ICAO - International Civil Aviation Organization  
IN/FC - Inspection/Functional Check  
INS – Inertial Navigation System 
IR - Infrared 
ISC - Industry Steering Committee  
ISO - International Standard Organization  
JSF - Joint Strike Fighter 
L/HIRF - Lightning/High Intensity Radiated Field  
LOS - Line-Of-Sight 
LU/SV - Lubrication/Servicing  
MAV - Micro-Air Vehicle 
MDT - Mean Downtime 
MR - Mishap Rate 
MRB - Maintenance Review Board  
MRBR - Maintenance Review Board Report  
MSG-3 - Maintenance Steering Group-3  
MSI - Maintenance Significant Items  
MTBCF - Mean Time Between Critical Failure 
MTBF - Mean Time Between Failure 
MTBM - Mean Time between Maintenance 
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MTTR - Mean Time to Repair 
MUAV - Micro UAV 
NASA - National Aeronautics and Space Administration  
NAWC/AD - Naval Air Warfare Centre Aircraft Division 
NPS – Naval Postgraduate School 
NRL - Naval Research Laboratory 
O&S - Operation and Support  
OBC - Onboard Computer  
OBC - Onboard Computer 
OP/VC - Operational/Visual Check  
OTHT - Over The Horizon Targeting 
PM - Planned Maintenance  
QFD - Quality Function Deployment  
RC - Radio Control 
RCM - Reliability Centered Maintenance  
RECCE - Reconnaissance mission 
RPN - Risk Priority Number  
RPV - Remote Piloted Vehicles  
RS - Restoration  
RSTA - Reconnaissance Surveillance and Target Acquisition 
SAE - Society of the Automotive Engineers 
SAR - Synthetic Aperture Radar 
SARP - Standards and Recommended Practices  
SEAD - Suppression of the Enemy Air Defences 
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SIGINT – Signal Intelligence 
SSI - Structural Significant Items  
STAN - Surveillance and Tactical Acquisition Network 
SUAV - Small Unmanned Aerial Vehicle 
TAAF - Test, Analyze and Fix 
TR - Tactical Reconnaissance 
TUAV - Tactical UAV 
UCAV - Unmanned Combat Aerial Vehicle 
UHF - Ultra High Frequency 
VR - Vendor Recommendations  
VTOL - Vertical Take-Off and Landing 
WG - Working Group  
 
217 
 LIST OF REFERENCES 
Air Transport Association of America, “ATA MSG-3, Operator/Manufacturer 
Scheduled Maintenance Development, Revision 2002.1,” November 30, 2001. 
Aladon Ltd, Specialists in the application of Reliability-Centered Maintenance, 
“Reliability Centred Maintenance-An Introduction,” Internet, February 2004. Available 
at: www.aladon.co.uk/10intro.html 
Aladon Ltd, Specialists in the application of Reliability-Centered Maintenance, 
“About RCM,” Internet, February 2004. Available at: www.aladon.co.uk/02rcm.html 
Ashworth, Peter, LCDR, Royal Australian Navy, Sea Power Centre, Working 
Paper No6, “UAVs and the Future Navy”, May 2001, Internet, February 2004. Available 
at: http://www.navy.gov.au/spc/workingpapers/Working%20Paper%206.pdf 
Athos Corporation, Reliability-Centered Maintenance Consulting, “SAE RCM 
Standard: JA 1011, Evaluation Criteria for RCM Process,” Internet, February 2004. 
Available at: http://www.athoscorp.com/SAE-RCMStandard.html 
Barfield, Finley, Automated Air Collision Avoidance Program, Air Force 
Research Laboratory, AFRL/VACC, WPAFB,“Autonomous Collision Avoidance: the 
Technical Requirements,” 0-7803-6262-4/00/$10.00(c)2000 IEEE. 
Blischke, R. W., and Murthy D. N. Prabhakar, Reliability Modeling, Prediction, 
and Optimization, John Wiley & Sons, 2000. 
Carmichael, Bruce W., Col (Sel), Troy E. DeVine, Maj, Robert J. Kaufman, Maj, 
Patrick E. Pence, Maj, and Richard S. Wilcox, Maj, “Strikestar 2025,” August 1996, 
Department of Defense, Internet, February 2004. Available at: http://www.au.af.mil 
/au/2025/volume3 /chap13/v3c13-2.htm 
Ciufo, Chris A., “UAVs:New Tools for the Military Toolbox,” [66] COTS 
Journal, June 2003, Internet, May 2004. Available at: http://www.cotsjournalonline.com 
/2003/66 
218 
Clade, Lt Col, USAF, “Unmanned Aerial Vehicles: Implications for Military 
Operations,” July 2000, Occasional Paper No. 16 Center for Strategy and Technology, 
Air War College, Air University, Maxwell Air Force Base. 
Clark, Richard M., Lt Col, USAF, “Uninhabited Combat Aerial Vehicles, 
Airpower by the People, For the People, But Not with the People,” CADRE Paper No. 8, 
Air University Press, Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama, August 2000, Internet, February 
2004. Available at: http://www.maxwell.af.mil/au/aupress/CADRE_Papers/PDF_Bin 
/clark.pdf 
Clarke, Phill, “Letter to the Editor of New Engineer Magazine regarding Professor 
David Sherwin at ICOMS 2000,” question 10, August 2000, Internet, May 2004. 
Available at: http://www.assetpartnership.com /downloads.htm-13k 
Clough, Bruce, “UAVS-You Want Affordability and Capability? Get 
Autonomy!” Air Force Research Laboratory, 2003. 
Coker, David, and Geoffrey Kuhlmann, “Tactical-Unmanned Aerial Vehicle 
‘Shadow 200’ (T_UAV),” Internet, February 2004. Available at: 
http://www.isye.gatech.edu/~tg /cources/6219/assign /fall2002/TUAVRedesign/ 
Department of Defense, Director of Operational Test & Evaluation, “Missile 
Defense and Related Programs FY 1997 Annual Report,” February 1998, Internet, 
February 2004. Available at: http://www.fas.org/spp/starwars/program/dote97/97cp.html 
Department of Defense, MIL-STD-1629A, “Procedures For Performing a Failure 
Mode Effects and Criticality Analysis,” Task 101 FMEA sheet, November 24, 1980. 
Dixon, Stephen R., and Christopher D. Wickens, “Control of multiple UAVs: A 
Workload Analysis,” University of Illinois, Aviation Human Factors Division, Presented 
to 12th International Symposium on Aviation Psychology, Dayton, Ohio 2003. 
Duane, J. J., “Learning Curve Approach to Reliability Modeling,” Institute of 
Electrical and Electronic Engineers Transactions on Aerospace and Electronic Systems 
(IEEE. Trans. Aerospace 2563), 1964. 
219 
Fei-Bin, Hsiao, Meng-Tse Lee, Wen-Ying Chang, Cheng-Chen Yang, Kuo-Wei 
Lin, Yi-Feng Tsai, and Chun-Ron Wy, ICAS 2002, 23rd International Congress of 
Aeronautical Sciences, proceedings, Toronto Canada, 8 to 13 September 2002, Article: 
“The Development of a Low Cost Autonomous UAV System”, Institute of Aeronautics 
National Cheng Kung University Tainan, TAIWAN ROC. 
GlobalSecurity.org, “Pioneer Short Range (SR) UAV,” maintained by John Pike, 
last modified: November 20, 2002, Internet, May 2004. Available at: http://www. 
globalssecurity.org/intell/systems/pioneer.htm 
GlobalSecurity.org, “RQ-3 Dark Star Tier III Minus,” maintained by John Pike, 
last modified: November 20, 2002, Internet, May 2004. Available at: Available at: 
http://www.globalsecurity.org /intell/systems/darkstar.htm 
Goebel, Greg,/ In the Public Domain, “[6.0] US Battlefield UAVs (1),” January 1, 
2003, Internet, February 2004. Available at: http://www.vectorsite. net/twuav6.html 
Gottfried, Russell, LCDR (USN), Unmanned Vehicle Integration TACMEMO, 5-6 
May Recap, e-mail May 7, 2004. 
Hoivik, Thomas H., OA-4603 Test and Evaluation Lecture Notes, Version 5.5, 
“The Role of Test and Evaluation,” presented at NPS, winter quarter 2004. 
Hoyland, A., and Rausand, M., System Reliability Theory: Models and Statistics 
Methods, New York: John Wiley and Sons, 1994. 
Kececioglu, D., Reliability Engineering Handbook Volume 2, Prentice Hall Inc., 
1991. 
Kuo, W., and Zuo, J. M., Optimal Reliability Modeling, John Wiley & Sons, 
2003. 
Lewis E. E., Introduction to Reliability Engineering, Second Edition, John Wiley 
& Sons, 1996, pages 211-212. 
Lopez, Ramon, American Institute of Aeronautics and Astronautics (AIAA), 
“Avoiding Collisions in the Age of UAVs,” Aerospace America, June 2002, Internet, 
220 
February 2004. Available at: http://www.aiaa.org/aerospace /Article.cfm? 
issuetocid=223&ArchiveIssueID=27 
McDermott, E. R., Mikulak, J. R, and Beauregard, R. M., The Basics of FMEA, 
Productivity Inc., 1996. 
Meeker, Q. W., and Escobar, A. L., Statistical Methods for Reliability Data, John 
Wiley & Sons Inc., 1998. 
Message from COMMMNAVAIRSYSCOM to HQ USSOCOM MACDILL AFB 
FL, March 26, 2004, “UAV Interim Flight Clearance for XPV-1B TERN UAV System, 
Land Based Concept of Operation Flights.” 
Morris, Jefferson, Aerospace Daily, December 8, 2003, “Navy To Use Wasp 
Micro Air Vehicle To Conduct Littoral Surveillance.” 
Moubray, John, summarized by Sandy Dunn, Plant Maintenance Resource Center, 
“Maintenance Task Selection-Part 3,” Revised September 18, 2002, Internet, May 2004. 
Available at: http://www.plant-maintenance.com/articles/maintenance_tak_selection_ 
part2.shtml 
Moubray, John, an excerpt of the first chapter of the book “Reliability-centered 
Maintenance,” Plant Maintenance Resource Center, “Introduction to Reliability-centered 
Maintenance,” Revised December 3, 2002, Internet, May 2004, Available at: 
http://www.plant-maintenance.com/RCM-intro.shtml 
Munro, Cameron and Petter Krus, AIAA’s 1st Technical Conference & Workshop 
on Unmanned Aerospace Vehicles, Systems, Technologies and Operations; a Collection 
of Technical Papers, AIAA 2002-3451,“A Design Approach for Low cost ‘Expendable’ 
UAV system,” undated. 
Nakata, Dave, White paper, “Can Safe Aircraft and MSG-3 Coexist in an Airline 
Maintenance Program?”, Sinex Aviation Technologies, 2002, Internet, May 2004. 
Available at: http://www.sinex.com/ products/Infonet/q8.htm 
National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA), “Preferred Reliability 
Practices: Problem Reporting and Corrective Action System (PRACAS),” practice NO. 
221 
PD-ED-1255, Internet, February 2004. Available at: http://klabs.org/DEI /References 
/design_guidelines/design_series/1255ksc .pdf 
National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA), “Reliability Centered 
Maintenance & Commissioning,” February 16, 2000, Internet, May 2004. Available at: 
http://www.hq.nasa.gov/office/codej/codejx/Intro2.pdf 
National Air and Space Museum, Smithsonian Institution, “Pioneer RQ-2A,” 
1998-2000, revised 9/14/01 Connor R. and Lee R. E., Internet, May 2004. Available at: 
http://www.nasm.si.edu /research/aero/aircraft/pioneer.htm 
NAVAIR, “Small Unmanned Aerial Vehicles,” undated, Internet, February 2004. 
Available at: http://uav.navair.navy.mil/smuav/smuav_home.htm 
Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD), “Unmanned Aerial Vehicles Roadmap 
2000-2025,” April 2001. 
Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD), “Unmanned Aerial Vehicles Roadmap 
2002-2027,” December 2002. 
Pecht, M., Product Reliability Maintainability and Supportability Handbook, 
CRC Press, 1995. 
Peck, Michael, National Defense Magazine, May 2003, Feature Article, 
“Pentagon Unhappy About Drone Aircraft Reliability, Rising Mishap Rates of Unmanned 
Vehicles Attributed to Rushed Deployments,” Internet, February 2004. Available at: 
http://www. nationaldefensemagazine.org/article. cfm?Id=1105 
Petrie, G., Geo Informatics, Article “Robotic Aerial Platforms for Remote 
Sensing,” Department of Geography &Topographic Science, University of Glasgow, 
May 2001, Internet, February 2004. Available at: http://web.geog.gla.ac.uk /~gpetrie 
/12_17_petrie.pdf 
Pike, John, Intelligence Resource Program, “Unmanned Aerial Vehicles 
(UAVS),” Internet, March 2004. Available at: http://www.fas.org/irp/program/collect/ua 
222 
Puscov, Johan, “Flight System Implementation,” Sommaren-Hosten 2002, Royal 
Institute of Technology (KTH), Internet, February 2004. Available at:  http://www. 
particle.kth.se/group_docs/admin /2002/Johan_2t.pdf 
Regan, Nancy, RCM Team Leader, Naval Air Warfare Center, Aircraft Division, 
“US Naval Aviation Implements RCM,” undated, Internet, February 2004. Available at: 
http://www.mt-online.com/articles/0302_navalrcm.cfm 
Reliability Analysis Center (RAC), Failure Mode, Effects and Criticality Analysis 
(FMECA), 1993. 
Reliability Analysis Center (RAC), Fault Tree Analysis (FTA) Application Guide, 
1990. 
Reliability Analysis Center (RAC), Reliability Toolkit: Commercial Practices 
Edition. A Practical Guide for Commercial Products and Military Systems Under 
Acquisition Reform, 2004. 
Riebeling, Sandy, Redstone Rocket Article, Volume 51, No.28, “Unmanned Aerial 
Vehicles,” July 17, 2002, Col. Burke John, Unmanned Aerial Vehicle Systems project 
manager, Internet, February 2004. Available at: http://www.tuav.redstone.army.mil 
/rsa_article.htm 
Robinson, John, Technical Specialist Mercury Computers, COTS Journal, “UAV 
Multi-Mission Payloads Demand a Flexible Common Processor,” June 2003, Internet, 
February 2004. Available at:  http://www.mc.com/literature/literature_files/COTSJ 
_UAVs_6-03.pdf 
Sakamoto, Norm, presentation: “UAVs, Past Present and Future,” Naval 
Postgraduate School, February 26, 2004. 
Stamatis, D. H., Failure Mode and Effect Analysis: FMEA from Theory to 
Execution, American Society for Quality (ASQ), 1995. 
Sullivan, Carol, Kellogg, James, Peddicord, Eric, Naval Research Lab, January 
2002, Draft of “Initial Sea All Shipboard Experimentation.” 
223 
Teets, Edward H., Casey J. Donohue, Ken Underwood, and Jeffrey E. Bauer, 
National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA), NASA/TM-1998-206541, 
“Atmospheric Considerations for UAV Flight Test Planning,” January 1998, Internet, 
February 2004. Available at: http://www.dfrc.nasa.gov /DTRS/1998/PDF/H-2220.pdf 
The Global Aircraft Organization, US Reconnaissance, “U-2 Dragon Lady,” 
Internet, February 2004. Available at: http://www.globalaircraft.org/planes/u-2 
_dragon_lady.pl 
The Warfighter’s Encyclopedia, Aircraft, UAVs, “RQ-2 Pioneer,” August 14, 
2003, Internet, February 2004. Available at: http://www.wrc.chinalake. navy.mil 
/warfighter_enc/aircraft/UAVs/pioneer .htm 
Tozer, Tim, David Grace, John Thompson, and Peter Baynham, “UAVs and 
HAPs-Potential Convergence for Military Communications,” Univercity of York, DERA 
Defford, undated, Internet, February 2004. Available at: http://www.elec.york.ac.uk 
/comms/papers/tozer00_ieecol.pdf 
Transport Canada Civil Aviation (TCCA), Maintenance Instruction Development 
Process, TP 13850, Part B, “The Maintenance Review Board (MRB) Process (TP 13850), 
Chapter 1. General,” last updated: April 19, 2003, Internet, February 2004. Available at: 
http://www.tc.gc.ca/civilaviation /maintenance/aarpd/tp13850/partB.htm 
UAV Annual Report FY 1997: Subsystems, Key subsystem program, “UAV 
common recovery system (UCARS),” Internet, February 2004. Available at: 
http://www.fas.org/irp/agency/daro/uav97 /page36.html 
UAV Rolling News, “New UAV work for Dryden in 2004,” June 12, 2003, 
Internet, February 2004. Available at: http://www.uavworld.com /_disc1/00000068.htm 
UAV Rolling News, “UAV Roadmap defines reliability objectives,” March 18, 
2003, Internet, February 2004. Available at: http://www.uavworld.com/_disc1 /0000002 
Undated message from Commander, Cruiser Destroyer Group 12 to Commander, 
Second Fleet, “Urgent Requirement for UAVs in Support of Enterprise Battle Group 
Recognized Maritime Picture.” 
224 
Williams Warren, and Michael Harris, “The Challenges of Flight –Testing 
Unmanned Air Vehicles,” Systems Engineering, Test & Evaluation Conference, Sydney, 
Australia, October 2002. 
Zachany, Bathon A., Marine Forces Reserve, “Unmanned Aerial Vehicles Help 
3/14 Call For and Adjust Fire,” Story ID Number: 2001411104010, April 5, 2001, 
Internet, February 2004. Available at: http://www.13meu.usmc. mil/marinelink 
/mcn2000.nsf/Open document. 
225 
INITIAL DISTRIBUTION LIST 
1. Defense Technical Information Center 
Ft. Belvoir, VA  
 
2. Dudley Knox Library 
Naval Postgraduate School 
Monterey, CA 
 
3. Dr. Dave Olwell (2) 
NPS, (Code OR-OL) 
Monterey, CA 
 
4. Dr. David W. Netzer 
NPS, (Code 09) 
Monterey, CA 
 
5. Dr. Mike McCauley 
NPS, (Code OR) 
Monterey, CA 
 
6. Dr. Thomas Hoivik 
NPS, (Code OR) 
Monterey, CA 
 
7. Gottfried Russell, LCDR 
NPS, (Code OR) 
Monterey, CA 
 
8. CDR DonVarner, Air 4.1.1.5 
UAV Class Desk, PMA-263, NAVAIR 
Patuxent River, MD  
 
9. Brad Johnson, Code 4.1.1.5 
PMA-263, NAVAIR 
Patuxent River, MD 
 
10. Brannan Joe D., Code 4.1.1.5 
Fire scout Class Desk 
Patuxent River, MD 
 
11. Sorensen Dennis, Capt, 
3029 Jeannie Anna Ct, 
Oak Hill, Va 20171 
 
